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ABSTRACT
Essays on a Monopolist’s Product Choice and its Effect on Social Welfare. (August
2012)
Sung Ick Cho, B.A., Seoul National University;
M.A., Seoul National University; M.A., University of Rochester
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Steven Wiggins
This dissertation builds on earlier works by analyzing the provision of product quality
by a monopolist and comparing that to a social planner. This paper extends the
analysis of this problem to the discrete quality setting. Earlier works focused on a
continuum of qualities and found no quality distortion for the highest qualities, but
downward quality distortion for lower qualities.
The results in the discrete setting differ in that there can be an upward distortion
of qualities provided by the monopolist for the highest qualities. The key to this
distortion is that the monopolist focuses on the profit that can be extracted from
the group of consumers that value quality the most. When there are neither too
many nor only a few of these consumers relative to other market segments, it can
lead the monopolist to bias its quality provision to extract more value from the these
consumers. This effect distorts quality at the high-end as compared to the social
planner. This upward distortion of quality is found in the real world. In Texas,
30.6% of cable service providers offers an upward distorted service for higher taste
consumers.
Besides the quality issue, I also examine how consumer distributions affect on
price, profit, and social welfare. Under the various hypothetical consumer distribu-
tions, I simulate the above values, and I observe the effect of distribution changes.
iv
When I apply this tool to the real data from Texas cable service industry, I can simu-
late the consumer type distribution in each franchise, and I can construct the demand
curve. Finding consumer type distribution is the key for the demand estimation in
this structure.
vTo my Parents, Wonhee, and So-Yeon
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, I analyze a monopolist’s product quality choice. We can
find many firms, including a monopolist, which produce several products of different
qualities. For instances, Microsoft produces 6 different editions of Windows 7 and Intel
lists three different versions for 2nd Generation Intel R© CoreTM i7 Extreme Processor.
Obviously, both Microsoft and Intel might choose a quality, as well as a price, for
each edition or version strategically, considering market responses.
In fact, we have a long research history for the multi-product monopolist, in both
sides of theoretical and empirical literature. Since two seminal works of Mussa and
Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984), numerous have investigated properties
of products’ qualities, prices, and their market shares. However, only a few papers
consider monopolist’s quality choice explicitly. Many works, including Mussa and
Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984), do not need to care about the endoge-
nous quality problem, because they assume a continuous quality provision by the
monopolist, so all possible qualities are provided after all. Other works, adopting a
finite provision of products, just ignore the problem; they assume exogenously given
quality levels. In this dissertation, I try to solve the endogenous quality selections by
the monopolist.
When introducing various qualities of products, it is natural to consider different
tastes of consumers on qualities. Mussa and Rosen (1978) introduces heterogenous
consumers focusing on their responses on quality improvement. Some consumers were
This dissertation follows the style of Econometrica.
2supposed gladly to pay a big additional amount for the improvement of product qual-
ity, while others were reluctant to pay a sizable money. Targeting these consumers,
the monopolist, which Mussa and Rosen (1978) considered, could get a bigger profit
if it could offer a products catalog with various quality and price combinations. Tech-
nically, we have two different ways to introduce consumer heterogeneity. The first one
is to consider only finite number of different types and the second one is a continuum
of types.
Except Crawford and Shum (2007), every work adopting a continuum of con-
sumer types does not consider a case that the monopolist is restricted to a finite
number of products. In the real world, it is very difficult to find a firm which offers
a perfect customization to its customers. One possible reason can be a fixed cost
to introduce a new production line. Then, infinite addition of production lines will
not be profitable. Besides, some psychology works argue that consumers are usu-
ally overwhelmed by tremendous choices. The limited set of offered products can
be demanded ironically by consumers. Here, I consider the finite products by the
monopolist having the continuous consumer types.
This dissertation’s finite product differentiation model with the continuous con-
sumer types can endogenize both the monopolist’s quality choices for its products and
the market share for each product. As I explained before, the continuous product dif-
ferentiation with the continuous consumer types cannot endogenize the product qual-
ity. When we take the finite product differentiation with the finite consumer types,
the model must take exogenous market shares. It is because the probability for each
consumer type is given as primitive, and the given probability results in the market
share for a product that aims at the consumer type. That is, this dissertation models
the situation in which each product’s market share is determined by its quality, and
the monopolist chooses its product quality considering the product’s expected market
3share.
In the remaining part of the first chapter, I present an extensive literature review.
The review categorizes the existing works into three groups, using the cardinality
of provided products and consumer taste types. This taxonomy is quite useful to
understand which variables are endogenized or interested in the literature.
In the second chapter, I will construct the endogenous product differentiation
problem by both a monopolist and a social planner, in the finite products with the
continuous consumer types environment.
First, the chapter arranges optimality conditions for the monopolist. I reproduce
the results of Itoh (1983) regarding the optimal pricing scheme and Crawford and
Shum (2007) about the optimal quality selection rule. In the quality selection rule,
the average marginal benefit of consumers is greater than the increment of marginal
cost when improving a quality. It looks similar to the monopolist’s optimal pricing
scheme obtained in the only quantity relevant setting.
I show that the famous hazard rate assumption1 plays an important role in the
uniqueness of monopolist’s solution. It was a crucial assumption for the monotone
quality and price schedule, in the works of the continuous product provision with the
continuous consumer types.
Second, I reveal optimality conditions for a social planner. The optimality condi-
tions, with zero fixed cost, require the social planner to charge a tariff at the marginal
cost, simply equating the tariff to get a product to the marginal cost to produce it.
For the quality and the market segmentation, the social planner should equate the
average marginal benefit of consumers and the increment of marginal cost when im-
proving a quality.
1The derivative of an inverse hazard rate should be less than 1.
4After completing the monopolist’s and the social planner’s optimality conditions,
I develop numerical computation simulation procedures, which find exact optimal
(quality and price) values from the optimality conditions. The simulation method and
outcomes obtained from the various simulations are discussed in the third chapter.
There, I find possibility of the upward quality distortion for a product aiming at
a consumer with the highest taste, comparing the monopolist’s optimal choices and
the social best outcomes. This is a quite new discovery, which cannot be obtained in
any canonical models of both the finite products with the finite consumer types and
the continuous products with the continuous consumer types. Only few authors, such
as Meng and Tian (2008), reported the possibility, under the restricted setting, such
as an industry with network externality. More comparisons between the monopolist’s
choice and the social planner’s choice will be performed in the third chapter.
Besides the comparison, I can find relationships between the optimal price, qual-
ity, profit, and social welfare and the outsider parameters, like number of products and
parameters for consumer type distribution. That is, I can observe how the optimal
price, quality, profit, and social welfare change as the number of products increase.
The one possible task is to show that the finite/continuous model approaches to the
continuous/continuous model as the number of products increases. I can also show
how the product’s price, quality, profit and social welfare change as consumer dis-
tribution becomes more dispersed or more skewed. The detailed discussions about
the distributional changes, like an effect of a more dispersed distribution on social
welfare, are presented in the third chapter.
In the chapter IV, I will apply the model developed in the second and third
chapters to empirical analysis. There, I simulate the parameters for consumer type
distribution, using a real data in the cable industry. And I examine how demographic
variables affect the consumer distribution. In the setting of this dissertation, the con-
5sumer type distribution contains all information about consumer demand. Thus, we
can induce the demand curve for an interested product using the previously simulated
values, whenever we can fix consumer demographics and other product’s character-
istics. I also study the impact of the change of market environment on the demand
curve. When a demographic variable changes, the change of the variable alters the
consumer distribution. From this new consumer distribution, we can derive a new
demand curve. We can examine how the demand changes, shifts, or rotates.
More importantly, I find this possibility of upward quality distortion is quite
prevailing in the cable industry. In Texas, 30.6% of franchises shows the upward
quality distortion. Especially in Amarillo, the estimated amount of welfare loss,
induced by the upward distortion, is up to $1,048,705 monthly. I expect this discovery
will trigger a large volume of research for the upward quality distortion and its welfare
loss.
The cable industry is a perfect example for the model developed in this disserta-
tion. The cable service market is monopolized in each city by local authorities, and
the cable service providers offer two or three different tiers. Thus, I will examine real
data obtained from the cable industry, to support the results obtained in the second
and third chapters, and to estimate the demand function.
I conclude this dissertation in the fifth chapter.
In the Appendix A, I thoroughly review the cable industry. The all proofs for
propositions, lemmas, and corollaries, appeared in the Chapters II and III, are pre-
sented in the Appendix B. In the Appendix C, the uniqueness condition for the social
planner’s problem is discussed in detail. The explanation for data variables is given
in the Appendix D, and the tables and figures are presented in the Appendix E.
6A. Literature Review
To clarify on where this dissertation stands, I start from classifying the existing
literatures. The first criterion is whether firms choose price-quality combinations or
price-quantity combinations. Where quality is a choice variable, a consumer usually
needs and buys only one unit of product. Contrasting the differentiated qualities
problem, the authors call the quantity-choosing model a nonlinear pricing model.
While Mussa and Rosen (1978) investigated the differentiated qualities problem, many
other papers, including the seminal paper Maskin and Riley (1984), have researched
the nonlinear pricing problem. In many cases, the quantity variable in the nonlinear
pricing model is directly interchangeable with the quality variable in the quality-
choosing framework. Almost all results from the nonlinear pricing model can be
reconfirmed in the quality-choosing model.
The pattern of competition is the second and more meaningful criterion. Early
research focused on the monopolist’s problem. Many literatures, which have followed
Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984), have solved and analyzed the
monopolist’s behaviors and implications. However, the recent interest of researchers
has moved to the competitive environment, especially to oligopoly.
In fact, introducing competition is quite difficult in this stream of models. Since
price is one of the control variables of the firm, the direct extension to two, three or
many firms may collapse down to the Bertrand competition. To avoid this collapse
to the marginal cost pricing, some authors have assumed that the qualities are pre-
determined. Firms can compete only with prices, at their own quality levels. Then,
firms choose price, considering the incentive compatibility constraints. Even though
this (pre-determined quality) restriction seems too expedient, it is quite useful, es-
pecially in the empirical works. (See Bresnahan (1981), Bresnahan (1987), Shepard
7(1991), and Balan and Deltas (2010).) Others have developed a two-stage model; at
the first stage, firms choose quality levels for their products, and at the second stage,
they compete with prices. (See Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and Lahmandi-Ayed
(2000).) Others have introduced different entry timing for firms, usually in the form
of incumbent and entrant. (See Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2006).) Choi and
Shin (1992), Donnenfeld and Weber (1992), and Donnenfeld and Weber (1995) mod-
eled both two-stage quality-price choice and different entry timing of firms. More
interestingly, the others have introduced a multi-dimensional consumer heterogeneity
model. Unlike the canonical model of Mussa and Rosen (1978), where consumers
differ only in the willingness to pay for quality improvement, consumers can be differ-
ent in their location from stores, their brand loyalty for firms, and etc. In the model,
firms may recover their market power for some of consumer segments. (See Ivaldi and
Martimort (1994), Stole (1995), Rochet and Stole (1997), Rochet and Stole (2002),
and Miravete and Ro¨ller (2004).)
The dimension of product characteristics is the third criterion . While Mussa
and Rosen (1978) developed one-dimensional (quality) product characteristic, many
descendants have introduced products with multiple characteristics. (See McAfee and
McMillan (1988) and Armstrong (1996).) In this dissertation, I concentrate on only
the canonical one-dimensional quality model.
In summary, when we are going to classifying the literatures, the first question is
whether the paper adopts the quantity-choosing framework or the quality-choosing.
The second question should be whether the paper works in the monopolistic market
or the oligopolistic market. The last criterion is about the cardinality of product
characteristics and consumer heterogeneity.
From now on, I will extensively review literatures. In there, I categorize papers
into three groups; a finite product differentiation model with finite consumer types,
8a continuous product differentiation model with continuous consumer types, and a
finite product differentiation model with continuous consumer types, as I mentioned
before. And in the each category, I ask the above three criteria to find the paper’s
exact position in the literature.
At first, consider the finite product differentiation model with finite consumer
types. Donnenfeld and White (1988) is one of the earliest paper, which adopted the
Mussa and Rosen framework and modified it to the finite product and finite type
setting. They explicitly solved two-qualities and two-types model and showed various
comparative statics results. We can find the extensive discussion for the general n-
quality and n-type model in the chapter 6 of Wilson (1993). Besanko, Donnenfeld,
and White (1988) added various constraints to the finite/finite model, to explain how
regulations affect results. Salant (1989) extended the model to dynamic situation. In
the paper, a product provides utility for a long time after purchasing. He applied this
framework to the famous durable good monopoly problem. The model can be also
applied to network externality problem. Kim and Kim (1996) added an interaction
term of offered products in social welfare function, and so they can explain spill-over
effect. Csorba (2008) introduced the network externality term in the utility function.
Meng and Tian (2008) modified the individual rationality condition to incorporate
the network externality, and analyzed the direction of quality distortion.
We can also find some empirical applications of this finite/finite model. Goolsbee
and Petrin (2004) investigated the impact of the direct broadcast satellites on the
cable television industry. In doing so, they divided consumers into several (finite)
number of groups according to their income levels. Moreover, it is well known that
the cable providers offer several (finite) number of different services. In addition,
they assumed that the quality levels for these services were exogenously fixed. Unlike
Goolsbee and Petrin (2004), the following papers have taken the firms which choose
9the quality levels. Ghose and Sundararajan (2005) estimated the degree of quality
degradation using the different editions of softwares. Hernandez and Wiggins (2008)
and Dai, Liu, and Serfes (2010) applied the finite/finite framework to explain the effect
of market concentration on the prices in the airline industry. While all other papers
investigated the monopolist’s problem, Goolsbee and Petrin (2004), Hernandez and
Wiggins (2008), and Dai, Liu, and Serfes (2010) dealt the competitive environment.
To do so, the works employed two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity.
A second literature focuses on continuous product differentiation and continuous
consumer types. This continuous/continuous model includes the pioneering works of
Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Maskin and Riley (1984). Besanko, Donnenfeld, and
White (1987) further investigated quality distortion and also evaluated the effect of
government regulation. Bousquet and Ivaldi (1997) analyzed network externality,
directly included it in the utility function, and they estimated the demand side pa-
rameters using residential telephone data in France. Miravete (2002) also estimated
the demand side parameters under the two-part tariff convention using U.S. data.
Basaluzzo and Miravete (2007) introduced two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity
in the monopolistic industry. They investigated the pricing scheme using local cellular
telephone data in U.S.
Besides the above works for the monopolist, we also have many applications to the
competitive environment. The applications include Champsaur and Rochet (1989),
Ivaldi and Martimort (1994), Stole (1995), Rochet and Stole (1997), Rochet and Stole
(2002), and Miravete and Ro¨ller (2004). They all adopted the continuous/continuous
environment. While other papers mainly devoted to the theoretical works, Miravete
and Ro¨ller (2004) estimated the nonlinear pricing scheme under the U.S. cellular
phone competition.
Contrary to the finite/finite model, the continuous/continuous model doesn’t
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have the endogenous quality issue. In this model, the decision maker chooses a price
schedule, which is a function to assign price to each quality level. She doesn’t need
to sort out quality levels. The only quality-related problem is to assign which quality
level to which consumer type.
At third, I consider the finite product differentiation model with continuous con-
sumer types. Since the decision maker should choose only finite number of qualities
over the full support of qualities, it becomes an important topic which qualities should
be offered. One easy way to deal with the quality selection problem is taking it exoge-
nously given. Itoh (1983) constructed the monopolist’s problem, solved an optimal
pricing rule and found some comparative statics results including relationship with
the number of products. However, he could not solve an optimal quality conditions,
since he assumed the exogenously given qualities, so he didn’t need to do. Gabszewicz,
Shaked, Sutton, and Thisse (1986) also assumed the exogenously given qualities. In
addition, they assumed that consumer types (income, rather than willingness to pay
for quality improvement) are distributed uniformly. Upon these assumptions, they
could show the market segmentation explicitly, and relate the finite product case to
the infinite product case, as increasing the number of products to infinity. This was
the first work to connect the finite/continuous model with the continuous/continuous
model.
Verboven (2002b) tried to estimate the monopolist’s market power empirically.
In his reduced form estimations in a spreadsheet software market and a car engine
market, he used comparative statics results obtained from the exogenously given
quality model. Xia and Sexton (2010) extends this monopoly problem to the dynamic
environment, to deal with durable goods. They also stuck to the exogenously given
quality levels. We can find the network externality application in the finite/continuous
model, too. Jing (2007) inserted the network externality into the utility function. He
11
compared the optimal prices with and without network externality. While doing so, he
assumed the pre-determined quality level and the uniform consumer type distribution.
In the competitive environment, the exogenously given quality assumption prevails,
too. Bresnahan (1981), Bresnahan (1987), Shepard (1991), and Balan and Deltas
(2010) commonly assumed the exogenously given quality level. Especially, first three
papers proceeded to empirical works in the automobile market and the retail gasoline
market.
Related with the empirical works, the framework from Berry, Levinsohn, and
Pakes (1995), the famous paper in the empirical field, has been widely applied in our
context, too. Basically, their work is constructed on the exogenously given product
characteristics. Suppose that we have only one observed product characteristic, and
further it is a quality level. Then, we can interpret the random coefficient for the
characteristic as a vertical taste type, and the idiosyncratic error as a horizontal
consumer type. This connection is already pointed out by Rochet and Stole (2002).
Here, I document quality-related (or quantity-related) works using the BLP
method. We have several number of papers, which assumed finite exogenous quali-
ties, and adopted the vertical consumer heterogeneity (quality taste) as the form of
a random coefficient and the horizontal consumer heterogeneity (brand loyalty) as
the form of an error term. Verboven (2002a) adopted two discrete, and exogenously
given, qualities; a gasoline engine and a diesel engine. Firms chose one of them.
Consumers were different in their annual mileage, which interacts with the engine
choice. Leslie (2004) examined the pricing practice of Broadway theaters. They pro-
vided several different classes of seats. Mortimer (2007) also adopted similar strategy
in the VHS/DVD movie market. Her quality choice was selling or renting. Lustig
(2010) applied the framework to the privatized medicare system. In his work, the
generosity of coverage by an insurance plan can be interpreted as the quality in our
12
framework. He considered two or three insurance plans with different qualities. Mc-
Manus (2007) estimated the nonlinear pricing model. For his quantity variable, he
took the specialty coffee sizes. Cohen (2008) is another empirical example for the
nonlinear pricing model. He listed the several package sizes for paper towels.
Our last concern is the endogenous quality choice in the finite/continuous model.
Crawford and Shum (2007) is the only paper, which dealt with the endogenous quality
issue for the monopolist’s problem. They imitated the framework from Itoh (1983),
but they designed the endogenous qualities and found the condition for optimal qual-
ities. They could gauge the degree of quality distortion in the monopolized cable
market, using their theoretical results from the finite/continuous model. Here, it is
worth noting that their central results are based upon variation in shares and that
similar predictions could be obtained from a discrete/discrete model.
We have some papers, which investigated the endogenous quality issue in the
competitive environment. Choi and Shin (1992) is one of the earliest work to deal
with the endogenous quality problem explicitly. They constructed the competitive
structure, based on the sequential entry of firms and the sequential choice of quality
and price. To get an explicit solution, they assumed that the consumer types are
uniformly distributed and the marginal cost is zero. Under these restrictive assump-
tions, they can solve the optimal quality levels for the firms. Donnenfeld and Weber
(1992) and Donnenfeld and Weber (1995) took the same environment with Choi and
Shin (1992). The only difference was that they considered three-firm competition.
Lahmandi-Ayed (2000) extended the above works to the general n firms compe-
tition. He adopted simultaneous entry of firms, instead of sequential entry, but still
kept the sequential choice of quality and price. He introduced the strictly positive
marginal cost, but the change of the marginal cost is restricted within the narrow
range. The one common characteristic for the above four papers is that each firm
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produces just one product. Of course, the competing firms should consider the incen-
tive compatibility constraint, furnished by other firms, but the consideration pattern
is not same with a multi-product monopolist. Bonnisseau and Lahmandi-Ayed (2006)
introduced multi-product competing firms. The basic setup was similar to Choi and
Shin (1992). There were an incumbent firm and an entering firm. The consumer types
were uniformly distributed, and the marginal cost was zero. However, it is allowed
for the incumbent to produce multiple products. Chu (2010) is another paper with
the multi-product competing firms. He followed the incumbent-entrant framework,
but didn’t adopt the price competition after establishing quality level. The incum-
bent offered a quality and price combination, and then the entrant suggested a new
combination. Instead of quality-price sequence, he introduced BLP-like horizontal
consumer heterogeneity as a source of competition. The vertical consumer types,
inserted in the form of a random coefficient, is assumed to follow the Weibull distri-
bution. He estimated the impact of a direct broadcast satellite on the monopolized
cable market.
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CHAPTER II
ENDOGENOUS AND FINITE PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION BY A
MONOPOLIST
A. Introduction
It is very common for a firm to offer differentiated products in various grades. Ex-
amples include airlines, broadway plays, grades of gasoline, and meal size in fast food
restaurants. These products are close substitutes each other, but differ in quality.
This differentiation of products arises, because we have consumers with differing
tastes for quality. Mussa and Rosen (1978), a monumental and actual beginning work
of the product differentiation, introduces heterogenous consumers focusing on their
responses on quality improvement, as I described in the first chapter.
For the continuously distributed heterogenous consumers, Mussa and Rosen
(1978) and other literature find a monopolist’s continuous product schedule, which
maps all possible quality levels to price levels. Each consumer can find a uniquely
appealing product. Although finding the continuous product schedule is theoretically
interesting, firms in the real economy seldom provide the function, whose domain is
every possible quality level. Usually, firms compose a menu with finite number of
entries. In the continuous product differentiation model, the monopolist focuses only
on optimal pricing scheme. Because it will provide products in every quality level,
it does not need to solve for optimal quality level for each product in its catalog. In
the finite product differentiation model, however, finding optimal quality levels and
constructing optimal market share for each product become its task, in addition to
finding optimal price levels.
In almost all the literature, especially Itoh (1983), discussing finite product and
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continuous types, authors assume that quality levels were exogenously given to avoid
the quality choice problem. This assumption makes the problem very tractable. Only
small number of papers adopt the endogenously determined quality level.
In the real world, many firms can adjust their product qualities. Windows Media
Center was not included in Windows Vista Home Basic edition, but it was later in-
cluded in Windows 7 Home Basic edition. Obviously, Microsoft policies dictate which
features would be included in each edition. This research challenges the endogenous
quality problem in the environment with finite products and continuous types. Only
a few papers, such as Choi and Shin (1992), Crawford and Shum (2007), and Chu
(2010), precede this work.
Although the huge volume of relevant literature has discovered numerous valu-
able results, the above mentioned topic, the endogenous quality problem in the fi-
nite/continuous environment, still remains mostly unexplored. Specifically in the
monopolist’s problem, only Crawford and Shum (2007) considers endogenous quali-
ties. For the problem, we need to establish an optimal pricing rule, an optimal quality
selection, and market segmentation. Itoh (1983) establishes the monopolist’s optimal
pricing rule and the market segmentation with exogenously given quality levels, and
Crawford and Shum (2007) endogenizes the quality selection rule.
However, we have no comparative statics results, except the work of Itoh (1983)
between monopolist’s profit and the number of products. In fact, no work examines
the effect of consumer type distribution changes in the finite/continuous setting. In
the real economy, firms may offer different product catalogs, in geographically sepa-
rated markets. They may change their menus when the economy goes into a boom
or a bust. If we know how the distribution changes affect the optimal choices by the
monopolist, we can explain more about firms’ business practices.
Furthermore, we know nothing about a social planner’s problem in the setting
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of finite/continuous environment. The comparison, between the social planner’s first
best choice and the firms’ optimal choice constrained by the consumer’s choice, is
the first step for social welfare analysis. Both in the finite/finite and the continu-
ous/continous model, every social welfare research includes the analysis of the social
planner’s problem. However, we cannot find any preceding analysis for the social
planner’s problem in the finite/continuous model. Existing literature compares the
firms’ choice obtained from the finite/continuous setting with the social planner’s
choice obtained from the continuous/continuous setting.
This chapter constructs the endogenous product differentiation problem by both
a monopolist and a social planner, in the finite/continuous model. In the problem,
quality, as well as price, is also a control variable of a decision-maker.
At first, this work arranges the optimality conditions for the monopolist. I repro-
duce the results of Itoh (1983) regarding the optimal pricing scheme and Crawford
and Shum (2007) about the optimal quality selection rule. At second, I reveal the op-
timality conditions for a social planner. The social planner should equate the average
marginal benefit of consumers and the increment of marginal cost when improving
a quality. While I find the optimality conditions, I also examine the conditions to
guarantee the existence and uniqueness of solutions for the maximization problems.
I describe the conditions in detail, in the sections C and D. In the continuing sec-
tion, E, I present various relationships between the monopolist’s and social planner’s
optimal choices, profit, and social welfare and the number of products. Conclusions
are drawn in the section F.
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B. Model
The model adopted here is derived from Mussa and Rosen (1978). In this seminal
paper, they analyze a vertically differentiated product market with one-dimensional
heterogeneous consumers. In the market model, every product produced by a monop-
olist can be associated with a one-dimensional quality index. An individual consumer
differs from another in that she has a different sensitivity to increase of quality. Con-
sumers can be ordered by their sizes of the sensitivity.
First, I introduce a product and its producer, a monopolist. The products pro-
duced by the monopolist are same except for the quality, q. The monopolist can
produce products at various quality levels. In this work, the monopolist can pro-
duce only finite numbers of different products, which differs from Mussa and Rosen
(1978), but is similar to Itoh (1983). When the monopolist produce n different quality
products, I list the products as q1, q2, · · · , qn. The monopolist has a marginal cost
function, C(q), to produce a product of a quality q. This marginal cost is constant,
regardless of the quantity of products, for any given quality level. That is, the total
cost to produce n unit of products, whose quality level is q, is nC(q). The monopo-
list can set price on each its product. These prices are designated as p1, p2, · · · , pn.1
Naturally, pk is the price for the product qk. For the notational convenience, I denote
q ≡ (q1, q2, · · · , qn) ∈ Rn and p ≡ (p1, p2, · · · , pn) ∈ Rn.
For the marginal cost function, I should introduce an assumption, which will be
maintained throughout the whole dissertation. All things in the Assumption 1 are
standard in the literature.
Assumption 1. The marginal cost function C is twice differentiable, strictly increas-
1When we consider a social planner’s problem, p can be considered as a tariff.
A consumer, to whom a social planner assigns qk and who accepts this assignment,
should pay a tariff, pk.
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ing and strictly convex. That is, C ′ > 0 and C ′′ > 0. In addition, C(0) = 0 and
limq→0C ′(q) = 0.
Second, I discuss the continuum of consumer types. Some consumers highly
value quality improvement, while others obtain only small increase in their utility
from a quality improvement. I index the consumers as θ. The consumer taste type θ
is distributed in [0, θ¯], following a distribution function F and its density function f .
Now, I can present a utility function of a consumer of type θ when she consumes a
product q paying a price p;
(2.1) U(q, p; θ) = θq − p.2
1. Market Segmentation and Demand of Product
Before diving into a main problem, I investigate a consumer segment for each product.
The utility function (2.1) shows separability of q and p and linearity in θ. These char-
acteristics guarantee that consumers would be divided into several pieces according
to their types.
To check a consumer’s choice pattern, suppose that n products of (already cho-
sen) different qualities are selling in the market, assuming q1 < q2 < · · · < qn. In
order that every provided products are meaningful, p1 < p2 < · · · < pn. If p1 > p2,
nobody would like to buy the product q1. Under this setup, we can divide a market
(or consumers) into n + 1 segments. Consumers in the same segment buy a same
product or all buy nothing. In addition, I assume that a consumer, who is indiffer-
2We can easily generalize this utility form to U(q, p; θ) = V (q; θ) − p. In fact,
we can recover almost all properties, which discovered in this dissertation, in this
generalized form, when V is concave in q. However, this generalization makes our
problem tremendously and unnecessarily complex. We can find all essential results
from the simple linear form.
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ent between two different products, selects a higher quality one. This is a standard
tie-breaker.
Tentatively, assume that for all k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n− 1},
(2.2) (pk+1 − pk)(qk − qk−1) > (pk − pk−1)(qk+1 − qk),
where q0 = 0 and p0 = 0. Technically, buying nothing will be replaced by buying
q0 with its price p0. In the whole dissertation, (q0, p0) will be considered as buying
nothing. The equation (2.2) is just for that all n products are sold in the market.
Let θk ≡ (pk − pk−1)/(qk − qk−1), then the above equation guarantees that for all
k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n− 1}, θk < θk+1.
Proposition II.1. (Market Segmentation) Assume that the equation (2.2) holds.
Then, for all k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , n}, a consumer of type θ, who belongs to [θk, θk+1), will
buy qk, where θ0 = 0 and θn+1 = θ¯.
3
The Proposition II.1 shows that n cutoffs divide the market into n+ 1 segments.
The n + 1 exclusive segments compose the whole support for consumer types. A
consumer, who belongs to the upper segment, consumes a higher quality product
paying a higher price.
This market segmentation is the first step to calculate a market demand for each
product. We know all consumers in [θk, θk+1) want to buy a product qk with a price
pk. If we know an exact consumer type distribution and a whole market population,
we can calculate the number of consumers will buy a product qk. Here, I add an
assumption for a consumer distribution.
Assumption 2. The distribution function F is twice differentiable and strictly in-
creasing.
3The last cutoff, θn+1, is considered θ¯, whenever a problem chooses n products.
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Mussa and Rosen (1978) and some other works admit a upward jump of F . In
this research, I will not allow the mass point, which may make the problem extremely
messy. The Assumption 2 will be maintained throughout the whole dissertation.
Now, we can calculate the demand for each product. We know that consumers
in the segment [θk, θk+1) will buy the product qk, and other segments will not buy the
product qk. Thus, for all k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n}, the demand for the product qk,
D(qk) = M
∫ θk+1
θk
dF (θ),
whereM is a whole market population andD(q0) implies the volume who buy nothing.
Note that cutoff levels play crucial role to calculate a demand for each product.
For notational convenience in the rest of this dissertation, I denote the set of every
cutoffs as θ ≡ (θ1, θ2, · · · , θn). Additionally, I normalize M = 1. In fact, the size of
M does not play a special role except scale change.
C. The Monopolist’s Problem
It is time to take a monopolist’s problem. The monopolist maximizes its total (or
aggregate) profit earned from every segmented markets.
(P.M) max
q,p
n∑
k=1
D(qk)(pk − C(qk))
such that for all k, θkqk − pk = θkqk−1 − pk−1.
Before proceeding to solve the problem directly, I’ll examine the property of
prices. From the constraints, we know that for all i,
pi − pi−1 = θi(qi − qi−1).
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Then, pk =
∑k
j=1 θj(qj − qj−1). Now, we can rewrite the problem (P.M) as follows.
(P.M′) max
q,θ
n∑
k=1
D(qk)
(
k∑
j=1
θj(qj − qj−1)− C(qk)
)
.
In this problem, there is no pjs, and a control variable p is replaced by θ. Surprisingly,
D(qj) is not a function of qj any more, because θj and θj+1 are free variables now.
When qjs are given as q1 < q2 < · · · < qn, we can establish a one-to-one relationship
between p and θ. Then, the problem (P.M) and the problem (P.M′) are equivalent.
Let a combination (qm,θm) be a maximizer for the monopolist’s problem (P.M′).
Using the constraints of (P.M), pm can be obtained. The first result is existence of
the maximizer in the monopolist’s problem (P.M′), that is (P.M).
Proposition II.2. (Existence of a Maximizer in the Monopolist’s Problem)
Under the Assumptions 1 and 2, the maximizer (qm,θm) for the problem (P.M′)
exists.
Before presenting the next proposition, I should introduce another assumption
about distribution of consumers. This assumption is quite general for continuous
distributions with a truncated interval. Under this assumption, any type in the
support can be realized.
Assumption 3. For all θ ∈ [0, θ¯], f(θ) > 0.
The next proposition suggests conditions the maximizer for the problem (P.M′)
should satisfy. In this proposition and its proof, I implicitly assume that qm1 < q
m
2 <
· · · < qmn . In fact, the implicit assumption is true. It will be proved in the section E.
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Proposition II.3. (Monopolist’s Problem) Under the Assumptions 1, 2 and 3,
for all k, qm, pm and θm satisfy
pmk =
k∑
i=1
θmi (q
m
i − qmi−1),[
θmk −
1− F (θmk+1)
F (θmk+1)− F (θmk )
(θmk+1 − θmk )
]
= C ′(qmk ), and
θmk −
1− F (θmk )
f(θmk )
=
C(qmk )− C(qmk−1)
qmk − qmk−1
.
The Proposition II.3 is not a brand new result. The first and the third equations
in Proposition II.3 appeared in Itoh (1983), which is the first work adopting the
finite/continuous framework. Itoh (1983), however, assumes the exogenously given
quality levels. The second equation is from Crawford and Shum (2007).
The first equation explains the monopolist would not take a marginal cost pricing.
Moreover, the first and the third equations show that the price is greater than the
marginal cost.
pmk =
k∑
i=1
θmi (q
m
i − qmi−1) =
k∑
i=1
(
1− F (θmi )
f(θmi )
+
C(qmi )− C(qmi−1)
qmi − qmi−1
)
(qmi − qmi−1)
=
k∑
i=1
(
1− F (θmi )
f(θmi )
(qmi − qmi−1)
)
+ C(qmk ) > C(q
m
k ).
In the second equation, the increment of marginal cost does not match with the
average marginal benefit of consumers. In fact, the increment is much smaller than
the average marginal benefit, since
C ′(qmk ) =
[
θmk −
1− F (θmk+1)
F (θmk+1)− F (θmk )
(θmk+1 − θmk )
]
< θmk < E
(
θ|θ ∈ [θmk , θmk+1)
)
.
In the third equation, we have an inverse hazard rate term, which will not appear
in the social planner’s optimality condition. Assuming that the monopolist takes a
marginal cost pricing, the market is segmented, as dictated by the third equation
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without a term, −(1−F (θmk ))/f(θmk ). We can conjecture that the monopolist’s market
segmentation will shift upward, comparing to the case of marginal cost pricing.
The next proposition states uniqueness of the monopolist’s maximizer. For this
proposition, I add an assumption that is widely used in the literature, including
Maskin and Riley (1984) and Itoh (1983).
Assumption 4. Let H(θ) ≡ (1− F (θ))/f(θ). Then, H ′(θ) < 1.
In the continuous/continuous model, Assumption 4 ensures that the monopolist
monotonically assigns qualities on consumer types. Here, it ensures uniqueness of the
maximizer.
Proposition II.4. (Uniqueness of a Maximizer in the Monopolist’s Prob-
lem) Under the Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, the maximizer (qm,θm) for the problem
(P.M′) is unique.
Finding this set of sufficient conditions for the uniqueness for the monopolist’s
optimal solution is a quite substantial contribution. When we try to find a solution
by computer simulations, we should guarantee uniqueness of the solution, in order
that we should assure that the answer, a computer gives us, is what we are looking
for. Moreover, the most important condition, the Assumption 4, is very familiar with
us, and it is known to be a quite weak one.
D. Social Planner’s Problem
In this section, I explain the first best outcome of a benevolent social planner, which
is never explored before. I consider a market having n meaningful products, like in
the last section. Since the benevolent social planner wants to maximize aggregated
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social welfare, the problem is as follows;
(P.S) max
p,q
n∑
k=1
∫ θk+1
θk
[sqk − C(qk)]f(s)ds
such that for all θ ∈ [θk, θk+1), k, θkqk − pk = θkqk−1 − pk−1.
We know that sqk−pk implies net utility (or consumer surplus), which a consumer of
type s enjoys, and pk − C(qk) is profit margin of a monopolist selling one unit of qk.
Thus, the sum, (sqk− pk) + (pk−C(qk)) becomes social welfare when the monopolist
sells one unit of qk to a consumer of type s. Note that pk is a tariff, rather than a
price.
The first step to solve the problem (P.S) is showing that the social planner
exercises a marginal cost pricing (in fact, a marginal cost tariff) and makes no profit
in supply side, that is for all k, pk = C(qk). It is easy to think that any tariff scheme
will not affect the social planner’s problem to maximize total surplus, because a tariff
just divides a fixed total surplus into a consumer’s share and a monopolist’s share. It
is not true. In this model, the prices (or the tariffs) determine market segments also,
together with the qualities. A consumer may consume a different product under a
different pricing scheme, even under the exact same set of product’s qualities. Thus,
the social welfare may depend on the tariff scheme. The Lemma II.1 shows that the
maximum social welfare is achieved, under the marginal cost tariff scheme.
Lemma II.1. (Marginal Cost Tariff in the Social Planner’s Problem) Under
the Assumption 1, the problem (P.S) is maximized when pk = C(qk).
Due to the Lemma II.1, we can replace p with C(qk), in the problem (P.S). It
makes the social planner’s problem very tractable, since we do not need to consider
tariffs.
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Before solving the problem (P.S), I prove existence of a maximizer. Intuitively
the existence is obvious, because consumer’s utility increases linearly and producer’s
cost increases convexly. Thus, infinitely increasing the quality level cannot be the
social planner’s solution. There might be a proper quality level to maximize the
social welfare.
Let (q∗,p∗) be a maximizer for the social planner’s problem (P.S). Moreover, we
can derive θ∗ from (q∗,p∗) and constraints in the problem (P.S).
Proposition II.5. (Existence of a Maximizer in the Social Planner’s Prob-
lem) Under the Assumptions 1 and 2, the maximizer q∗ for the problem (P.S) exists.
With this proposition, we find the maximizer. The next proposition shows con-
ditions that the maximizer for the problem (P.S) satisfies. In the proposition and its
proof, I implicitly assume that for all k, q∗k < q
∗
k+1, like in the monopolist’s problem.
In fact, it is also true. This strict monotonicity will be explained in the next section.
Proposition II.6. (Social Planner’s Problem) Under the Assumptions 1 and 2,
for all k, q∗, p∗ and θ∗ satisfy
p∗k = C(q
∗
k),
E
(
θ|θ ∈ [θ∗k, θ∗k+1)
)
=
∫ θ∗k+1
θ∗k
s
f(s)
F (θ∗k+1)− F (θ∗k)
ds = C ′(q∗k), and
θ∗k =
p∗k − p∗k−1
q∗k − q∗k−1
=
C(q∗k)− C(q∗k−1)
q∗k − q∗k−1
.
The first equation explains the marginal cost tariff scheme is a social best tariff
schedule, and the third equation shows the market segmentation, induced by the
Proposition II.1 and the marginal cost pricing, is social best.
The right hand side of the second equation in the Proposition II.6 is an incre-
ment of marginal cost of the product provider (e.g. monopolist). When the product
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provider improves quality of a product qk by one unit, the marginal cost to produce
qk increases by C
′(qk). If the quality for a product qk is improved by one unit, utility
of a consumer of type θ increases by θ. The left hand side E
(
θ|θ ∈ [θ∗k, θ∗k+1)
)
is an
average taste of consumers who buy the product qk. Thus, the Proposition II.6 argues
that social welfare is maximized when the average marginal benefit in demand side
is equal to the increment of marginal cost in supply side, in each segment.
We can compare the results from the Proposition II.6 with the results from the
Proposition II.3. Tentatively, assume that θ∗k = θ
m
k . Then,
C ′(qmk ) =
[
θmk −
1− F (θmk+1)
F (θmk+1)− F (θmk )
(θmk+1 − θmk )
]
< E
(
θ|θ ∈ [θ∗k, θ∗k+1)
)
= C ′(q∗k).
If the market is segmented identically in both cases, then qmk < q
∗
k. The monopolist
seems to distort the quality of the product qk downward. However, θ
∗
k does not need
to be equal to θmk . For the direction of quality distortion, we need more careful
investigation.
The third equations in the both problems direct the market segmentation. The
only difference is the inverse hazard rate term in the monopolist’s optimal condition.
Tentatively, assume that q∗ = qm. Then, θmk > θ
∗
m. We can guess that the market
will be more finely segmented across higher taste types. However, q∗ also does not
need to be equal to qm. The pattern of market segmentation is not simple. The next
chapter, using numerical computation works, serves thorough comparisons between
the monopolist’s choice and the social planner’s choice.
We have one more salient topic in the social planner’s problem: uniqueness of
the maximizer. In fact, the uniqueness property is very important, when we find the
maximizer numerically. Finding conditions for the uniqueness is, however, intensely
technical and mathematical. I arrange the uniqueness topic in the appendix.
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E. Comparative Statics Results with Respect to the Number of Products
In this section, I examine comparative statics results: how the change of number
of products affects the monopolist’s (the social planner’s) optimal qualities, prices
(tariffs), and profit (social welfare).
The next proposition is about a relationship between the maximized profit of the
monopolist and the number of offered products. To present the proposition, I define
a profit function. Let
Πm (q,θ) ≡
n∑
k=1
D(qk)
(
k∑
j=1
θj(qj − qj−1)− C(qk)
)
.
Proposition II.7. (Total Profit and n) Under the Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, defin-
ing V(n) ≡ Πm ((qm1 , · · · , qmn ), (θm1 , · · · , θmn )), V(n) is strictly increasing in n.
Note that the Proposition II.7 is a rephrasing of the proposition 2 in Itoh (1983).
Under the exogenously given quality levels, Itoh (1983) obtains the above comparative
statics result.
We have a similar result in the social planner’s problem. The next proposition
shows that the total social welfare is strictly increasing in the number of provided
products. To present the proposition, I define a social welfare function. Let
SW SP (q) ≡
n∑
k=1
∫ θk+1
θk
[sqk − C(qk)]f(s)ds.
Note that for all k, θk is determined by θk = (C(qk)− C(qk−1))/(qk − qk−1).
Proposition II.8. (Social Welfare and n) Under the Assumptions 1 and 2, defin-
ing V (n) ≡ SW SP ((q∗1, q∗2, · · · , q∗n)), V (n) is strictly increasing in n.
This proposition implies that the expansion of the consumer choice set always
increases total social welfare. I have not considered the possibility of a cost to intro-
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duce an additional production line; a fixed cost. Without any additional cost to add
the line, the increase of social welfare in the number of products is quite predictable.
If we introduce the fixed cost to add a new production line, we cannot guarantee the
increase. It may be possible to find an optimal number of products to maximize the
total social welfare.
It is a good time to more discuss a fixed cost. Until now, I have ignored cost
to add a new production line. Without the fixed cost, the monopolist (or the social
planner) has an incentive to add production lines repeatedly, as argued by the Propo-
sitions II.7 and II.8. With the fixed cost, the monopolist (or the social planner) may
have an optimal number of products to maximize its profit (or her social welfare).
Suppose that a profit function is concave in the number of products and the fixed
cost is constant. If the monopolist already produces sufficient number of products,
the additional profit will be smaller than the additional cost to add a new line. At
that point, the monopolist does not differentiate more. This logic can be applied to
the social planner, too.
Now, it is time to explain the strict monotonicity of product’s qualities (for all
k, q∗k < q
∗
k+1, not q
∗
k ≤ q∗k+1), which I implicitly assume while proving the Proposition
II.6. According to Proposition II.8, the social welfare strictly increases whenever we
add a new product. Suppose that q∗k = q
∗
k+1. Since p
∗
k = C(q
∗
k) = C(q
∗
k+1) = p
∗
k+1, two
products are exactly same. It means we lose one possible product that can strictly
increase the social welfare. Thus, (q∗1, q
∗
2, · · · , q∗n) cannot be a maximizer if there is q∗k
such that q∗k = q
∗
k+1. The similar logic can be applied to the monopolist, too.
From now on, I examine what happens to the monopolist’s problem when the
number of offered products increase up to infinity. Intuitively, we can expect our
finite/continuous model should approach the continuous/continuous model.
One of the most important outcomes in the continuous/continuous model is
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a discordance between the monopolist’s profit maximizing product catalog and the
social planner’s best product lineup. It is very well known that the monopolist offers a
lower quality product to each consumer than the quality offered by the social planner
to the same consumer. The literature calls this phenomenon a downward distortion.
One more interesting discovery is that the monopolist does not distort a quality for
its highest product. In other words, a consumer with a highest taste is treated with
a same quality product from the monopolist and the social planner. The literature
calls this phenomenon no distortion on top.
In the finite/continuous model, neither phenomena hold. In fact, we can find
an upward-distorted product, aiming at a consumer-group of highest tastes. The
possibility of upward distortion deserves to be examined in detail and I will cover it
in the next chapter.
In this section, I prove that the monopolist’s quality choices recover both a
downward distortion and no distortion on top when the number of products goes to
infinite, which is what the Proposition II.9 states. Before presenting the proposition,
I should introduce new notations. Remember that the number of products is n. I
denote q∗(θ) as a quality of product which a consumer of type θ will get at the social
best and denote qm(θ) as a quality of product which the same consumer will get in
the monopoly. Then, if θ ∈ [θ∗k, θ∗k+1) and θ ∈ [θmj , θmj+1), q∗(θ) = q∗k and qm(θ) = qmj .
Next, I define q¯ as an efficient quality level for a consumer of a highest taste. At
the social planner’s optimal, the increment of marginal cost is equal to the marginal
benefit of a consumer. Thus, C ′(q¯) = θ¯.
Proposition II.9. (No Distortion on Top and Downward Distortion When
n Goes to Infinity) As n goes to ∞, both q∗n and qmn approach q¯. In addition, as n
goes to ∞, for all θ ∈ [0, θ¯], q∗(θ) ≥ qm(θ).
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Remember that q∗n and q
m
n are the highest qualities provided by the social planner
and the monopolist respectively. Generally, q∗n 6= qmn in the finite/continuous model.
However, the Proposition II.9 tells us that qmn goes to q¯ and q
∗
n, as n goes to ∞.
We can recover no distortion on top when n = ∞. Even though the downward
distortion does not hold always when n is finite, the Proposition II.9 argues that we
can recover q∗(θ) ≥ qm(θ) when n =∞. To sum up, the Proposition II.9 states that
the finite/continuous model converges to the contnuous/continuous model, at least in
the two above famous phenomena.
F. Conclusion
In this chapter II, I analyze the finite product differentiation model with continuous
consumer types. The model is the only possible mixture to endogenize both the
product quality and the market share, even though only a few theoretical works
adopt this model. Therefore, the thorough study for the finite/continuous model is
necessary, if we want to research the monopolist’s real optimal behaviors, and evaluate
the social welfare impact of the behaviors.
The model is applied to both the monopolist’s problem and the social plan-
ner’s problem. I reconfirm the optimal market segmentation of Itoh (1983) in the
endogenous quality setting. Remember that Itoh (1983) assumes the exogenously
given quality levels. I resolve the optimal quality selection rule of Crawford and
Shum (2007), in the explicit way. Remember that Crawford and Shum (2007) just
analogizes the result in the continuous/continuous model, into the finite/continuous
setting.
And then, I try to make a comparative static analysis; how the change of number
of offered products affect the maximized profit, the maximized social welfare. The
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Propositions II.7 and II.8 show that the maximized profit and the maximized social
welfare strictly increases, as the number of products increases. At last, I show the
two famous phenomena (no distortion on top and downward distortion), discovered
in the continuous/continuous literature, are reobtained, when the number of products
increases to infinity, that is, the finite/continuous model approaches to the continu-
ous/continuous model. At least, about two phenomena, the finite/continuous model
is a generalization of the continuous/continuous model.
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CHAPTER III
COMPARATIVE STATICS ANALYSIS USING NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
A. Introduction
Even though we find optimality conditions for the monopolist and the social planner
from the chapter II, it is very difficult to add further theoretical results using the
conditions. Unless we furnish some more restrictions for the marginal cost function
and the consumer type distribution, the additional theoretical analysis has a big
difficulty, since we have no reduced form solutions.
Here, I suggest the alternative way: depending on the numerical analysis. In
the section B, I present the procedures for the numerical simulations. Using the
procedures and the optimality conditions, obtained from the chapter II, I can find the
exact value for the optimal quality, price, profit, and social welfare, for each possible
combination of marginal cost function and consumer type distribution. Most of all,
I find the possibility of upward quality distortion, which has been never reported in
the previous researches without any further market frictions.
B. Computational Method to Find the Maximizers
In this section, I suggest computational methods to find the maximizers for the social
planner’s problem and the monopolist’s problem. The Procedure 1 is for the social
planner’s maximizer and The Procedure 2 is for the monopolist’s maximizer.
Procedure 1. (Procedure for the Social Planer’s Problem)
1. Take an arbitrary θ = (θ1, · · · , θn) such that θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θn.
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2. For given θ0 = 0 and θ2, find θ
′
1 and q
′
1 such that
C ′(q′1) = E (θ|θ ∈ [θ′1, θ2)) and θ′1 =
C(q′1)
q′1
.
3. For k = 2, · · · , n, find θ′k and q′k such that
C ′(q′k) = E (θ|θ ∈ [θ′k, θk+1)) , where θn+1 = θ¯,
C ′(q′k−1) = E (θ|θ ∈ [θk−1, θ′k)) and
θ′k =
C(q′k)− C(q′k−1)
q′k − q′k−1
.
4. Formulate θ′ from the steps 2 and 3.
5. Repeat the steps 2, 3 and 4 until θ converges.
Procedure 2. (Procedure for the Monopolist’s Problem)
1. Take an arbitrary θ = (θ1, · · · , θn) such that θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θn.
2. Calculate q′ = (q′1, · · · , q′n) using θ and the equation
C ′(q′k) = θk −
1− F (θk+1)
F (θk+1)− F (θk)(θk+1 − θk), where θn+1 = θ¯.
3. Calculate θ′ = (θ′1, · · · , θ′n) using q′ and the equation
θ′k −H(θ′k) =
C(q′k)− C(q′k−1)
q′k − q′k−1
where H(θ′k) =
1− F (θ′k)
f(θ′k)
and q0 = 0.
4. Repeat the steps 2 and 3 until θ and q converge.
The above procedures depend on the optimality conditions, obtained from the
Propositions II.3 and II.6. Thus, every converging values should satisfy the optimality
conditions. If the maximizers for the social planner’s problem and for the monopolist’s
problem are respectively unique, the converging values, obtained from the Procedures
1 and 2, will be true maximizers. I already showed that the Assumption 4 was a
sufficient condition for the uniqueness for the monopolist’s optimal. In the appendix,
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I thoroughly examine conditions for uniqueness for the social planner’s optimal. The
Condition 1, which will appear in the appendix, is a sufficient condition to guarantee
the uniqueness of the social planner’s maximizer.
Fortunately, both the Assumption 4 and the Condition 1 are not too restrictive.
Many previous works show that various families of distributions satisfy Assumption
4. In the appendix, I show the Condition 1 is not too strong, by simulating various
consumer distributions and marginal cost functions. Almost all ordinary families of
distributions and cost functions satisfy the Condition 1. Moreover, note that the
failures of the Condition 1 and the Assumption 4 do not imply that the maximizers
are not unique.
C. Effect of Number of Products
In the chapter II, I developed a theory for the finite product differentiation model
with continuous consumer types. From now on, I will present both theoretical and
numerical results, especially focusing on relationships between the monopolist’s and
social planner’s optimal choices and the number of products, n.
Itoh (1983) shows that the monopolist’s profit increases as n increases, when
every product quality is exogenously given. Remember that I reproduced the same
result in Proposition II.7, when the qualities are endogenously chosen. This disser-
tation solves the social planner’s problem in the finite/continuous setting, for the
first time. Thus, Proposition II.8, which states that the social welfare increases as n
increases, is the first statement about the relationship.
Except Itoh (1983), we have no meaningful preceding work to investigate an effect
of n on the profit/social welfare. It is because we cannot find closed form solutions
from the optimality conditions in Propositions II.3 and II.6. Since we do not have
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closed form solutions for the optimal quality, price, and market share, we do not have
well-organized profit and social welfare functions. This situation makes it difficult to
find interesting outcomes by changing n. This work adopts the numerical simulations
to investigate the relationship between the profit/social welfare and n.
The first task is to confirm the results of Proposition II.9, which argues that
the finite/continuous model recovers no distortion on top and downward distortion,
as the number of products increases up to infinity. The Figure 11 vividly shows
how we recover no distortion on top as n increases. For the simulation, I assume
that consumer tastes are distributed over [0, 5], by a truncated normal distribution
with a mean, 2.5 and a standard deviation, 1. A marginal cost function is assumed
quadratic; C(q) = (1/2)q2. In fact, we have similar graphs, although we change means
and standard deviations of distributions.
The second and more interesting work is to check the increasing pattern of the
profit and the social welfare, according to the number of products. In the previous
chapter, I already check that the maximized profit and the social welfare is strictly
increasing, as the number of products increases. Check the Propositions II.7 and II.8.
Here, I study how and how fast they are increasing. I show that the increment is
diminishing and the increasing speed is very fast. We can achieve significant levels of
the social welfare and the profit with only a small number of products.
Although it is quite natural to expect that the maximized profit or the maximized
social welfare is concave in n,2 we cannot show the concavity mathematically. Instead,
1In the Figure 1, I just connect discrete quality levels at midpoints of consumer
intervals, for provided quality lines. It is only for easy comparison.
2The monopolist would like to take best positions, when it is forced to choose only
a few different products. Thus, profit generated by newly introduced product may be
smaller than profit generated previously introduced product. The same logic can be
applied to the social planner.
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the Simulation Result III.1 states that the maximized profit (or the social welfare) is
concave in n generally.
Simulation Result III.1. (Diminishing Increment of Profit or Social Welfare
in n) Generally, the increment of the maximized profit (or the social welfare) by the
monopolist (or the social planner) is diminishing in n.
For the Simulation Result III.1, I tried various distributions: left-centered, right-
centered, concentrated, dispersed, extremely skewed, twin-peaked, and thin-centered
distributions. The Figures 2 and 3 show that the maximized profit and the maximized
social welfare are concave in n, in almost all imaginable consumer distributions.
Next, I examine the increasing speed of the profit or the social welfare, when n
increases.
Simulation Result III.2. (Increasing Speed of Profit or Social Welfare in
n) The profits and social welfare generally achieved by only a few products represents
more than 95 percent of the profits and social welfare generated by an infinite number
of products.
The Table 1 shows that the maximized profit (or social welfare) increases very
rapidly even when n is small. When n = 3, the simulated values explain over 96% of
the value achieved when n = 100. The value obtained when n = 100 is virtually equal
to the maximized value obtained in the continuous/continuous model. If n increases
up to 10, we can achieve over 99.5% of the value.
The monopolist (or social planner) in the real world may find an optimal number
of production lines, in the case that it has a constant fixed cost to add one more
production line. The Simulation Result III.1 tells us that the increment of profit (or
social welfare) becomes smaller and smaller as n increases. It means that it cannot
make enough profit to cover the cost to add a new production line, when n is enough
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big. That is, it should stop adding a new production line. Moreover, we can expect
that the moment will come very soon, due to the Simulation Result III.2.
D. Effect of Consumer Distribution Change
It is obvious that our model will predict different optimization results under different
consumer distributions. The next direct question is how distribution change affects
optimization results. The comparative statics analysis, usually using the implicit
function theorem or the envelope theorem, reveals how the change of parameters
defining distribution alters the optimized values. In this work, mathematical com-
plexity hinders the usual comparative statics analysis. The numerical simulations
come again.
Suppose that we know exact relationships between distribution and the monop-
olist’s choice. We can describe many real world phenomena. Consider a boom and
a bust in economy. A consumer distribution in a boom may be different with a dis-
tribution in a bust. One possible conjecture is that a distribution will have a much
thicker right-side (higher tastes) tail in a boom. Knowing the relationship enables
prediction of the monopolist’s behaviors in a boom or a bust. Another example is
comparison over societies or industries. Some societies may highly value diversity,
while others can be populated with similar taste consumers. Some industries can
be trend-sensitive, while others may have a steady consumption pattern. We can
interpret these varieties as differences of consumer distributions.
I begin this section with a taxonomy of distributions.
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1. Classification of Distributions
Here, I use two criteria to classify consumer distributions. The first one is a center. A
left-centered distribution implies that a high proportion of consumers has low tastes.
Considering a truncated normal distribution, I have two free selectable parameters:
a mean and a standard deviation, when the support is fixed. The mean determines
whether a distribution is left- or right-centered. As the mean changes from small
to large, the distribution goes from severely left-centered to lightly left-centered, to
symmetric, to lightly right-centered and to severely right-centered.
I have one more criterion, a concentration. I divide distributions into concen-
trated distributions and dispersed distributions. The degree of concentration is closely
related to a standard deviation of distribution. If we have a large standard deviation,
the distribution has a high peak and thin tails on both sides. I call this type of
distributions a concentrated distribution. If we have a small standard deviation, the
consumer types are widely dispersed over the support. I call this type of distributions
a dispersed distribution.
We can cross over these two criteria, like a left-centered concentrated distribution.
The Figure 4 shows examples for each class of distribution, when the support is [0, 5].
2. Distortion on Top
In this subsection, I investigate the property of no distortion on top in detail. Almost
all existing works have reported that a quality distortion does not happen on a con-
sumer of a highest taste. Remember q¯ defined in the Chapter II, where q¯ is the socially
efficient quality level for the consumer of the taste θ¯. Both in the discrete/discrete
and the continuous/continuous model, the monopolist sells q¯ to the consumer of the
type θ¯.
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In our finite/continuous model, neither the monopolist nor the social planner
provides q¯ to the consumer of the type θ¯. They are both serving consumer interval,
including θ¯ at the end of interval, not only to θ¯. Since they should consider other
consumers besides θ¯, the product quality may be distorted downward from q¯. Thus,
for more meaningful interpretation, we need to check whether the monopolist’s choice
is equal to the social best for the highest group of consumers, rather than compare
to q¯.
Simulation Result III.3. (Distortion on Top) Generally, q∗n 6= qmn . That is,
the highest quality provided by the monopolist may be distorted from the social best
selection.
As we saw in the previous section, the distortion on top does not happen in the
case that n = ∞. When we have a uniform consumer distribution and a quadratic
marginal cost function, we can analytically verify there is no distortion on top. Unfor-
tunately, these are just special examples. In usual environments, quality for a highest
interval tends to be distorted either downward or upward. The Figure 1 shows the
instances of downward distortion on top.
From the Propositions II.3 and II.6, in order that q∗n is equal to q
m
n ,
(3.2) C ′(qmn ) = θ
m
n = E
(
θ|θ ∈ [θ∗n, θ¯]
)
= C ′(q∗n).
The equation (3.2) implies that θmn should be equal to a conditional mean over the
interval [θ∗n, θ¯]. It usually does not happen. If θ
m
n is greater than the conditional
mean, qmn > q
∗
n, the highest quality product can be distorted upward.
The Table 2 reports simulation results using six different truncated normal dis-
tributions. Each distribution has a right-side tail of different thickness and length.
There, the monopolist and the social planner choose only three different products. In
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all distributions, qmn < q
∗
n, confirming the Simulation Result III.3.
Next, I define a degree of quality distortion on top as a ratio of qualities provided
to a highest consumer group by the monopolist and by the social planner. That is,
qmn /q
∗
n. If the degree of quality distortion on top is greater than 1, it means upward
distortion. Note that as the ratio recedes from 1 either upward or downward, the
quality is heavily distorted.
The first task is to find a relationship between the degree of quality distortion
and a center of distribution.
Simulation Result III.4. (Degree of Quality Distortion on Top and Center
of Distribution)
• Generally, the degree of quality distortion on top is larger when the distribution
is left-centered, rather than right-centered.
• In the concentrated distribution, the degree of quality distortion on top becomes
larger as the center of distribution goes to both extremes.
• In the dispersed distribution, the degree of quality distortion on top becomes
smaller as the center of distribution goes to right.
The Simulation Result III.4 is nothing but a summary for the Figure 5. The key
element to explain the Simulation Result III.4 is for whom the monopolist cares. In a
left-centered distribution, its main concern may be consumers of low tastes. Since the
low quality product market is large, the monopolist wants to reduce consumers who
will buy nothing. Thus, θm1 will be quite small. In a right-centered distribution, it
cares for consumers of high tastes. It does not need to have a very small θm1 . Let θ
m
1,l
be θm1 in the left-centered distribution and θ
m
1,r be in the right-centered distribution.
Obviously, θm1,l < θ
m
1,r. The product quality increases as the consumer type increases.
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Since θ¯ − θm1,l > θ¯ − θm1,r, the quality can travel a longer span in the left-centered
distribution, and so it may arrive at a higher level.
The above scenario can be applied to the second and third argument in the Sim-
ulation Result III.4, except the right-centered concentrated distribution. In the case,
consumer population of highest tastes is very large. Now, the right-side population
is extremely important for the monopolist’s profit. To fully exploit their tastes, the
monopolist may offer a high quality product with a high price.
Next, I relate the degree of quality distortion with the degree of concentration.
Simulation Result III.5. (Degree of Quality Distortion on Top and Degree
of Concentration)
• The degree of quality distortion on top approaches 1 as the distribution becomes
more dispersed (flatter).
• If the distribution is not too dispersed, the degree of quality distortion on top
becomes smaller as the distribution becomes more concentrated.
• In the left-centered distribution and under the proper degree of concentration,
the degree of quality distortion on top may be bigger than 1 (upward distortion).
The first argument is related to a uniform distribution property. As σ goes to
infinity, a distribution becomes a uniform distribution. As previously mentioned, q∗n =
qmn = q¯ when adopting the uniform distribution. Then, the degree of quality distortion
on top becomes 1. For the second argument, we should consider a proportion of
consumers of high tastes. The more concentrated the distribution is, the more thin
the right-side tail. Then, the consumers of high tastes are ignorable by the monopolist.
The highest quality product will be more distorted downward. The third argument
is observed in the Figures 5 and 6. This upward distortion will be explained in detail
in the next subsection.
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3. Quality Flipping
In the previous subsection, we observed the possibility of upward distortion. I inves-
tigate the possibility in more detail.
To find a upward-distorted product, I make simulations adopting truncated nor-
mal distributions with a mean, 1 over a support, [0, 5]. The monopolist and the social
planner choose three different products. The Table 3 shows upward distortion when
2.03 ≤ σ ≤ 20, where σ is a standard deviation of distribution.
Simulation Result III.6. (Upward Distortion) In some environments of dis-
tributions, qmk can be greater than q
∗
k. That is, some consumers can enjoy a higher
quality product in the monopoly, rather than the social best selection.
Naturally, I should investigate a relationship between direction of quality distor-
tion and a standard deviation of distribution. Since our distribution is left-centered,
we have a thin right-side tail. The standard deviation determines how thin the right-
side tail is. As the standard deviation grows, in other words, the distribution becomes
more dispersed, we have a thicker right-side tail. See the Figure 7.
We can find an interesting association related to the thickness of tail. With a
very thin tail of high tastes, the social planner cares about them only in proportion
to their volume. The monopolist, however, almost ignores these consumers of high
tastes, because their population is too small to yield a big profit. In this stage,
the highest quality product is distorted downward. As the volume of consumers of
high tastes increases, the social planner’s concern for these consumers increases in
proportion to their volume again. The monopolist, however, has a different incentive.
The consumers of high tastes, who still comprise a small population but who can
pay a large amount, abruptly become very attractive to the monopolist. In this
phase, the monopolist reflects these consumers’ tastes very significantly. Sometimes
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the monopolist offers a product even distorted upward to fully exploit the great
willingness to pay of these consumers. Consider the situation with enough number of
consumers of high tastes. The increment of consumers of high tastes is not attractive
any more. The product quality aiming at the consumers is already enough high. The
monopolist’s enthusiasm to produce an extreme edition is damped, while the social
planner always keep her pace, in proportion to the consumers’ volume.
Simulation Result III.7. (Quality Flipping) Suppose that the distribution is left-
centered. When the distribution has a thin tail, qmn is downward distorted. As the tail
of the distribution become thicker, qmn approaches, and then passes over q
∗
n. That is,
the quality can be distorted upward. After that, qmn approaches q
∗
n downwardly, when
the distribution becomes uniform. The qualities provided by the monopolist and by the
social planner can be flipped.
The Table 3 and the Figure 8 vividly show the quality flipping phenomenon.
4. Excluded Consumers from Consumption
Even in a social best product selection, some consumers will be excluded from con-
sumption. Some consumers, who are located in a left side of support, have extremely
low tastes. Since they extremely undervalue the worth of quality increase, even the
benevolent social planner may want to exclude these consumers. She has to choose
only a finite number of products.
In the monopolist’s problem, the consumer of θm1 has a highest taste among
consumers who will not buy nothing. Thus, the proportion of excluded consumers
is F (θm1 ) in the monopoly. Similarly, F (θ
∗
1) is the proportion of consumers excluded
by the social planner. Before presenting the simulation results, I define a ratio of
excluded consumers as F (θ∗1)/F (θ
m
1 ).
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Simulation Result III.8. (Patterns of Excluded Consumers)
• The monopolist excludes more consumers from consumption than the social
planner.
• Both in the monopolist’s and the social planner’s optimal, the proportion of
excluded consumers decreases as the distribution evolves from left-centered to
right-centered.
• The ratio of excluded consumers increases as the distribution evolves from left-
centered to right-centered.
• The proportion of excluded consumers decreases as the distribution becomes
more concentrated, if it is not too left-centered.
• The ratio of excluded consumers increases as the distribution becomes more
concentrated.
See the Figure 9. The panels in the first column show how density changes from
the left-centered to the right-centered as the mean increases. From the panels in
the second column, we can confirm the monopolist excludes more consumers than the
social planner. The solid lines, which represents the proportion of excluded consumers
at the monopoly optimal, are over the dotted lines, which represents the proportion
of excluded consumers at the social best. The downward slopes of both lines explains
that the proportion of excluded consumers decreases as the mean increases. The
panels in the third column argue that the ratio of excluded consumers increases as
the mean increases.
The Figure 10 completes the remaining parts of the Simulation Result III.9. The
first three panels show the results from left-centered density, symmetric density, and
right-centered density. We can check that the solid lines are above the dotted lines
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again. In addition, the Figure 10 explains that the proportion of excluded consumers
decreases as the standard deviation decreases; that is, the distribution becomes more
concentrated. The ratio of excluded consumers increases as the distribution becomes
more concentrated.
5. Information Rent
The existing literature has documented that information rent, which each consumer
can take, increases as the consumer’s type increases, in the monopoly market. That
is, as θ increases, the (net) utility, U(q, p; θ) = θq − p increases. This result can be
reconfirmed in our finite/continuous environment.
Let q(θ) be a quality and p(θ) be a price of a product that is purchased by the
consumer of type θ.
Proposition III.1. (Increasing Information Rent in Type) If θ < θ′,
U(q(θ), p(θ); θ) ≤ U(q(θ′), p(θ′); θ′),
where the equality holds only when q(θ) = q(θ′) = 0.
I will now examine how the information rent is affected by distribution change.
Simulation Result III.9. (Information Rent and Distribution Change)
• The information rent becomes smaller as the distribution changes from left-
centered to right-centered.
• The information rent becomes smaller as the left-centered distribution changes
from concentrated to dispersed.
• The information rent becomes smaller as the right-centered distribution changes
from dispersed to concentrated.
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The above simulation results are supported by the Figures 11 and 12. This time,
the monopolist chooses five different product qualities, rather than three products,
which can show the information rents curve more smoothly.
The Figure 11 shows that the left-centered distributions have higher information
rent curves than the right-centered distributions. The Figure 12 argues that the degree
of concentration works in opposition, depending on whether the distribution is left- or
right-centered. When the distribution is left-centered or symmetric, the concentrated
distributions have higher information rent curves. When the distribution is right-
centered, the dispersed distributions have higher information rent curves.
The key factor for the Simulation Result III.9 is the proportion of consumers of
low tastes. As the proportion of consumers of low tastes increases, the information
rent curve shift upward. The reason comes from the pricing scheme. We know that
pmk = p
m
k−1 + θ
m
k (q
m
k − qmk−1). Suppose that we have a thick volume of low tastes.
Since the monopolist wants to fully exploit these low tastes, it offers a cheap price to
the consumers. This cheaply offered price affects on the all prices of higher quality
products. All prices of higher quality products should be offered at cheaper levels.
Thus, if the monopolist really cares for the consumers of low tastes, it should endure
a reduced ability to exploit consumers of higher tastes.
6. Profit and Social Welfare
Last, I report relationships between profit/social welfare and distribution change.
Simulation Result III.10. (Profit, Consumer Surplus and Social Welfare)
• Both profit and consumer surplus in the monopoly increase, when the proportion
of consumers of high tastes increases.
• Both social welfare in the monopoly and at the social best increase, when the
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proportion of consumers of high tastes increases.
The Simulation Result III.10 is obvious. Consumers of higher tastes can get
higher utilities, if ignoring prices. Thus, they have a higher willingness to pay. The
social planner can achieve a higher social welfare, and the monopolist can obtain a
higher profit. We know that consumers of higher tastes can enjoy higher information
rents. Thus, we will get a higher total consumer surplus.
See the Figures 13 and 14. In the left-centered or the symmetric distributions,
the more dispersed distribution implies a larger proportion of consumers of high
tastes. Meanwhile, the more dispersed distribution implies a smaller proportion in the
right-centered distribution. These simulation results strongly support the Simulation
Result III.10.
I calculate total surplus in the monopoly. Total surplus is just a sum of the
monopolist’s profit and total consumer surplus; that is, social welfare induced by the
monopolist. Now, I define an efficiency score achieved by the monopolist as follows;
efficiency score =
social welfare induced by the monopolist
social welfare at the social best
.
Since the social welfare is maximized by the social planner, the efficiency score cannot
be strictly greater than 1.
Simulation Result III.11. (Efficiency Score) The efficiency score increases as
the distribution becomes more concentrated.
If the consumers are very homogenous; that is, almost all consumer tastes are
very similar, the monopolist and the social planner will provide a similar product
catalog. Since everybody wants similar products, both the monopolist and the social
planner should provide the similar ones. In this case, just obeying the consumers’
demand is a best strategy for both decision-makers.
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When the tastes of consumers are widely dispersed, the monopolist can utilize
consumer heterogeneity. The monopolist offers a distorted product catalog from the
social planner’s list. This distortion decreases the efficiency score. See the Figure
15. When the distribution is extremely concentrated, the ratio is close to 1. As the
distribution becomes more dispersed, the score declines rapidly.
E. Conclusion
Using the computational procedures introduced in this chapter and the optimality
conditions obtained from the chapter II, I could find the exact values for optimal
qualities, prices, maximized profit and social welfare. Then, I could compare the
monopolist’s optimal with the social planner’s optimal. The comparison is the first
step for welfare analysis, which can induce policy implications.
From the comparison, I showed the possibility of upward quality distortion, which
the existing literature has not previously reported. This discovery of the upward
quality distortion, especially on the highest quality product, can stimulate research
for an extreme product version.
This chapter also analyzed how the number of products affects on the monop-
olist’s and the social planner’s decisions. The profit/social welfare strictly increases
as the number of products increases. Moreover, the increment of increase diminishes
rapidly.
The chapter III also researched how distribution change affects the monopolist’s
and the social planner’s choices. When a consumer distribution is dispersed, or left-
centered, or both, the quality is less distorted and the amount of excluded consumers
is large. When we have a large volume of consumers of low tastes, the quality is less
distorted and information rents, which are enjoyed by consumers, increase. When we
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have a proper level of thick right-side tail, the possibility of upward distortion arises.
When the distribution is concentrated, the monopolist can achieve a higher efficiency
level compared with the social best.
The major contribution of this chapter is that this is the first work for the
social welfare analysis in the finite/continuous setting. I expect this work can trigger
numerous following welfare related research, adopting the finite/continuous setting.
Remember that the finite/continuous setting is the only model, which can endogenize
both the quality and the market share.
50
CHAPTER IV
ESTIMATIONS OF CONSUMER DISTRIBUTION AND MARKET DEMAND IN
THE CABLE INDUSTRY
A. Introduction
Until now, I have developed the endogenous quality choice model for a monopolist
and a social planner. In the chapter II, I constructed the maximization problems
for both decision makers, and found optimality conditions for the problems. In the
chapter III, I calculated the market prices, qualities, profit, and social welfare, in a
hypothetical market environment. In addition, I examined how the above market
results change, as the underlying market environments change. By the numerical
simulation, I could try and check all imaginable market environments.
Now, it is time to apply the previously obtained results to the real world. In this
chapter IV, I examine the cable service industry.1 The cable service industry perfectly
fits the model, which has been developed in the previous chapters. First, the cable
service market is monopolized by an exclusive contract with a local authority, in
each franchise. Second, the cable service providers offer two or three service tiers
with differing numbers of channels, which can be interpreted as qualities. Thus, the
cable service provider is a monopolist offering two or three products of differentiated
qualities. Adopting theoretical and numerical methods from the previous chapters, I
can analyze the cable industry in the more rigid framework.
At first, I construct a consumer type distribution by simulating parameters using
real data. The section B explains the data set, which includes a monthly fee for each
service tier in each franchise. In addition, the set has the number of subscribers
1In the appendix, I thoroughly review the cable service industry.
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for each tier. This chapter assumes that the values result from a profit maximizing
strategy by the cable service provider (in fact, the monopolist). In the chapter III,
I could simulate the profit maximizing prices, qualities, and market shares, when I
know an underlying consumer type distribution. In this chapter, I go the reverse
direction, simulating a consumer type distribution from optimized (or assumed to be
optimized) values. Thus, the main job in the section B is to recover a consumer type
distribution in each franchise.
After recovering the consumer type distribution, I can simulate optimal values
for the social planner: optimal quality and optimal tariff levels for each tier, and the
number of subscribers assigned for each tier. Now, I can check the most important
discovery, obtained in the chapter III: the upward quality distortion. I find the
upward quality distortion is a very prevailing phenomenon. In Texas, 64 franchises
among 209 franchises displays the upward quality distortion. It explains 30.6% of
all relevant franchises. Considering almost all previous literature have ignored the
possibility of upward quality distortion, it is a quite shocking result.
In the section D, I examine how demographic variables affect the consumer type
distribution. Here, I assume that the consumer type distribution responds to under-
lying demographic factors, like population, female population, Hispanic population,
city size, household’s income level, age distribution, income distribution, number of
households, and etc. I estimate how much each demographic variable affects mean,
standard deviation, and upper bound for the consumer type distribution. Then, I
can predict how the shape of distribution will change, according to the change of a
demographic variable. In fact, the section D shows that the increase of population
makes the consumer distribution more right-centered and more concentrated.
In the section E, I construct the demand curve. Since I know a consumer dis-
tribution, I can make a demand curve for a given service tier, varying price levels.
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Moreover, I also study the impact of the change of market environment on the de-
mand curve. When the population increases, the discussion of the section D can
describe how the change of population alters the consumer type distribution. Then,
I can construct the new demand curve from the new consumer distribution.
The comparison between the original demand curve and the new demand curve
displays shift, rotation, or both. Since the increase of population affects the consumer
distribution, in a few different routes, such as mean, standard deviation, and upper
bound, we can observe the rotation of the demand curve, as well as the shift of the
demand curve.
B. Data Description and Simulating Consumer Distributions
1. Data Description
In this dissertation, I gather the data for cable service providers, operating in Texas.
Each cable service provider operates in the franchise, where the provider contracts
with the local authority. In the most cases, we can find one provider in one franchise.
Rarely, we can encounter multiple cable service providers in one franchise. Fortu-
nately, all these rare cases happens in the large cities, like Houston, and the biggest
provider has a dominant market position, in the point of market share. In fact, the
other providers in the large cities have ignorable market shares. In Houston, there are
Comcast and its small competitors. In this dissertation, I adopt only the monopolist
or the largest firm in the city. Thus, in my data set, the unit of observation becomes
a franchise (or a cable service provider, equivalently). Each franchise is considered as
an independent market, since consumers have no choice except their exclusive service
provider.
In Texas, we had, have, or had have 740 cable service providers. Among these
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740 providers, only 426 providers are operating, now. Among these 426 providers,
only 275 providers offer multiple services, usually two or three services among a basic
service, an expanded basic service, and a digital basic service. In this chapter, I
only consider the franchises with multiple service tiers.2 I cannot match demographic
variables in 16 franchises, and I remove 11 more providers, which are not No.1 service
providers in their franchises. Finally, I have 248 provider-franchise observations, in
which monopolists offer multiple service tiers.
The Table 4 summarizes the collected data on cable service providers. The data
comes from WarrenCommunicationsNews (2012). For the more detailed definition
and the description for each variable, confer the Appendix.
The Table 4 strongly implies that each provider plays a monopolist role in its
franchise. Among all providers, 47% of them are affiliated to a big MSOs, like Comcast
or Suddenlink. More than half are independent providers, or are affiliated to small
MSOs, only operating in a few different franchises. In fact, even MSO-affiliated firms
operate quite independently, because local authorities furnish different contractual
conditions, including ownership requirement.
For each service tier, we can check that the number of channels and the monthly
fees have significant differences across the cable service providers. The differences
prevail even in the cable service providers affiliated to the same MSO. In fact, the
number of channels widely distributes from 6 to 36 for the basic service, and from 22
to 91 for the expanded basic service, even only considering 76 cable service providers
affiliated to Suddenlink. These wide differences suggest each cable service provider
operates independently.
2I assume that the number of offered tiers is exogenously given to the provider.
Although the problem of how many services they offer is very important, I rule out
the problem in this chapter. It is consistent with the previous chapters.
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It is rational to think that this diversification comes from the provider’s profit
maximizing strategy. That is, the providers certainly respond to market environ-
ments, including a consumer type distribution, and so they generate quite different
choices in the different markets, whatever their affiliations are.
This big diversification also motivates empirical works. It suggests the change of
market environments can make a big difference on the provider’s choices. From the
data work, we can analyze how the market environment affects the consumer type
distribution and the market demand, and how the consumer type distribution affects
the provider’s products choice.
The Table 4 also includes other information. The miles of plant, which a provider
install, distributes from 7 to 29791. Comparing to the median, the mean is much
bigger. It implies that we have a few big firms and many small operators. About the
installation fees, we don’t have enough differences, regardless of service tiers. The
providers seem to want to promote upper class services, when a new customer visit
them.
The Table 5 shows the demographic data, collected from United States Census
Bureau, City-Data.com, and Google map. Our franchises are approximately 130
miles from the closest large city in average. The average population is 46089, and the
median is 5563. Thus, we have a few franchises with large populations, and many
franchises with small populations. It agrees with our observation in the Table 4 about
the size distribution of the cable service providers.
For the Hispanic population, we have a significant fluctuation. In some franchises,
we have a large portion of Hispanic population, while we have the small number of
Hispanic people in the other franchises. The large fluctuation of Hispanic population
gives a hint that the Hispanic population can be one of the reasons for a large fluc-
tuation of product choices of firms. For income level or poverty ratio, we can also
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find a large fluctuation. This diversification of market environments also stimulates
empirical works. It is natural to conjecture that these big differences in the market
environments induce the big differences in the offered products across markets.
2. Construction of the Consumer Distribution Simulating Parameters
In this subsection, I simulate five parameters, which represent operating cable service
providers and market environments, in each franchise. For the cable service provider,
I simulate a coefficient for marginal cost function with respect to a quality, a. Like
previous chapters, the marginal cost is assumed as constant with respect to a quantity.
The constant marginal cost, however, is increasing in the quadratic form, as the
quality is improved. That is, C(q) = aq2, where q is a quality and C(q) is a constant
marginal cost when producing a product of q quality.
The remaining parameters are for the market environments. Especially, I simu-
late three parameters for a consumer type distribution. In each franchise (equivalently,
in each market), a consumer type distribution is assumed to follow a truncated normal
distribution. To define a truncated normal distribution, we need a four parameters: a
mean, a standard deviation, a lower bound, and an upper bound. I assume the lower
bound is zero, since nobody would like to value quality improvement negatively. The
other three parameters are recovered by simulations, using the real world data.
Here, I introduce one more parameter, a total number of potential subscribers,
which is not a direct parameter to explain a truncated normal distribution. The
number implies a market size in each franchise. In fact, I have a data for total number
of households, but it is not exactly same with the number of potential subscribers.
Besides households, there are demands for cable services, like restaurants, sports
bars, and hotels. In rare cases, some households subscribe two or three cable services.
In the case that a cable service provider serves neighboring areas, we don’t know
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how many households there are. Thus, the parameter, the total number of potential
subscribers, is also simulated, as a parameter to describe a franchise.
In the franchise with two products, I have the prices for the basic service and
expanded basic service, and the number of subscribers for both service tiers. In
addition, I have the number of channels each service tier carries. I use this number
of channels for a proxy of product quality, in two different ways. First, I take the
number of channels for the quality for the product. Second, I take the square root
of the number of channels for the quality. The second method reflects the fact that
one additional channel is very valuable when we have only a few channels, but the
additional enjoyment is not much when we already have many channels. I will try
both ways. However, coming results without any special descriptions, result from the
second method.
Now, I possess the prices, qualities, and market shares. Assuming the monopo-
list (the provider) offers a profit maximizing combination of products, I look for the
most probable truncated normal distribution and the number of potential households,
which can match the real data. The simulation is performed as follows; I set up a
hypothetical consumer type distribution, simulate the profit maximizing values for
the monopolist, compare the simulated values with the data, renew the hypotheti-
cal consumer type distribution, and repeat the above steps until I find the closest
simulated values with the data.
The Table 6 summarizes the simulation results. The lower table shows the results
when I take the square root of the number of channels for a quality, while the upper
table shows the results when I take the number of channels for a quality. From now
on, I explain the lower table. After simulations, I am compelled to abandon some
observations (franchises), because the predicted (profit maximizing) values obtained
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from the simulation quite differ from the data.3 I abandon 39 observations, which the
upper bound is over 12. I find that the size of upper bound is closely related with
the differences between the predicted values and the real data.
The simulation results, presented at the Table 6, are quite stable. For the coef-
ficient of marginal cost function, almost all simulated values stay around the mean.
We have only 10 providers, whose coefficients are outside of 2 standard deviations.
The simulated values for the total number of potential subscribers reflect our de-
mographic observations very well. The fact that the mean is much bigger than the
median, implies that we have a few big markets and many small markets.
In the average franchise, we have 63155 potential subscribers, and the consumer
types distribute over [0, 5.107607], following the truncated normal distribution with
-1.53716 mean and 7.060615 standard deviation. That is, the density function is
monotonically decreasing over the relevant support. However, the most distributions
has a peak in the relevant support. Note that the median of the mean is 1.162921,
which is greater than 0, a designated lower bound. Considering that the mean of the
upper bound is 5.107607, and the median is 4.401373, the most of distributions are
left-centered. Considering that the mean of the standard deviation is 7.060615, and
the median is 1.498823, the most of distributions are not dispersed.
C. Upward Quality Distortion and the Effect on Social Welfare
In the previous chapter, the possibility of upward quality distortion is one of the
main discoveries. That is, the monopolist can offer a higher quality product than
the social planner offers. This phenomenon is never reported in the canonical model
3In the case of the number of channels for the quality, I obtain relatively better
fits between the predicted values and the data. However, the square root is still more
appealing, in the sense of the proxy for the quality.
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of product differentiation. Here, I verify that the possibility really arises in the real
world. Among the meaningful 209 franchises, which is explained in the last section,
I find 64 franchises, where the upward distortion happens. Approximately, 30.6% of
franchises show the upward distortion. In the real world, we can argue that the upward
distortion is a quite prevailing phenomenon. This is very surprising, considering the
existing literature have overlooked the possibility.
In fact, the most of big cities, like Houston, San Antonio, Austin, and Fort Worth,
shows a downward quality distortion, the existing literature suggested. However,
the examples for the upward distortion also include meaningful franchises, such as
Amarillo, San Angelo, and Conroe. In Amarillo, the welfare loss induced by the
upward quality distortion reaches $1,048,705 per month. Moreover, the welfare loss
explains almost 50% of possible social welfare at the social best. The Table 7 presents
some franchises which are worthy of note.
Since I recover the consumer distribution from the simulations starting from the
real data, there are an inevitable amount of difference between the predicted (profit
maximizing) values and the real data. It is very difficult to discriminate whether the
upward distortion comes from the profit maximization process or from the simulation
error.4 Thus, I also consider the possibility of upward quality distortion, comparing
the predicted values from the simulated distribution and the data. The result is more
stunning. Among 209 franchises, 188 franchises display the upward quality distortion,
which explains approximately 90% of franchises. The examples include the most of
all large cities, such as San Antonio, Austin, and Fort Worth. Houston, however,
still shows the downward quality distortion. When I consider the number of channels
for the quality, and hires the predicted values for comparison, 197 franchises (79.4%)
4Here, I call the difference between the predicted values and the data the simulation
error.
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shows the upward quality distortion.
This prevailing phenomenon of the upward quality distortion gives us a new
perspective on the policy making. The existing regulation, represented by Minimum
Quality Standard, concentrates on the downward distortion, trying to guarantee cable
viewers a minimum service level. Now, we should review the situation that the cable
viewers subscribe even unwanted channels, by the service provider’s profit maximizing
behaviors.
Before proceeding to the next section, I also report the welfare loss induced by
the downward quality distortion. As I mentioned earlier, the major portion of fran-
chises (60.4%) experiences the downward quality distortion. Especially, San Antonio
displays a huge welfare loss: $30,861,898 per month. Kerrville has $824,777 welfare
loss per month, Tyler has $795,152 per month, and Corrigan $570,918 per month.
To be fair, the results show that the welfare loss is a more serious problem in the
downward distortion case, comparing to the upward distortion case. However, the
welfare loss induced by the upward distortion also deserves careful consideration.
The phenomenon is enough prevailing and the loss is enough severe.
D. Estimation of Consumer Distribution
Each franchise has a unique market environment. I collect the demographic data to
explain each franchise’s environment. It is rational to consider that the demographic
variables are closely related to the consumer type distribution. A household with a
high income may have a higher taste for the quality improvement. Of course, it may
not have. Neighbors can affect to the taste. Suppose that every neighbors value the
quality improvement highly. Then, the adjacent may also value highly. The household
with many children may show a higher taste for adding TV channels.
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The Table 8 shows the estimation results how the demographic variables affect
the consumer distribution. About the total number of potential subscribers (t. subs.),
the city area size (ar land) and the population (pop 2009) are important. In the bigger
city and in the more crowded city, we have a more potential subscribers. Obviously,
it is very intuitive.
For the driving distances to a nearest big city, we have a more interesting inter-
pretation. As the distance between a franchise and a big city (Metropolitan Statistical
Area over 500,000 population) grows, the number of potential subscribers diminishes.
It is easy to explain; we are going to a rural area. However, as the distance between a
franchise and a metropolis (Metropolitan Statistical Area over 5,000,000 population5)
decreases, we have less potential subscribers, surprisingly. A possible explanation is
the existence of “reluctant” consumers. There are some households, which voluntarily
don’t want to watch TV. In the metropolitan area, we can find more single-person
households, which may have a smaller taste for watching TV. Possibly, there are more
people with unique tastes, like game mania, orthodox book readers, and etc. These
kind of people likely hate watching TV. In the metropolitan area, we can easily find
substitutes for watching TV, rather than a mid-size city or a rural town.
The size of a household is negatively related to the number of potential sub-
scribers, even though it is not significant. Controlling the race, income, and city size,
a big family values other activities, rather than watching TV.
The mean of consumer distribution determines whether the distribution is left-
centered or right-centered, together with the upper bound. The hypothesis of “re-
luctant” consumers is re-discovered here. In the metropolitan area, the consumer
distribution becomes left-centered. We have more people who undervalues the qual-
5In Texas, we have only two such Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Dallas-Fort
Worth-Arlington and Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown.
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ity improvement. In the mid and large size city over 500,000 population, however,
the mean increases. The urban citizens, who may be easily affected by neighbors, has
the higher tastes for the quality improvement.
The income distribution is identified as the very important factor for the mean
of the consumer distribution. The more the low income households are, the smaller
the mean is. In addition, the more the high income households are, the bigger the
mean is. The household with a high income may display the high taste for adding
TV channels.
Controlling all the other factors, Hispanic families don’t like to spend too much
time watching TV. The bigger portion of female population makes the left-centered
consumer distribution, even though insignificantly. We can imagine a society of many
girl-talk clubs.
Now, consider the upper bound. We can develop some more neighborhood stories
here. The increase of population shifts the upper bound to the right, but the city
size shifts it to the left. In the more spacious areas, people would like to find other
enjoyment, besides watching TV. Moreover, other enjoyment, like outdoor activities,
may involve their neighbors.
The income distribution plays a similar role with the case of the mean. The
low income households decreases the upper bound, and the high income households
increase the upper bound. However, the trigger income levels, which start to increases
the parameters, are different. The upper bound becomes bigger at the lower income
level, and the mean responds later.
The standard deviation of the consumer distribution defines how dispersed the
distribution is. The bigger the standard deviation is, the more dispersed the distri-
bution is. In the large city, we have more concentrated distribution; that is another
example for the neighborhood effect. In the case of large portion of Hispanic house-
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holds, the distribution becomes more dispersed. Possibly, Hispanic families have
different tastes with the other races. When we have a higher proportion of high
income households, the distribution becomes more concentrated. The high income
households may have a stable and substantial lower bound of tastes, comparing to
the low income households.
The Tables 9 and 10 examines which and how demographic factors affect the
cutoff levels, inducing a given probability, and the probabilities, obtained from a
given cutoff level. The city size and the population play some roles when determining
the cutoff levels or the probabilities. Generally, the factors affect the mean or the
upper bound of the distribution, and then the distributional change affects the cutoff
levels and the probabilities.
In conclusion, some demographic variables can really change the consumer dis-
tribution. In the process, we can find some stories, like a neighborhood effect and
“reluctant” consumers.
E. Estimation of Market Demand
In the section B, I suggest the method to make a consumer type distribution, using
the real world data. In the section D, I find how the demographic variables affect the
parameters for the consumer distribution.
Here, we have a data set for a cable service provider in Dallas. In Dallas, Time
Warner Cable offers a basic service (24 channels, $11.35), an expanded basic service
(71 channels, $44.5), and a digital basic service (125 channels, $54.45). Then, we
can construct the consumer type distribution for Dallas, and simulate the number of
potential subscribers of Dallas.
Using the above menu, offered by Time Warner Cable, we can calculate the
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quantity demanded for each service tier. Fixing every other values and only varying
the price for the expanded basic service, I derive the demand curve for the expanded
basic service. The first panel in the figure 16 shows the current demand curve for the
expanded basic service.
In this time, we can make an experiment, changing other variables. First, sup-
pose that the population in Dallas increases by 100,000. The increase changes the
mean, the standard deviation, the upper bound, and the total number of potential
subscribers. Thus, we can derive a brand new demand curve, using the new consumer
distribution. The second panel displays the original demand curve and the new one
for the expanded basic service. The third panel shows a new demand curve, when the
median household income in Dallas increases by $10,000. The last panel includes a
new demand curve, when the ratio of households with income over $150,000 increases
by 1%.
In fact, Dallas is not a good example to show the shift of rotation or both for
demand curve, since the market is too big to capture the change of demographic
variables. Here, I present another example. Georgetown, a prosperous suburban city
of Austin, is a mid-size city with population of 50885. There, Suddenlink offers a
basic service (14 channels, $5.99), an expanded basic service (65 channels, $18.48),
and a digital basic service (152 channels, $52.34).
The impact of demographic variable changes appears more vividly, in the Figure
17. The panels show the increase of population by 10,000, the increase of median
household income by 10,000, and the decrease of the proportion of higher income
household by 1%.
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F. Conclusion
The most important discovery in this chapter IV is confirming the possibility of
upward quality distortion. I show that the upward distortion is quite prevailing in
the cable industry. In Texas, 64 franchises among 209 franchises displays the upward
quality distortion. In some franchises, we can find the upward quality distortion even
in the low-end product. Considering the limited volume of previous research, this
discovery is really surprising. I expect this dissertation will be a trigger to introduce
the serious research for the upward quality distortion and its welfare loss.
Another contribution of this chapter is the construction of the consumer type
distribution and the demand curve for a given interested product. The construction
of the consumer distribution is performed by the simulation using the real data of the
cable industry. The section B includes the detailed methodology. In the section E, I
construct the demand curve. Since I already simulate the consumer type distribution,
I can also simulate each product’s market share, varying price levels and fixing other
variables.
In the section D, I examine how demographic variables, like population, income,
city size, race, and gender, affect the consumer distribution. It is performed while
I relate the above demographic variables to the parameters for the consumer type
distribution.
Naturally, the next topic is how the demographic variables affect the market
demand. The effect of a demographic variable’s change on the consumer distribution
can be traced by the estimation results, obtained from the section D. Then, the effect
of a distribution change on the demand curve can be obtained by the simulation,
suggested in the section E. The change of demographic variables can induce the shift
or rotation or both of the demand.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation adopts the finite product differentiation model with continuous con-
sumer types. The model is applied to both the monopolist’s problem and the social
planner’s problem. I reobtain the optimality conditions for the monopolist, originally
obtained by Itoh (1983) and Crawford and Shum (2007). I reconfirm the optimal
market segmentation of Itoh (1983), even in the endogenous quality setting, and re-
solve the optimal quality selection rule of Crawford and Shum (2007), in the more
direct way. Moreover, I also solve the optimality conditions for the social planner, for
the first time. In the chapter III, I introduce the numerical procedures. Using these
computational procedures and the optimality conditions obtained from the chapter
II, I can find the exact values for optimal qualities, prices, maximized profit and social
welfare.
Next, I compare the monopolist’s optimal with the social planner’s optimal. The
comparison is the first step for welfare analysis, which can induce policy implications.
Some part of comparison is performed analytically, while other part is performed
numerically. From the comparison, I show the possibility of upward quality distortion,
which the existing literature has not previously reported. This discovery of the upward
quality distortion, especially on the highest quality product, can stimulate research
for an extreme product version. Although we can easily find the flagship product with
an extremely high quality, like an Intel’s deca-core Xeon CPU and a premium booth
in Yankee Stadium, we have no precedent research for this kind of extreme editions.
I confirm this possibility of upward quality distortion, in the chapter IV. In
fact, it is quite prevailing in the cable industry. In Texas, 64 franchises among 209
franchises displays the upward quality distortion. In some franchises, we can find the
66
upward quality distortion even in the low-end product. Considering the limited vol-
ume of previous research, this discovery is really surprising. I expect this dissertation
will be a trigger to introduce the serious research for the upward quality distortion
and its welfare loss.
This dissertation also analyzes how the number of products affects on the monop-
olist’s and the social planner’s decisions. The profit/social welfare strictly increases
as the number of products increases. Moreover, the increment of increase diminishes
rapidly. The chapter III also researches how distribution change affects the monop-
olist’s and the social planner’s choices. When a consumer distribution is dispersed,
or left-centered, or both, the quality is less distorted and the amount of excluded
consumers is large. When we have a large volume of consumers of low tastes, the
quality is less distorted and information rents, which are enjoyed by consumers, in-
crease. When we have a proper level of thick right-side tail, the possibility of upward
distortion arises. When the distribution is concentrated, the monopolist can achieve
a higher efficiency level compared with the social best.
In the chapter IV, I construct the consumer type distribution by simulating
parameters using a real data in the cable industry. I examine how demographic
variables, like population, income, city size, race, and gender, affect the consumer
distribution. It is performed while I relate the above demographic variables to the
parameters for the consumer type distribution.
When we have a consumer distribution, we can make a demand curve for a
given service tier, varying price levels. I construct the demand curve in the chapter
IV. Moreover, I also study the impact of the change of market environment on the
demand curve. When the population increases, the change of population alters the
consumer distribution. Using this new consumer distribution, we can make a new
demand curve. In the Economics textbook level, we can expect that the change of
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outside parameter induces the shift of demand curve. Here, the story is much complex.
The increase of population affect the consumer distribution, in a few different routes:
mean, standard deviation, and upper bound. In fact, it affect the total number of
potential subscribers, which is another determinant for the demand curve. We can
observe the rotation of the demand curve, as well as the shift of the demand curve.
This dissertation can be a first stepping stone between theoretical framework for
endogenous quality choice and empirical model using finite product differentiation.
Essentially, empirical models take a discrete product space, since data is collected
in the discrete space. Moreover, numerous followers of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes
(1995) usually have assumed that firm’s quality level is exogenously given and only
price is endogenously chosen considering its expected market share. In many cases,
firms choose quality considering the expected market share, too. In addition, the
market share of a product depends on the product quality, as well as its price. This
work can help empirical researchers simulate the endogenously chosen quality, to-
gether with the endogenously chosen price and the endogenously determined market
share.
The immediate future works, therefore, are empirical applications of this work,
even though I already start the work here. Crawford and Shum (2007) is a valuable
and unique previous empirical analysis with the endogenous qualities in the monopoly,
like this work. Other future investigations would be extending this dissertation’s
framework into competitive environment. Although we already have several preceding
papers of finite products and endogenous qualities, almost all works adopt quite
restrictive environments, like a uniform consumer distribution and a zero marginal
cost. Chu (2010) begins the study from the empirical side but it makes a theoretical
improvement also. He adopts even more flexible consumer distribution and estimates
both quality and market share, even though he needs some restrictions. He exploits
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consumers’ brand loyalty and incumbent-entrant structure. However, in empirical
application or extension to the competitive environments or both, many tasks and
topics remain to be developed.
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APPENDIX A
OVERVIEW OF THE CABLE INDUSTRY
In this appendix, I survey the cable industry. At first, I describe the chrono-
logical history of the industry. While describing, I focus on a structural change of
the industry, usually induced by technological innovations or governmental interven-
tions. And then I describe the technology of the industry. In the third subsection,
I listed essential governmental interventions. The remaining subsections are devoted
to describing big players of the industry: MSOs and media conglomerates.
The cable industry has had a relatively short life. Parsons (2008) argues that
the industry is very young, compared with other industries’ process of development.
Although the industry has grown only a short time, its influence over mass culture,
especially America’s mass culture, is enormous. Thus, many authors have been feeling
it is a good time to comb through the industry’s history. See Mullen (2008), Parsons
(2008), and Webb (1983) for examples. Both Parsons (2008) and Mullen (2008)
employ a chronological method, but Mullen (2008) pays more attention to the roles
of people around the industry, while Parsons (2008) emphasizes the institutional
effects like regulation. Webb (1983) analyzes causes and consequences of the industry
using economic logic.
A Brief History of the Industry
An Eve of the Birth of the Cable Industry
In the 19th century, radio was already used in the form of “wireless telegraph.” In
early times, the “wireless” use of radio was usually applied to ships in the ocean.
It didn’t, however, take a long before recognizing there was no technical difficulty
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to apply the radio technology to multiple anonymous recipients, instead of a single
known recipient like a ship. In the 1920s, the interest of industry using the radio
technology moved from telegraphing to broadcasting radio. In 1926, NBC, the first
radio station, was founded, and in 1928, CBS followed. The U.S. government, which
observed that the radio technology could become the essential part of mass media,
introduced the Radio Act of 1927 and created the FRC. Ever since, the government
have put various regulations on the industry.
The era of radio rapidly had evolved to the era of television. The government
needed a new act, the Communication Act of 1934, and the FRC was replaced with
the FCC. In the 1930s, the major radio stations sensed the potential power of tele-
visions. In fact, “Hollywood” was enjoying their heyday in these times, and many
persons regarded television as a potential mini-theater at home. Since the late 1930s,
numerous potential television broadcast stations were waiting to get their licenses
from the FCC. But the enemy of the entrepreneurs was not the FCC, but World War
II. The spectrums had to be assigned to military uses and the broadcasting licenses
were limited at the minimum level. After the war, numerous stations, over 100, were
licensed and began to broadcast. The limited spectrums were exhausted in a very
short time, and there was much confusion in radio uses. After all, the FCC declared
all additional licensing should be frozen. While freezing additional stations, there
were efforts to exploit existing signals from already licensed stations. These efforts
triggered the cable industry.
An Early Stage: a CATV Business and Beginning of Government Regulations
John Walson, an appliance dealer, made a cable system for the first time in 1948.
Mahanoy City in Pennsylvania is surrounded by mountains and so this city couldn’t
get signals from Philadelphia. Walson had difficulties to sell televisions in this city
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and he decided to set a big antenna on Tuscarora Mountain. The households in
Mahanoy city were connected to this antenna, and became the first cable subscribers.
Walson offered free cable service for buying a television set, and this service became
the foundation of Service Electric Television, which is one of the biggest MSOs today.
On the other hand, we have three more plausible stories for the first cable service.
Leroy E. Parsons of Astoria, Oregon installed an antenna on the top of a hotel near
his home just to secure a clean screen. But right after that, he found the business
opportunity from this antenna. It happened in late 1948. James Y. Davidson of Tuck-
erman, Arkansas did a similar thing to Parsons. The difference was that he made a
100-foot big antenna to receive signals from faraway Memphis. After the demonstra-
tion of a football game: University of Tennessee versus University of Mississippi, he
was recognized as the center of cable business in this region. In Lansford, Pennsylva-
nia, Robert J. Tarlton began Panther Valley TV in 1950. Though he started a little
later than his competitors for the “first,” the Panther Valley TV established its own
business model faster than others after merging with Jerrold Electronics, which sup-
plied cable equipments including a CATV-specific coaxial cable. The Panther Valley
TV charged an installation fee and then a monthly subscription fee, which is very
similar to a cable service charge today.
We call this kind of service a CATV; a community antenna television. In this
stage, the function of the cable industry was just to retransmit signals from broad-
casting stations operating in big cities. For more information about a CATV and
early pioneers, see Lockman and Sarvey (2005) and Robichaux (2002). Both two
books are wholly devoted to CATV pioneers.
During the 1950s, the FCC could not determine its position. The FCC, basically,
was not for this industry. The CATV used wired cable like telephone, but they
transmitted the signal from broadcasting stations. In the viewpoint of the FCC,
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it was neither telephone-like nor broadcast-like. Of course, it was both telephone-
like and broadcast-like. Virtually, the standpoint of the FCC was no intervention
through all the 1950s. The CATV industry rapidly expanded their businesses without
regulations.
The philosophy of the FCC was changed dramatically in the 1960s after the
CATV industry employed microwaves. Local small broadcasting stations began to
strongly complain that CATV threatened their survival. Through the microwaves,
the CATV industry could supply high quality and capital-intensive programs pro-
duced by urban-area stations to local subscribers in rural areas. It stole numerous
audiences from local small broadcasting stations. The FCC decided to stand on the
local stations’ side although Congress and Court still didn’t determine their positions.
Until this time, Congress could not pass any bill about the CATV business and courts
gave some mixed judgements. The FCC required all CATV companies should deliver
their local stations’ programs (a must-carry rule) and strictly limited the adoption of
microwaves.
In the late of 1960s, the government and some governmental bodies including
the FCC determined their position at last. The FCC considered the CATV as a
top prospect to break down the strong three-network oligopoly in the broadcasting
industry. At this time, the U.S. broadcasting market was ruled by ABC, CBS, and
NBC. The regulations of the FCC aimed at invigorating local broadcasting stations.
Thus, the CATV systems, which were medium to large size, were asked to produce
and deliver their own programs (a local origination rule).
Since this local broadcasting, a recent form of cable television began to replace
the CATV system. That is, the cable industry added the local broadcasting service
on just a retransmitting service. The FCC’s intention got a small success, but a
big failure at large. In some communities, cable service providers constructed active
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relationship with local schools and local groups. They cooperated to produce regional
programs, which was exactly FCC hoped. But in most part, this regulation induced
a huge financial crisis among the local CATV companies.
In 1972, the FCC modified their regulations. Apparently, it seemed to strengthen
the regulations. They added the mandatory delivering the programs of assigned local
stations and they obligated contracts with local governments in CATV company’s
service area. But the real face was different; the FCC loosened the requirement to be
under the regulation. Now, the companies only in big cities fell under the regulation.
In fact, the FCC wanted to supply a remedy for the financial crisis of the CATV
companies. The obligation of municipal contracts was, in the point of fact, helpful to
companies, because it limited a franchising fee of municipality. In 1974, people began
to think that a CATV business could make a profit.
In spite of non-cooperative attitude of FCC in the 1960s, CATV industry still
continued to expand. There appeared a few prototypes of a future MSO. And pro-
totypes of a pay cable channel also entered the stage. After a few experiments in
the 1950s, some pay channels were formed. The Gridtronics, owned by Warner Com-
munication, started the service. It eventually had grown into The Movie Channel.
Another pay channel, the Z Channel, was a foundation for Showtime. In 1972, Ster-
ling Manhattan Cable, owned by the Time, Inc., launched a pay channel, named by
Home Box Office.
An Era of Satellites: a Rise of the Cable Networks
In the early 1970s, the cable industry was congested. Pay televisions using cables
were prohibited, companies in a big city were severely regulated by the FCC, and the
plan to utilize satellites was pending by endless debates among related government
bodies. Moreover, the conflicts about the copyright of broadcasting programs were
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still in courts. Nobody could squeeze a growth plan out of the industry. In 1975,
accurately after 1972, the agonies of the industry suddenly melted down with the
satellite debut in the cable industry. Since that, the satellites became the essential
part of the industry growth.
In the 1960s, pioneering satellite experiments were being tried. Numerous CATV
companies had much interest on that, since AT&T land lines asked expensive charges.
But the “discussion” between the FCC and other governmental bodies had continued
until 1972. That is, for the CATV companies, the satellites were just a pie in the sky.
In the 1970s, the FCC eliminated almost all possible legal obstacles in the in-
dustry. In 1974, the regulation to produce local programs was abolished. In 1976
and 1980, the FCC allowed all kinds of importation of programs from any broadcast
stations, step by step. Except for the municipal contracts, almost all obligations
were disappeared.1 Most of all, the cable company could use their longing satellites
in 1975. It seemed that the industry could grow easily and rapidly, with satellites
together. But it was not easy like that. The rental fee for the satellites2 and the
cost of dishes and converters were not cheap enough. In 1979, the FCC repealed the
specific technological requirements on a satellite and a receiving dish and converter.
And then, the cable providers could employ the “cheap” technologies according to
their profit level.
The first forerunners employing a satellite technology were pay-cable stations, es-
1We should note one thing here: Although the FCC removed the local program
obligations, the local programs could hold their positions. It was because of main-
taining municipal contracts obligations. Local governments and civil activists asked
for the cable providers to produce the local programs. As the prospect of the industry
became positive, the competition for the service contract became fierce. Thus local
governments had strong bargaining power.
2Of course, the rental fee for a satellite was reverted to a cable broadcasting
network, not a cable service provider.
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pecially HBO. But the other broadcasting stations began to adopt the technology, not
before long the HBO’s employment. In these times, the local broadcasting stations,
like New York’s WOR and Chicago’s WGN, grew the nation-wide super-stations by
delivering their signals using the satellites. In the late 1970s, the other cable-based
networks started to make revenue. The networks like USA, C-SPAN, ESPN, and
many Spanish networks began the nation-wide services through satellites.
During the 1980s, people began to think that the cable industry would be a cash
cow. Using the satellite technology, newly arriving networks produced numerous at-
tractive programs. In 1980, there were only 12 networks, but in 1992, the number of
operating networks were over 60. In the deregulation mood of the Reagan adminis-
tration, the Cable Act of 1984 really promoted astonishing growth of the industry.
The main objective of the Act was a compromise between the cable industry and
the municipalities. But the Act, the first industry-specific Act, maintained almost
all existing traditions. The large MSOs, which will be explained in following sections
in detail, got a chance to leap one more time. Usually, a laissez faire policy helps
big players. These big MSOs became bigger and bigger, and they moved into the
area of broadcasting networks. In conclusion, it made a big development of cable-
specific broadcasting. Helped by MSO’s financing, many networks could begin their
adventurous businesses.
In those days, some thought that the narrow-tasted channels also would be prof-
itable in the multi-channel age. They launched the so-called “culture” networks.
ABC launched ABC-ARTS. CBS had CBS-Cable and NBC had the Entertainment
Channel. In addition, there was Bravo3. These “culture” networks couldn’t last long.
ABC-ARTS and the Entertainment Channel merged into A&E, and A&E added more
3At that time, this network broadcasted non-Hollywood movies, usually interna-
tional art films.
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popular programs. Bravo also added some popular films in their program lineup.
In 1980, Time, Inc. set up Cinemax, as a complement of HBO. In 1984, Lifetime
was founded aiming for housewife TV viewers. In 1985, John Hendricks launched
Discovery Channel. And the Discovery networks added The Learning Channel, Travel
Channel, Animal Planet, Discovery Health Channel and Discovery Home and Leisure.
There was another big success story. The owner of TBS,4 Ted Turner, launched
CNN in 1980. In early years, it underwent difficult days to attract viewers. CNN,
however, aggressively secured international news sources, and it gave CNN a big
success, especially, through the Gulf war. Turner added TNT, Cartoon Network, and
TCM in turn.
In the 1990s, there appeared networks with more restricted audience targets.
Comedy Central and E! Entertainment Television aimed their own special audiences.
The first considered politically progressive young people. The second aimed young
and easy-going persons. But the most outstanding success story went to MTV. MTV
made a big success not only on the broadcasting scene, but also the whole cultural
scene. MTV could make a new MTV generation and it was a cultural phenomenon,
jumping over TV’s limitation. Another phenomenon worthy of noting is advent of
home shopping channels. In the 1980s, several home shopping channels made suc-
cesses. Before launching of home shopping channels, people thought that the mutual
interaction would play a big role in success of these channels. But at that time, they
just used phone call interactions. After that, the interest on the mutual interaction
technology moved to an internet, not a cable. Recently, the home shopping channels
are facing with a big challenge of an internet-based business.
4At first, it was a local broadcasting station in Atlanta area. By delivering the
signal using the satellite, it grew a nation-wide super-station.
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Convergence of Communication related Industries
In the 1980s, the industry expanded astonishingly. The Cable Act of 1984 removed
almost all obstacles in the industry. It was obvious that big players would play in
the region of cable service providing. The first one was TCI. The TCI already had
2 million subscribers in 1981. During the 1980s, the TCI acquired many small cable
systems and rival systems. In the early 1980s, the TCI made a hub and spokes-like
big system near Pittsburgh. The economic benefit of this system stimulated other
MSOs. In conclusion, almost all metropolitan areas were equipped by this hub and
spokes system. To do this, the MSOs merged, acquired, and exchanged numerous
local systems. The most notable story was about “swaps” between Milwaukee for
Time Warner and Chicago for TCI in 1998.
By 1990, Comcast also obtained a seat for a big MSO. Comcast started in 1963,
and by the numerous merger and acquisition, it grew a big MSO. Comcast expanded
one more time when adding MediaOne’s system after merger and acquisition with
AT&T. And then, the breakup of TCI gave Comcast a chance to the largest one in
the industry. As of 2008, Comcast secured 24.2 million subscribers.
Warner-Amex and ATC were another big MSOs in the 1980s. And in the 1990s,
ATC had became the big part of a giant Time Warner. After a huge size M&A
deal of Time Warner in 1989, Time Warner obtained NewChannel in 1995. It had
13.1 million subscribers in 2008. The third positioned, Cox Communications had 5.3
million. On the other hand, Service Electric, which we reviewed in the Section 1.2,
was fourteenth positioned and had 29 thousand subscribers.
In these times, that is, in the 1990s and the 2000s, the most outstanding phe-
nomenon was a convergence of industry and technology. Telephone, internet, and ca-
ble business in addition to broadcasting industry were rapidly coming together under
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one roof. Today, almost all cable MSOs offer the cable-internet-telephone package.
Moreover, the cable MSOs have a substantial share for broadcasting networks. In
1996 Time Warner merged with Turner Broadcasting, and in 2001 it acquired AOL.
Here are some notable mergers: in 1993 Walt Disney Co. acquired ABC, in 1997
Microsoft acquired 11.5% share of Comcast, and in 1999 CBS and Viacom merged.
In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act,
mainly leaded Senator Albert Gore. Unlike the Act of 1984, this one strengthened
some regulations. Especially, this Act limited the total number of subscribers in
one MSO. But this Act quickly replaced by the Communication Act of 1996. In
1996, people already expected the industry convergence, so they needed the new
bill to manage relevant industries together. The Act of 1996 gave a chance to a
telephone companies. Until 1996, the telephone companies were more regulated than
others. Moreover, by the new integrated Act, some new technologies, like the Ku-
band satellite broadcasting system, entered the cable industry as competitors. As the
cable MSOs have had new chances for a business, they have had new competitors,
who were not before.
A Basic Technological Explanation on the Industry
A Cable Technology
In this section, we examine technical aspects of the cable industry. The essence of
the cable industry is to take broadcasting signals and to deliver them to end-node
consumers, households. At first, we describe the receiving and re-distributing process.
Of course, we will deal other functions relevant with the cable industry.
The first and most important function in the cable industry is receiving broad-
casting signals and re-distributing. In early years, broadcasting stations started to
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emit signals, but the signals couldn’t go very far. Moreover, they were affected by
geography. So people constructed a big antenna on a high hill to collect the signals
and distributed them through cables connected with the big antenna. The signals
collected by the big antenna were sent to a headend at first. The headend can amplify
and process the signals.
When the broadcasting stations employed microwaves, the function of headend
had also expanded to receive microwaves. In the form of microwaves, the signals
could travel longer distances. And the new headend could change the spectrum of
microwaves and emit the changed. That is, the signal from a broadcasting station
could travel longer and longer distances. It suggested a possibility of a big broadcast-
ing station. In the 1970s, we could use satellites to distribute broadcasting signals.
A headend, of course, evolved to accept the satellite technologies.
A headend has other functions than receiving and re-distributing. A headend
employs various playback technologies, so it can adjust broadcasting schedules and
sequences. Sometimes it can insert a locally prepared program between regular broad-
casting programs. Many headends are connected to facilities to make own programs.
In recent years, a headend can process internet services and cable telephone services.
Now, almost all cable service providers offer a bundle consisting with a cable service,
a telephone service, and an internet service.
From the headend, the signals go to a subscriber’s home. To connect the headend
to the subscriber’s television, we use a cable. There are some different kinds of
cables; a feeder is a thick cable from the headend and a drop connects a feeder with
a subscriber’s home. The signal moves through these cables from the headend to a
subscriber’s home. In this process, there happen amplifications a few times.
Once the signal arrives at the subscriber’s home, we need a converter box. This
converter box tunes the arrived signals by VHF dials or alternative tuning device.
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Today almost all televisions include the converter box, so many people can use the
cable services just from wall. The converter box, however, is still used for new services;
digital channels, interactive services, and digital video recording. Sometimes the
converter box is used for cable-related services; a high-speed internet and a cable
telephone.
In recent days, the major part of cable services is no longer re-distributing the
air-signals from the broadcasting stations. After the communication satellites became
popular, there have arrived numerous cable-based program services or networks. Us-
ing the communication satellites, they emit signals which a household cannot receive
by a usual antenna. Only cable service providers can receive these and re-distribute
into a subscriber’s home by cables. The familiar channels, like CNN, ESPN, and
MTV, are cable-based networks. We cannot receive these channels’ programs only
using a regular antenna, while we are able to catch the programs from ABC, CBS,
NBC, and Fox. There are many networks using air-signals,5 but most air-signal net-
works are affiliated with ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox and PBS.6 The technical part is almost
same in these different stations, only except whether using air-signals or not.
Competing Technologies with Cable
A MMDS uses microwave relays. The receiver collects signals in the form of mi-
crowaves, and it re-broadcasts in the form of air-signals in the limited area. Since
it needs air-signals, the number of channels should be limited, usually around 10.
In the middle of 1980s, that is, in the first arrival of multi-channel age, the MMDS
5The name of local air-signal networks begins with K(west of the Mississippi) or
W(east of the Mississippi). This name is a license granted by FCC.
6There are a few independent local air-signal networks. They are usually “homes”
for local Major League Baseball teams or “broadcasting platform” for religious bodies.
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had disappeared. But its extremely low cost and the wireless form can be another
alternative someday.
A SMATV is serviced only for hotels, hospitals, and so on. This is a small size
CATV industry. A hotel installs a dish for SMATV service on its rooftop and entire
hotel rooms are connected to the dish by cables. This system doesn’t need expensive
utility polls, but it was not profitable enough to overcome the competition with rich
cable operators. It is, however, still attractive in remote areas.
The DBS, which usually we call a dish, are the strongest rival for the cable
industry. Since the middle of 1970s, they have expanded their business and now they
have a substantial proportion in the multichannel television services industry.
The first“dish”-like technology was DTH satellite service using the C-band sig-
nals. This service requires 10-12-foot earth station; a big dish. When it was intro-
duced first, people really welcomed it. Especially in rural areas, it was quite popular.
At that time, it asked just one-time installation fee. But after the invention of scram-
bling technology, the operators charged a monthly fee. It removed the attractiveness
of the service. Except in a few rural areas, this technology has quickly disappeared.
And then, the DBS using the Ku band signals came. It requires 18-20-inch dishes to
install anywhere around a house. Although there were eight service providers at early
days, we have only two major companies, DirecTV and Echostar (DISH Network).
The weakness of DBS is the limited number of service providers, for the number of
orbital slots for static satellites is limited.
The History of Regulations on the Industry
A tone of governmental regulations always depends on the political viewpoint of a
party in power. In the Republican administration, the tone was quite generous. The
government would remove regulations and would like to promote private enterprise
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atmosphere. On the other hand, the Democratic administration stressed strict reg-
ulations and consumer protection. They pursued competition in a controlled industry.
The Communication Act of 1934 This act, which was following the Radio Act
of 1927, formulated the FCC. Since after this act, the FCC has regulated all relevant
industries. At that time, the relevant industries were classified into two categories: a
mass communication and an intercommunication. The mass communication included
radio and television broadcasting. The intercommunication included telephone and
telegraph. Especially, they called the intercommunication as a common carrier.
The characteristics of the mass communication were described by emission of
air-signal to unknown mass and one-way communication. On the other hand, the
intercommunication could specify receiving subjects and could get the response from
the receivers. In the mass communication, the business should use the spectrum,
which was allocated by the FCC, and so the FCC had justification for regulations
on these businesses. In the case for the intercommunication, the businesses needed
some geographical monopolistic power to secure local network facilities. Thus, the
FCC guaranteed some degree of market power and then regulated their businesses,
especially the FCC did rate regulation.
In the case for the cable television business, the situation was much more compli-
cated. The cable industry didn’t employ air signal and it could specify the receiving
subject. Moreover, they needed some local network facilities. But it didn’t admit
intercommunication, although it was technologically possible. And the main contents
of this business was ones of the mass communication. That is, the cable television
business was neither a mass communication nor intercommunication. At the early
years of the industry, the FCC didn’t consider the industry as a common carrier, so
it could avoid a rate regulation.
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Belknap Dispute (1951-1954) In 1951, J. E. Belknap and Associates claimed that
it would employ microwave as a common carrier. They argued that they would sell
broadcasting signals to CATV companies using microwave. So microwave could be a
common carrier in this case. But at that time, the only consumer CATV company
was J. E. Belknap and Associates itself. Thus, the main issue was whether a CATV
business was a common carrier or not, since the final and conclusive service was a
CATV, not a microwave business. Since the Communication Act of 1934, the FCC
still hadn’t decide their position about CATV businesses. In this reason, J. E. Belknap
and Associates reclaimed the same argument after dividing company into a microwave
part and a CATV part. Although it got a permission in 1954, it couldn’t begin its
business.
While this claim proceeded, some issues, which would become major controversial
things during a few following decades, rose on the surface. The first one is copyright.
The contents of CATV businesses were from broadcasting companies. Although the
broadcasting stations had benefits from re-distributing of their signal, the problem
on property right for their creations still remained unsolved.
The second one was the concern of the FCC to protect small local broadcasting
stations. The import of popular programs made by big urban broadcasting sta-
tions, using microwaves and CATV, might do harm to local stations. Since after this
claim, the FCC had maintained their propensity for diversity and equal opportunity
of broadcasting in rural area until the Reagan administration would appear.
Cox Report (1958) and 1959 Report and Order of the FCC In 1958, the
Senate Committee issued the staff report, authored by Cox, about the debate on the
cable industry. Until this report, the FCC had held their position, in which they
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were reluctant to intervene the industry operation. But the report suggested that the
FCC should regulate the industry as a new media. Especially, the report pointed that
the industry could be harmful to a local small broadcasters, and so the FCC should
protect these broadcasters.
The 1959 Report and Order of the FCC was a response on the report. Although
the FCC explained the CATV wasn’t harmful much to a local broadcasters, the FCC
recommended that CATA operators should obtain retransmission consent from broad-
casters whose signal CATV operators would want to carry.
S.2653 (1959) At the late of 1950s, the first industry specific bill was prepared. The
bill, S.2653, required that the FCC made mandatory licensing procedure for CATV
business. The CATV operators should carry local broadcasting signals and they were
prevented to duplicate long distance signals or other cable channels’ programs. The
most outstanding figure of this bill was the fact that the CATV industry would be
regulated by a mass communication, not a common carrier. After a big exhaustive
debates, the bill was defeated and died in committee.
Carter Mountain Decision (1962) The FCC denied to license a microwave ap-
plication of Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. The FCC judged that microwave
import might be harmful to local broadcasters and the FCC decided to protect them.
This decision became a new momentum for the expansion of regulatory authority.
Note that the FCC still had considered the industry as a common carrier. That is,
the FCC took the first step to regulate the industry, but the FCC didn’t take the
whole viewpoint of S.2653.
The Seiden Report (1964) As of 1964, there was still no official Congressional
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regulation on the industry. The FCC hired Dr. Seiden to investigate the effect of the
CATV industry on local broadcasters, especially UHF television stations. The report
showed CATV to be less of a threat to the broadcast stations, and so Dr. Seiden
preferred to support UHF stations, rather than regulate CATV.
1965 and 1966 Report and Order of the FCC Still with no Congressional sup-
port, the FCC set up their regulatory position at last. The FCC acknowledged that
they needed a new category to regulate the industry, neither a mass communication
nor an intercommunication. And the FCC dealt with the industry aiming the public
interest. Their actions were close to Cox Report and S.2653, rather than the Seiden
Report. From this time, the FCC began to intervene the industry effectively for the
first time.
The Rostow Report (1968) In 1968, a task force, leaded by Eugene Rostow, was
formed by the White House of Johnson administration. They recommended the FCC
to relax regulations on the industry. It was because they decided that the cable in-
dustry could be a good alternative to collapse three network oligopoly in television
broadcasting industry. After the report, people had recognized the industry’s new
role as an alternative for the mass communication industry.
Two Court Decisions in 1968 In the case of United States vs. Southwestern Cable,
the Supreme Court admitted the jurisdiction of the FCC in the industry. This be-
came the first legal support for the regulations of the FCC. In another case of United
Artists Television vs. Fortnightly Corp., the Supreme Court removed the copyright
liability from the CATV industry. The court recognized the CATV as one of viewer’s
tools to catch broadcasting signals. Thus, the CATV company was free of copyright
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liability, like an antenna company.
1972 Report and Order of the FCC This was the first extensive regulations
for the industry. Under this rule, the cable systems were required to have at least
20 channels and two-way capacity. If the system had more than 3,500 subscribers,
it should offer one access channel. And the system, which operated in the top 100
markets, had to provide at least three public, government, and educational channels.
About the importation of signals, cable systems were granted the right to import
distant signals. The number of signals the system could import depended on the
market size. Top market systems could import 3 additional independent signals.
But systems in markets below 100 could carry only one independent, which is called
“anti-leapfrogging.” Of course, the local broadcasters’ signals should be carried by
the systems.
The Certificate of Compliance was added to the regulation set for the industry.
Every cable operators should take this Certificate, and this was related with munic-
ipalities. The FCC gave municipalities some degree of control power on the cable
operators, instead of capping franchise fees at 3%. The operators should take the
Certificate from bargaining with municipalities.
As a whole, the 1972 rule was constructed by the viewpoint of liberalism in the
Nixon administration. Indeed, the Certificate played a role to protect cable systems
from local fickle politicians. And the new importation policy was quite favorable to
the operators. At that time, the NCTA evaluated this rule as the first step to end
the industry freeze.
Deregulating Steps During 1974-1980 In 1974, the FCC abandoned the rule to
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originate programming in the top market systems.7 In 1976, the FCC removed any
restriction on the importation of signals. Then in 1980, the FCC removed the all
remaining “anti-leapfrogging” rule.
The Copyright Act of 1976 Contrary to the Court decision of 1968, the act guar-
anteed the property rights of broadcasters on programming. But the act got rid
of all exhaustive conflicts between broadcasters and cable operators, employing a
“compulsory license” system. Every cable operators should pay some royalties to the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal and it re-distributed that money to broadcasters.
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 The main purpose of this Act
was a compromise between the interests of the cable industry and those of the munic-
ipalities in which cable systems wished to do business. At that time, cable franchising
process was quite corrupted and so this compromise was very important. Apparently,
this Act handed a win to municipalities, giving some regulatory powers and rights to
secure leased access channels. The Act, however, was based on the deregulation mind
of the Reagan administration. While establishing franchising process gave some reg-
ulation power to cities, it freed cable operators from unreasonable bargaining process
with municipalities. Additionally, consolidating regulations implied cable operators
were free as long as they were under the regulation. Thanks to this favorable Act,
the cable industry could grow very fast, especially a large MSO could.
Must-Carry Decision in 1985 In 1980, Ted Turner petitioned the FCC for elimi-
nation of the must-carry rules, arguing that they violated the First Amendment rights
7By the 1969 rule, the systems, which had more than 3,500 subscribers, should
offer their own local programming.
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of the Constitutional law. But the FCC didn’t respond to the petition. Meanwhile,
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. in Quincy, Washington, decided not to carry three local
Spokane broadcast signals, choosing to import three stations from Seattle instead.
The FCC ordered carriage of local signals and charged a fine. At last, both cases
went to the court. In 1985, the District of Columbia Circuit Court ruled the FCC’s
must-carry rules were an unconstitutional infringement of the cable operator’s First
Amendment rights.
Abandon of Price Control (1986) On December 29, 1986, the FCC abandoned
the control for cable subscriber rates. In the first six months of deregulation, the
average cost of basic service increased between 10.6% and 14.6%, depending on the
estimates. We should note that an industry with the possibility of a natural monopoly
are usually controlled by a rate regulation.
The Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 The era of
a laissez faire arisen from the Cable Act of 1984 had gone in 1992. The 1992 Cable
Act was leaded by Senator Albert Gore, and he recognized US consumers as victims
of a greedy and out-of-control cable industry. This new Act proclaimed a new mood
of the Clinton administration.
This new Act was the most harsh regulation for the industry. The FCC could
do a rate regulation and even a tier regulation. As a matter of fact, the FCC ordered
a freeze on all cable rate increases and then began a systematic rate rollback in 1993.
Must-carry was reinstated. The service guideline was introduced in detail. The reg-
ulatory power of municipality was enhanced.
The Telecommunication Act of 1996 Since 1934, the communication industry
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had changed dramatically, and it invented numerous new technologies. Thus, it was
inevitable to compose a new Act, the Telecommunication Act. This act mainly con-
cerned about the telecommunication industry focusing on the telephone industry, not
the cable industry. But the Act had significantly influenced over the cable industry.
The Clinton administration pursued to increase competition, and so they re-
moved barriers between relevant industries. Right after the Act, the telephone com-
panies began to enter the cable industry. Moreover, the cable operators could possess
cable networks.
Additionally, this Act relaxed the rate regulation. The MSOs with less than
50,000 subscribers were freed immediately.
The Rise and Fall of MSOs
Through the 1970s, TelePrompTer dominated the cable TV business.8 And in the
1980s, TCI became a No.1 market sharer. After falling of TCI, the domination had
passed to Time Warmer and Comcast, in turn. As of 2008, Comcast secured the
largest subscribers, and Time Warner and Cox followed Comcast. The Table 11
shows the ranking of MSOs in 2008.9
TelePrompTer Corporation Irving B. Kahn was one of the first leaders of a recent
style MSO. In 1959, Kahn’s TelePrompTer began to acquire CATV systems. By the
mid-1960s, TelePrompTer had grown to one of the biggest in U.S. with 14 systems
and 70,000 subscribers. TelePrompTer began to lose its leading role in the industry
since 1971, when Kahn was convicted of bribery during the Johnstown, Pennsylvania
8The substantial amount of descriptions in this section was from explanation of
Wikipedia.
9Confer the NCTA website.
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franchise renewal process. During all 1970s, TelePrompTer had been in difficulty, and
at last it was sold to Westinghouse’s Group W Cable Subdivision in 1981.
Cox Communications, Inc. In 1962, Cox Enterprises dived into the cable busi-
ness, purchasing a number of cable systems in Pennsylvania, California, Oregon and
Washington. In 1999 Cox acquired the cable television assets of Media General in
Virginia. In 2000 Cox Communications acquired Multimedia Cablevision with as-
sets in Kansas, Oklahoma and North Carolina. On November 1, 2005, Cox sold all
of its Texas, Missouri, Mississippi and North Carolina properties, as well as some
systems in Arkansas, California, Louisiana and Oklahoma to Cebridge Communica-
tions. The sale closed in 2006 and those systems were transitioned by their new owner
from Cox to Suddenlink Communications, a new brand of Cebridge Communications.
Tele-Communication, Inc. TCI was a cable television provider for much of its
history controlled by John Malone. The company came into being in 1968, following
the merger of Western Microwave, Inc. and Community Television, Inc.
In 1956, Bob Magness decided to raise some money for a CATV system in
Memphis, Texas. Two years later, he built 6 systems with some partners, serving
a total of 12,000 homes. In 1968, the companies moved to Denver and became Tele-
Communications Inc. TCI went public in 1970. At the time, it was the 10th largest
cable company in the United States. By 1972, with 100,000 subscribers, Magness
needed someone with more business knowledge to run the operation. He decided to
hire John Malone, president of Jerrold Electronics, a division of General Instrument.
By 1981, Malone had made TCI the largest cable company in the United States. His
major business skill was merging and acquiring small to mid-size other companies.
Between 1972 and 1988, TCI completed 482 acquisition or sale deals.
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After a failed merger attempt with Bell Atlantic in 1994, it was purchased in 1999
by AT&T. On June 24, 1998, AT&T, the nation’s largest provider of telephone ser-
vice, announced a plan to buy TCI, for $32 billion in stock and $16 billion in assumed
debt. This marked the first major merger between phone and cable since deregula-
tion after the Reagan administration. AT&T completed its acquisition March 9, 1999,
and TCI became AT&T Broadband and Internet Services, the company’s largest unit.
TCI’s cable television assets were later acquired by Charter Communications and the
Comcast Corporation.
American Television and Communications Bill Daniels, commonly known as
the “Father of Cable Television,” constructed a CATV system in New Mexico in the
1950s and employed a microwave relay for the first time. He founded Daniels and
Associates, a cable brokerage firm in 1958. In 1968, Daniels and Associates gath-
ered a number of systems and created a new cable company, ATC. Right after its
birth, it was the third largest cable company in the country with more than 100,000
subscribers. In 1973, ATC bought the systems from Time, Inc., but the whole ATC
including the part from Time, Inc. was purchased back by Time, Inc. in 1978.
Comcast Corporation American Cable Systems was founded in 1963 by Ralph J.
Roberts, and in 1969 it was incorporated in Pennsylvania under the name Comcast
Corporation. Comcast bought 25% of Group W Cable in 1986, doubling its size. Two
years later, it purchased a 50% share in Storer Communications, Inc. Comcast became
the third largest cable operator in 1994 following its purchase of Maclean-Hunter’s
American division.
In June 1997, Microsoft bought 11% of Comcast for $1 billion. This was another
evidence that Microsoft had much interest in a cable industry, together with Paul
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Allen’s Charter Communications. A substantial amount of Wall Street investment
followed Bill Gates.
In 2001, Comcast announced it would acquire the assets of the largest cable tele-
vision operator at the time, AT&T Broadband (AT&T’s spin off cable TV service)
for $44.5 billion. In 2002, Comcast acquired all assets of AT&T Broadband, thus
making Comcast the largest cable television company in the United States with over
22 million subscribers. In 2005, Comcast joined Adelphia purchase with Time Warner
Cable.10
Adelphia Communications Corporation John Rigas opened his first cable sys-
tem in 1953. In 1973, he put all his businesses together, and create Adelphia. He
and his family made this company to the nation’s sixth largest MSO, with more than
5 million subscribers. But the excessive investment to telephony business brought a
huge financial crisis. As a result, it bankrupted in 2002, and its assets were officially
acquired by Time Warner and Comcast on July 31, 2006.
Cablevision Systems Corporation Cablevision Systems Corporation was founded
in 1973 under leading of Charles Dolan. As of 2008, it was the 5th largest cable
provider in the US, with most customers residing in New York, New Jersey, Con-
necticut, and parts of Pennsylvania.
Group W Cable The Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, also known as Group
W, was the broadcasting division of Westinghouse Electric Corporation, founded in
1886. It had operated in radio and television broadcasting since the 1920s. In 1981,
10See the subsections for Adelphia and Time Warner Cable.
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Group W purchased cable TV system operator TelePrompTer, which it renamed
Group W Cable the following year. Group W would leave the cable TV system busi-
ness in 1986. Their assets, covering 2.1 million subscribers and valuing $2.1 billion,
went to ATC, Comcast, Daniels and Associates, Century Communications, and TCI.
Time Warner Cable, Inc. Time Life Broadcasting entered the CATV field in
1965. Its most historically significant investment came to a company called Sterling
Communications. In fall of 1964, Sterling applied for a franchise to wire New York.
The heavy amount of investment for Manhattan, however, was a big burden for
Sterling. After a big failure in Manhattan, Time Inc. abandoned its CATV business,
selling assets to ATC in 1973. But in 1978 Time Inc. reentered system operation,
purchasing the whole ATC back.
In 1974, Warner Communications entered the cable television industry by form-
ing Warner Cable in Ohio and Virginia. In 1977, Warner Cable’s Columbus, Ohio
unit introduced the QUBE, the world’s first interactive television programming sys-
tem. Despite its technological innovation and vision, the creation of the QUBE and
its relative financial failure meant that Warner Communications needed outside cap-
ital to expand beyond Columbus, Ohio. In December 1979, Warner Communications
and American Express each contributed $75 million to form a joint venture with two
divisions: Warner Amex Cable Company and Warner Amex Satellite Entertainment
Company.
Time Warner Cable was formed in 1989 through the merger of Time Inc.’s cable
television company, and Warner Cable, a division of Warner Communications. It also
includes the remnants of the defunct QUBE interactive TV service. It became the
nation’s largest cable provider after TCI, with 5 million subscribers.
On July 31, 2006, Time Warner Cable and Comcast completed a deal to purchase
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Adelphia’s assets for $17 billion. Time Warner Cable gained 3.3 million of Adelphia’s
subscribers, a 29% increase, while Comcast gained almost 1.7 million subscribers.
Adelphia stockholders received 16% of Time Warner Cable.
In addition to Adelphia’s coverage being divided up, Time Warner Cable and
Comcast also agreed to exchange some of their own subscribers in order to consoli-
date key regions. An example of this was the Los Angeles market, which was mostly
covered by Comcast and Adelphia (and some areas of the region already served by
TWC), went under Time Warner Cable. In Philadelphia, previously was split between
Time Warner and Comcast, the majority of cable subscribers went to Comcast. Time
Warner subscribers in Philadelphia were swapped with Comcast in early 2007. Sim-
ilarly, the Houston area, which was under Time Warner, was swapped to Comcast,
while the Dallas metro area was changed to Time Warner. In the Twin Cities, Min-
neapolis was Time Warner and Saint Paul was Comcast. That whole market is now
Comcast.
Charter Communications, Inc. This company was founded in Delaware in 1993.
In 1998, Paul Allen, co-founder of Microsoft with Bill Gates, bought its controlling
share, and the new Charter gathered numerous systems during a few following years.
By 2001, Charter was the fourth largest cable company with more than 6 million
subscribers. But the rise of Charter couldn’t continue, suffering a lawsuit for former
executives’ financial report fraud.
On March 28, 2009, Charter Communications filed for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.
For assets of Charter, Comcast and Time Warner Cable would be interested in. Espe-
cially, Time Warner has some incentives in California, while Comcast has a positive
attitude for assets of New England.
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The Media Conglomerates
The media conglomerates own lots of subsidiary companies in the television related
fields: air signal broadcasting, cable networks, film and music recording makers as
contents, cable operators, DBS operators, spin-off magazines and online business, and
etc. In this section, we briefly describes the company structure of major media con-
glomerates. To investigate the structure, we usually consulted with each companies’
internet website.
Comcast Corporation The national No.1 cable operator, Comcast, is the owner of
Comcast Spectator (which owns a NBA team, Philadelphia 76ers) and several cable
networks including Comcast SportsNet, E! Entertainment Television, Style Network,
G4, the Golf Channel, and Versus.
E. W. Scripps Company This was founded by Edward W. Scripps in 1878. It
started as a newspaper company and added numerous newspapers, and television
and radio stations, mostly associated with ABC. For the cable networks, it owns
HGTV, DIY Network, Food Network, and etc.
General Electric GE of Thomas Edison also has its subsidiary company in the
entertaining field: NBC Universal. GE owns 80% share of NBC Universal and the
remaining 20% is owned by Vivendi, a French media group.
In a movie industry, NBC Universal owns Universal Studios. It also has 3 parks
and resorts in Los Angeles, Orlando, and Tokyo. The major part of the company lies
in television networks. It owns NBC, CNBC, Bravo, Syfy, Telemundo, USA Network,
and the Weather Channel. Together with Microsoft, it launched MSNBC in 1996.
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On the other hand, NBC Universal has some shares of A&E11, the History Channel,
the Biography Channel, National Geographic, and TiVo.
Liberty Media Corporation This company, which is controlled by John Malone,
has 48% interest of DirecTV, a DBS operator. A major league baseball team, At-
lanta Braves and a film maker, Overture Films, are also its property. For the cable
networks, it owns some regional franchises of FSN and QVC. On the other hand, it
has some interests for Discovery Communications, which is controlled by its founder,
John Hendricks. Discovery Communications owns Discovery Channel, TLC, Animal
Planet, Discovery Health Channel, Science Channel, Military Channel, and etc.
News Cooperation Rupert Murdoch has lots of newspapers and book publishing
companies in Oceania. In US, News Corporation owns a series of Fox companies.
It has film makers: 20th Century Fox, Fox Searchlight Pictures, Fox Studios, and
Blue Sky Studios. For the air signal broadcasting, it has Fox Broadcasting Company.
In the cable networks, it includes Fox Movie Channel, Fox News Channel, Fox Col-
lege Sports, Fox Sports Net, Fuel TV, FX, National Geographic, and Speed. It has
newspapers like the Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones, and New York Post. And Its
most prominent book publisher is HarperCollins Publishers. It also owns an internet
blogging site, MySpace.
Time Warner Inc. Time Warner Inc. consists of 5 subgroups: AOL LLC, Time
Inc., HBO, Turner Broadcasting System, and Warner Bros. Entertainment.
Time Inc. has numerous magazines including Entertainment Weekly, Fortune,
11Recently, A&E Television Networks, which is a joint venture of Hearst, Disney,
and NBC, acquired Lifetime Entertainment Services. It was on August 27, 2009.
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Health, In Style, Money, People, Sports Illustrated, and Time. HBO has two brands:
HBO and Cinemax. Turner Broadcasting System plays in the area of cable networks.
It includes Adult Swim, Boomerang, Cartoon Network, CNN, HLN, TBS, TCM,
truTV, Turner Classic Movies, and Turner Network Television. The last branch is
Warner Bros. Entertainment. It has Warner Bros. Pictures, Warner Bros. Television,
and DC Comics. The CW television network is a joint venture of CBS Corporation
and Warner Bros. Entertainment. Note that Warner Music Group is not owned by
Time Warner Inc. any more. It is sold in 2004.
Importantly note that Time Warner Cable, the national No. 2 cable operator,
was separated from Time Warner Inc. in March, 2009. Time Warner Inc. disposed
its 84% share of Time Warner Cable, receiving one time money dividend.
Viacom/CBS Viacom/CBS was split in 2005: Viacom and CBS corporation. But
both companies are still controlled by Sumner Redstone of National Amusements. So
we consider both firms together.
Viacom owns cable networks including BET, CMT, Comedy Central, MTV, Nick-
elodeon, Nick at Nite, Noggin, Spike, the N, TV Land, and VH1. And it owns film
maker, Paramount Pictures. CBS corporation consists of numerous CBS subsidiaries
(including television networks, film makers, and radio stations), Simon & Schuster
(a book publisher), Showtime, and the CW television network, a joint venture with
Warner Bros.
Vivendi The historic French media group, Vivendi, currently owns Canal+ Group
(French television networks) and Universal Music Group. It has controlling stakes in
Activision Blizzard (video games), Maroc Telecom (telecommunication operator in
Moroco) and SFR (telecommunication operator in France). Last, it has 20% share of
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NBC Universal.
Walt Disney Group Walt Disney Group has many subsidiary companies in many
entertaining fields. The first field is a motion pictures. The Walt Disney Studio
Entertainment include Walt Disney Pictures which includes Walt Disney Animation
Studios, Pixar Animation Studios and DisneyToon Studios, Touchstone Pictures,
Hollywood Pictures, and Miramax Films. To distribute their movies, Disney Group
owns Walt Disney Studios Home Entertainment. About music business, Disney Mu-
sic Group distributes their music properties under Walt Disney Records, Hollywood
Records, and Lyric Street Records. On the other hand, Disney Theatrical Produc-
tions which includes Disney Live Family Entertainment and Disney on Ice produces
substantial amount of theatrical performances.
Disney’s Parks and Resorts owns 11 theme parks in 5 resort locations: Disney-
land Resort (Anaheim, California), Walt Disney World Resort (Lake Buena Vista,
Florida), Tokyo Disney Resort (Urayasu, Chiba), Disneyland Resort Paris (Marne La
Valle, France), and Hong Kong Disneyland (Penny’s Bay, Lantau Island).
Disney Media Networks comprise a vast array of broadcast, cable, radio, pub-
lishing and Internet businesses. The Disney-ABC Television Group includes the ABC
Television Network (including ABC Daytime, ABC Entertainment and ABC News
divisions), the Disney Channels, ABC Family, and SOAPnet. And the company holds
equity interest in Lifetime Entertainment Services and A&E Television Networks.
Last, Walt Disney Group owns an 80% share of the ESPN network. The re-
maining share of the ESPN network goes to Hearst Corporation, which has numerous
newspapers and magazines.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS
Proof for the Section B in the Chapter II
Proof. (Proposition II.1: Market Segmentation) We want to show that for all
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , n} and j 6= k, θqk − pk ≥ θqj − pj, and θqk − pk > θqj − pj when
k < j. Suppose that k > j. Then,
θ(qk − qj)− (pk − pj)
= θ{(qk − qk−1) + (qk−1 − qk−2) + · · ·+ (qj+1 − qj)}
− {(pk − pk−1) + (pk−1 − pk−2) + · · ·+ (pj+1 − pj)}
= {θ(qk − qk−1)− (pk − pk−1)}+ {θ(qk−1 − qk−2)− (pk−1 − pk−2)}
+ · · ·+ {θ(qj+1 − qj)− (pj+1 − pj)}
≥ {θk(qk − qk−1)− (pk − pk−1)}+ {θk−1(qk−1 − qk−2)− (pk−1 − pk−2)}
+ · · ·+ {θj+1(qj+1 − qj)− (pj+1 − pj)} = 0.
Now, suppose that k < j. Then,
θ(qk − qj)− (pk − pj) = −[θ(qj − qk)− (pj − pk)]
= −[θ{(qj − qj−1) + (qj−1 − qj−2) + · · ·+ (qk+1 − qk)}
− {(pj − pj−1) + (pj−1 − pj−2) + · · ·+ (pk+1 − pk)}]
> −[{θj(qj − qj−1)− (pj − pj−1)}+ {θj−1(qj−1 − qj−2)− (pj−1 − pj−2)}
+ · · ·+ {θk+1(qk+1 − qk)− (pk+1 − pk)}] = 0.
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Proofs for the Section C in the Chapter II
In this subsection, I prove the existence, uniqueness and the first order conditions for
the monopolist’s solution.
Proof. (Proposition II.2: Existence of a Maximizer in the Monopolist’s
Problem) Our objective function, Π : Rn×2 ⇒ R is defined by
Π(q,θ) =
n∑
k=1
{(∫ θk+1
θk
f(θ)dθ
)( k∑
j=1
θj(qj − qj−1)− C(qk)
)}
.
This function’s inputs are q and θ and the output is the monopolist’s profit. We can
easily establish the compactness of domain and the continuity of Π in q and θ.
Proof. (Proposition II.3: Monopolist’s Problem) For the first equation, remind
of the constraint in (P.M); pi − pi−1 = θi(qi − qi−1). Summing up from 1 to k,
pk =
∑k
i=1 θi(qi − qi−1).
Let Oj ≡ D(qj)
(∑j
i=1 θi(qi − qi−1)− C(qj)
)
. Then, our objective function be-
comes
∑n
j=1Oj. For k such that 1 < k < n,
∂
∑n
j=1Oj
∂qk
=
∂Ok
∂qk
+
∂Ok+1
∂qk
+ · · ·+ ∂On
∂qk
, and
∂
∑n
j=1Oj
∂θk
=
∂Ok−1
∂θk
+
∂Ok
∂θk
+
∂Ok+1
∂θk
+ · · ·+ ∂On
∂θk
.
Differentiating the objective function with respect to qk,
∂
∑n
j=1Oj
∂qk
= D(qk)[θk − C ′(qk)] +
n∑
j=k+1
D(qj) (θk − θk+1)
=
[
D(qk)θk −
n∑
j=k+1
D(qj)(θk+1 − θk)
]
−D(qk)C ′(qk)
= [{F (θk+1)− F (θk)} θk − {1− F (θk+1)} (θk+1 − θk)]
− {F (θk+1)− F (θk)}C ′(qk).
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Differentiating the objective function with respect to θk,
∂
∑n
j=1Oj
∂θk
= f(θk)
(
k−1∑
j=1
θj(qj − qj−1)− C(qk−1)
)
− f(θk)
(
k∑
j=1
θj(qj − qj−1)− C(qk)
)
+
n∑
j=k
D(qj) (qk − qk−1)
= −f(θk) [θk {qk − qk−1} − (C(qk)− C(qk−1))] + (1− F (θk)) (qk − qk−1) .
Now, I consider the case that k = 1. In fact, ∂(
∑n
j=1Oj)/∂q1 has a same result
with the previous case. Differentiating the objective function with respect to θ1,
∂
∑n
j=1Oj
∂θ1
= −f(θ1) [θ1(q1 − q0)− C(q1)] +
n∑
j=1
D(qj) (q1 − q0)
= −f(θ1) [θ1(q1 − q0)− {C(q1)− C(q0)}] + (1− F (θ1)) (q1 − q0) .
Last, I consider the case that k = n.
∂
∑n
j=1Oj
∂qn
=
∂On
∂qn
= D(qn)[θn − C ′(qn)] = (1− F (θn))[θn − C ′(qn)]
=
[{
F (θ¯)− F (θn)
}
θn −
{
1− F (θ¯)} (θ¯ − θn)]− {F (θ¯)− F (θn)}C ′(qn).
Differentiating the objective function with respect to θ1 and θn, we get a consistent
result with the case that 1 < k < n. The first order conditions imply the second and
the third equations in this proposition. Note that the second order conditions for the
maximizers hold by Assumption 1.
Proof. (Proposition II.4: Uniqueness of a Maximizer in the Monopolist’s
Problem) Let both (q,θ) and (q′,θ′) be the maximizer for the problem (P.M′)
such that (q,θ) 6= (q′,θ′). Before diving into the proof, I define L(θ) such that
L(θ) ≡ θ −H(θ). By Assumption 4, L′(θ) > 0.
First, suppose that q = q′. Then, for all k and k − 1, (C(qk) − C(qk−1))/(qk −
qk−1) = (C(q′k) − C(q′k−1))/(q′k − q′k−1). By Proposition II.3, L(θk) = L(θ′k). Since L
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is strictly increasing, θ = θ′. Thus, q 6= q′.
Second, suppose that q 6= q′. Then, there exists k such that qk 6= q′k and for
all j < k, qj = q
′
j.
12 Without loss of generality, we can assume that qk < q
′
k. From
Proposition II.3, we know that
(B.1) L(θk) =
C(qk)− C(qk−1)
qk − qk−1 and L(θ
′
k) =
C(q′k)− C(q′k−1)
q′k − q′k−1
.
Since C is strictly convex, L is strictly increasing, qk−1 = q′k−1 and qk < q
′
k, the
equation (B.1) implies that θk < θ
′
k.
Meanwhile, we have one more equation from Proposition II.3;
θk−1 − 1− F (θk)
F (θk)− F (θk−1)(θk − θk−1) = C
′(qk−1) and(B.2a)
θ′k−1 −
1− F (θ′k)
F (θ′k)− F (θ′k−1)
(θ′k − θ′k−1) = C ′(q′k−1).(B.2b)
Since qk−1 = q′k−1 and θk−1 = θ
′
k−1,
(B.3)
1− F (θk)
F (θk)− F (θk−1)(θk − θk−1) =
1− F (θ′k)
F (θ′k)− F (θk−1)
(θ′k − θk−1).
Let K(b|a) ≡ {(1− F (b))/(F (b)− F (a))}(b− a), given a. Then,
∂K
∂b
=
−f(b)
F (b)− F (a)(b− a)−
(1− F (b))f(b)
(F (b)− F (a))2 (b− a) +
1− F (b)
F (b)− F (a)
=
f(b)
F (b)− F (a)
{
−(b− a)− 1− F (b)
F (b)− F (a)(b− a) +
1− F (b)
f(b)
}
=
f(b)
F (b)− F (a) {(a−K(b|a))− (b−H(b))} .(B.4)
12I assume that q0 = q
′
0 = 0 as always.
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Then, by the equation (B.1) and (B.2),
∂K(θ|θk−1)
∂θ
|θ=θk =
f(θk)
F (θk)− F (θk−1) {(θk−1 −K(θk|θk−1))− (θk −H(θk))}
=
f(θk)
F (θk)− F (θk−1)
{
C ′(qk−1)− C(qk)− C(qk−1)
qk − qk−1
}
< 0.
Similarly, {∂K(θ|θk−1)/∂θ}|θ=θ′k < 0.
Now, consider the function K(θ|θk−1) on the interval [θk, θ′k]. We know that
K(θ|θk−1) is continuous in θ on [θk, θ′k] and K(θk|θk−1) = K(θ′k|θk−1) by the equation
(B.3). Since both {∂K(θ|θk−1)/∂θ}|θ=θk < 0 and {∂K(θ|θk−1)/∂θ}|θ=θ′k < 0, we have
at least 2 different points in (θk, θ
′
k), satisfying ∂K(θ|θk−1)/∂θ = 0. The Figure 18
will help us understand the above logic.
Let Θ = {θ ∈ [θk, θ′k]|∂K(θ|θk−1)/∂θ = 0}, and let θ1 ≡ min Θ and θ2 ≡ max Θ.
Obviously, θ1 < θ2. Since {∂K(θ|θk−1)/∂θ}|θ=θk < 0 and {∂K(θ|θk−1)/∂θ}|θ=θ′k < 0,
(B.5) K(θ1|θk−1) < K(θk|θk−1) = K(θ′k|θk−1) < K(θ2|θk−1).
By Assumption 3 and the equation (B.4), we know that θk−1 − K(θ|θk−1) =
θ −H(θ) if ∂K(θ|θk−1)/∂θ = 0. Since θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ, θk−1 −K(θ1|θk−1) = θ1 −H(θ1) =
L(θ1) and θk−1 − K(θ2|θk−1) = θ2 − H(θ2) = L(θ2). Since L′(θ) > 0 and θ1 <
θ2, θk−1 − K(θ1|θk−1) < θk−1 − K(θ2|θk−1). Thus, K(θ1|θk−1) > K(θ2|θk−1), which
contradicts to the equation (B.5).
Proofs for the Section D in the Chapter II
In this subsection, I prove the existence, uniqueness and the first order conditions for
the social planner’s solution.
Proof. (Lemma II.1: Marginal Cost Tariff in the Social Planner’s Problem)
To solve the problem (P.S), the social planner should find the optimal q, p, and θ.
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We can assume that the social planner’s tariff scheme is pk = Pk(q,θ). Then, we can
rewrite the problem (P.S) as
(P1′) max
q,P1,··· ,Pn
n∑
k=1
∫ θk+1
θk
[sqk − C(qk)]f(s)ds
such that for all k, θkqk − pk = θkqk−1 − pk−1 and pk = Pk(q,θ).
In the problem (P1′), the social planner should find the optimal set of qualities and
the optimal tariff scheme.
Let q∗ be a maximizer when for all k, Pk(q,θ) = C(qk). Let q˜ be a maximizer
when for all k, Pk(q,θ) = C˜k(q,θ) and for some k, C˜k(q,θ) 6= C(qk). Using q˜,
C˜k(q,θ) and the cutoff constraint, we can find the set of θ˜.
Now, consider a combination (q˜, θ˜, (C(q˜1), C(q˜2), · · · , C(q˜n))) and a combination
(q˜, θ˜, (C˜1(q˜, θ˜), C˜2(q˜, θ˜), · · · , C˜n(q˜, θ˜)). Take an arbitrary interval, [θ˜k, θ˜k+1). The
social welfare in the interval is∫ θ˜k+1
θ˜k
(
θq˜k − C˜k(q˜, θ˜)
)
dθ +
(
C˜k(q˜, θ˜)− C(q˜k)
)(
F (θ˜k+1)− F (θ˜k)
)
=
∫ θ˜k+1
θ˜k
θq˜kdθ − C(q˜k)
(
F (θ˜k+1)− F (θ˜k)
)
=
∫ θ˜k+1
θ˜k
(θq˜k − C(q˜k)) dθ.
The above equation shows that the combination (q˜, θ˜, (C(q˜1), C(q˜2), · · · , C(q˜n))) and
the combination (q˜, θ˜, (C˜1(q˜, θ˜), C˜2(q˜, θ˜), · · · , C˜n(q˜, θ˜)) give us the same social wel-
fare when Pk = C˜k(q,θ).
That is, the marginal cost tariff scheme guarantees at least the same welfare
level with the other possible tariff scheme, when we adopt the other scheme’s optimal
qualities and cutoffs combination. We know the combination (q∗,θ∗) is the opti-
mal combination, under the tariff scheme Pk(q,θ) = C(qk). Thus, the combination
(q∗,θ∗) gives us a greater social welfare with the combination (q˜, θ˜).
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Proof. (Proposition II.5: Existence of a Maximizer in the Social Planner’s
Problem) At the beginning, I clarify the objective function. This function’s input is q
and its output is the value of total social surplus. That is, the function SW : Rn ⇒ R
is defined by
(B.6) SW (q) =
n∑
k=1
∫ θk+1
θk
[sqk − C(qk)]f(s)ds,
where θkqk − C(qk) = θkqk−1 − C(qk−1), for all k.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qn. We define q¯
such that C ′(q¯) = θ¯. Then, qn ≤ q¯. Any q over than q¯ cannot be an element of the
maximizer for (P.S), because
C(q)− C(q¯)
q − q¯ > C
′(q¯) = θ¯ ≥ θ ⇒ θq − C(q) < θq¯ − C(q¯),
for all q > q¯ and θ ∈ [0, θ¯]. Therefore, 0 ≤ q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qn ≤ q¯. The domain of
SW , the relevant subset of Rn, is compact.
Now, we need to show that SW is a continuous function of q. Since SW is
determined by q and θ, which is determined by q, we have to show that i) SW is a
continuous function of q when θ is fixed, ii) θ is a continuous function of q and iii)
SW is a continuous function of θ.
The first step is obvious, since C is continuous.
For the next two steps, let
(B.7) θk(qk−1, qk) =
 (C(qk)− C(qk−1))/(qk − qk−1) when qk > qk−1C ′(qk−1) = C ′(qk) when qk = qk−1.
This definition is exactly same with θk in the problem (P.S) except when qk = qk−1.
In the problem (P.S), θk is not defined when qk = qk−1. Note that θk is simply a slope
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between (qk, C(qk)) and (qk+1, C(qk+1)), and
lim
qk→qk−1
C(qk)− C(qk−1)
qk − qk−1 = C
′(qk−1) = C ′(qk) = lim
qk−1→qk
C(qk)− C(qk−1)
qk − qk−1 .
In the problem (P.S), consumers who are in [θk−1, θk+1) will buy the product
qk−1 or the exactly same one qk. In our new definition, consumers who are in
[θk−1, C ′(qk−1)) will buy the product qk−1 and consumers who are in [C ′(qk−1), θk+1)
will buy the product qk. Thus, our newly extended definition in the equation (B.7)
gives the same social welfare with the equation (B.6).
The definition in the equation (B.7) guarantees the continuity of θ in q. The
second step is done. Since F has no mass point, SW is a continuous function of θ.
The third is also done.
Since the relevant domain is compact and the objective function is continuous in
q, there exists a maximizer by the Weierstrass theorem.
Proof. (Proposition II.6: Social Planner’s Problem) The first and third equa-
tions come from the Proposition II.1 and the Lemma II.1 directly.
Let Oj ≡
∫ θj+1
θj
[sqj −C(qj)]f(s)ds. Then, our objective function is
∑n
j=1Oj. For
k such that 1 < k < n,
∂
∑n
j=1 Oj
∂qk
=
∂Ok−1
∂qk
+
∂Ok
∂qk
+
∂Ok+1
∂qk
.
Letting θk(qk, qk−1) ≡ (C(qk) − C(qk−1))/(qk − qk−1) and using the Leibniz integral
rule,13
∂Ok−1
∂qk
=
∂θk(qk, qk−1)
∂qk
[θkqk−1 − C(qk−1)] f(θk)
13The Leibniz rule is d
dα
∫ b(α)
a(α)
f(x, α)dx = db(α)
dα
f(b(α), α) − da(α)
dα
f(a(α), α) +∫ b(α)
a(α)
∂
∂α
f(x, α)dx.
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− 0
(
∵ ∂θk−1(qk−1, qk−2)
∂qk
= 0
)
+ 0
(
∵ ∂
∂qk
[sqk−1 − C(qk−1)]f(s) = 0
)
,
∂Ok
∂qk
=
∂θk+1(qk+1, qk)
∂qk
[θk+1qk − C(qk)] f(θk+1)
− ∂θk(qk, qk−1)
∂qk
[θkqk − C(qk)] f(θk) +
∫ θk+1
θk
[s− C ′(qk)]f(s)ds, and
∂Ok+1
∂qk
= −∂θk+1(qk+1, qk)
∂qk
[θk+1qk+1 − C(qk+1)] f(θk+1)
+ 0
(
∵ ∂θk+2(qk+2, qk+1)
∂qk
= 0
)
+ 0
(
∵ ∂
∂qk
[sqk+1 − C(qk+1)]f(s) = 0
)
.
Since θjqj − C(qj) = θjqj−1 − C(qj−1), ∂(
∑n
j=1Oj)/∂qk =
∫ θk+1
θk
[s− C ′(qk)]f(s)ds.
Now, I consider the case that k = 1.
∂
∑n
j=1Oj
∂q1
=
∂O1
∂q1
+
∂O2
∂q1
=
∂θ2(q2, q1)
∂q1
[θ2q1 − C(q1)]f(θ2)− ∂θ1(q1, q0)
∂q1
[θ1q1 − C(q1)]f(θ1)
+
∫ θ2
θ1
[s− C ′(q1)]f(s)ds+ 0
(
∵ ∂θ3(q3, q2)
∂q1
= 0
)
−∂θ2(q2, q1)
∂q1
[θ2q2 − C(q2)]f(θ2) + 0
(
∵ ∂
∂q1
[sq2 − C(q2)]f(s) = 0
)
=
∫ θ2
θ1
[s− C ′(q1)]f(s)ds (∵ θ1q1 − C(q1) = 0) .
Last, I consider the case that k = n.
∂
∑n
j=1 Oj
∂qn
=
∂On−1
∂qn
+
∂On
∂qn
=
∂θn(qn, qn−1)
∂qn
[θnqn−1 − C(qn−1)]f(θn)− 0
(
∵ ∂θn−1(qn−1, qn−2)
∂qn
= 0
)
+0
(
∵ ∂
∂qn
[sqn−1 − C(qn−1)]f(s) = 0
)
+ 0
(
∵ ∂θ¯
∂qn
= 0
)
−∂θn(qn, qn−1)
∂qn
[θnqn − C(qn)]f(θn) +
∫ θ¯
θn
[s− C ′(qn)]f(s)ds
=
∫ θ¯
θn
[s− C ′(qn)]f(s)ds.
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Since θn+1 = θ¯, the first order conditions imply that for all k,∫ θk+1
θk
[s− C ′(qk)]f(s)ds = 0
⇔
∫ θk+1
θk
s
f(s)
F (θk+1)− F (θk)ds = C
′(qk)
(∫ θk+1
θk
f(s)
F (θk+1)− F (θk)ds
)
= C ′(qk).
We can easily show that the second order conditions for the maximizers hold.
The convexity assumption for C in the Assumption 1 crucially plays.
Proofs for the Section E in the Chapter II
Proof. (Proposition II.7: Total Profit and n) Let qm = (qm1 , q
m
2 , · · · , qmn ) and
θm = (θm1 , θ
m
2 , · · · , θmn ) be a maximizer when we have n different goods and let
qm
′
= (qm
′
1 , q
m′
2 , · · · , qm′n+1) and θm′ = (θm′1 , θm′2 , · · · , θm′n+1) be a maximizer when
we can choose n + 1 products. Note that pmk =
∑k
i=1 θ
m
i (q
m
i − qmi−1) and pm′k =∑k
i=1 θ
m′
i (q
m′
i − qm′i−1). Assume that qm1 < qm2 < · · · < qmn , in order that every product
is meaningful. Additionally, assume 0 < θm1 < θ
m
2 < · · · < θmn < θ¯ so that all n
products are meaningful in the market.
Take an arbitrary θ˜ such that θmn < θ˜ < θ¯, and take q˜ such that θ˜ > (C(q˜) −
C(qmn ))/(q˜ − qmn ) and qmn < q˜ < q¯. Since θ˜ > θmn = C ′(qmn ) by the Proposition II.3
and since limq˜→qmn {(C(q˜)− C(qmn ))/(q˜ − qmn )} = C ′(qmn ), we can always find a proper
q˜ slightly over than qmn . Last, I define p˜ = p
m
n + θ˜(q˜ − qmn ), which exactly coincides
with the pricing formula.
Now, I introduce a new product combination that is added θ˜, (qm1 , q
m
2 , · · · , qmn , q˜),
(θm1 , θ
m
2 , · · · , θmn , θ˜) and (pm1 , pm2 , · · · , pmn , p˜). We can easily confirm that for k such
that 1 ≤ k < n, a consumer in the segment [θmk , θmk+1) buys the product qmk at the price
pmk . That is, a consumer in [0, θ
m
n ) consumes the exactly same product at the same
price with the original profit maximizing offer of the monopolist when the number of
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product is n. By the definition of p˜ and the linear structure of utility, a consumer
in [θmn , θ˜) would like to buy q
m
n . Meanwhile, a consumer in [θ˜, θ¯] would like to buy
q˜. The monopolist’s new profit in the segment [θ˜, θ¯] is (1− F (θ˜))(p˜−C(q˜)). We can
check
(B.8) (p˜− C(q˜))− (pmn − C(qmn )) = θ˜(q˜ − qmn )− (C(q˜)− C(qmn )) > 0,
by the formulation of (q˜, θ˜, p˜). Then,
Πm
(
(qm1 , · · · , qmn , q˜), (θm1 , · · · , θmn , θ˜)
)
= Πm (qm,θm)− (1− F (θmn ))(pmn − C(qmn ))
+ (F (θ˜)− F (θmn ))(pmn − C(qmn )) + (1− F (θ˜))(p˜− C(q˜))
= Πm (qm,θm) + (1− F (θ˜))((p˜− C(q˜))− (pmn − C(qmn ))).
By the above equation (B.8),
Πm
(
(qm1 , · · · , qmn , q˜), (θm1 , · · · , θmn , θ˜)
)
> Πm (qm,θm) .
Since qm
′
and θm
′
is a maximizer when the monopolist can choose n+1 products,
Πm
(
qm
′
,θm
′
)
≥ Πm
(
(qm1 , · · · , qmn , q˜), (θm1 , · · · , θmn , θ˜)
)
.
Therefore, Πm
(
qm
′
,θm
′)
> Πm (qm,θm), which implies that V(n) is strictly increas-
ing in n.
Proof. (Proposition II.8: Social Welfare and n) Let (q∗1, q
∗
2, · · · , q∗n) be a maxi-
mizer when we have n different goods and let (q∗∗1 , q
∗∗
2 , · · · , q∗∗n+1) be a maximizer when
we can choose n+ 1 products.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that q∗1 ≤ q∗2 ≤ · · · ≤ q∗n. And I assume
that all n products are meaningful, that is, each product has consumers who buy it.
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Since p∗k = C(q
∗
k), q
∗
1 < q
∗
2 < · · · < q∗n, in order that we have n different products.
Then, for all k, since C is strictly convex,
θ∗k =
C(q∗k)− C(q∗k−1)
q∗k − q∗k−1
< C ′(q∗k) <
C(q∗k+1)− C(q∗k)
q∗k+1 − q∗k
= θ∗k+1.
From the Proposition II.6, we know that q∗k satisfies E
(
θ|θ ∈ [θ∗k, θ∗k+1)
)
= C ′(q∗k).
Since C ′′ > 0, q∗k = C
′−1 (E (θ|θ ∈ [θ∗k, θ∗k+1))), which is a strictly increasing function.
Now, take an arbitrary θins such that θ∗k < θ
ins < θ∗k+1 and denote
E(θins1 ) ≡
∫ θins
θ∗k
s
f(s)
F (θins)− F (θ∗k)
ds and E(θins2 ) ≡
∫ θ∗k+1
θins
s
f(s)
F (θ∗k+1)− F (θins)
ds.
Take qins1 and q
ins
2 to satisfy E(θins1 ) = C ′(qins1 ) and E(θins2 ) = C ′(qins2 ).
Since E(θins1 ) < E
(
θ|θ ∈ [θ∗k, θ∗k+1)
)
< E(θins2 ) and C ′−1 is strictly increasing,
qins1 < q
∗
k < q
ins
2 . By the maximizing conditions,∫ θ∗k+1
θ∗k
[sq∗k − C(q∗k)]f(s)ds
=
∫ θins
θ∗k
[sq∗k − C(q∗k)]f(s)ds+
∫ θ∗k+1
θins
[sq∗k − C(q∗k)]f(s)ds
<
∫ θins
θ∗k
[sqins1 − C(qins1 )]f(s)ds+
∫ θ∗k+1
θins
[sqins2 − C(qins2 )]f(s)ds.
Keeping other q∗j s and only replacing q
∗
k with q
ins
1 and q
ins
2 , we get the same social
welfare from other intervals, and the higher social welfare from the kth interval (now
divided by two intervals). That is, SW SP
(
(q∗1, · · · , q∗k−1, qins1 , qins2 , q∗k+1, · · · , q∗n)
)
>
SW SP ((q∗1, · · · , q∗k, · · · , q∗n)). Since (q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 , · · · , q∗∗n+1) is a maximizer when we can
choose n+ 1 products,
SW SP
(
(q∗∗1 , · · · , q∗∗k , · · · , q∗∗n+1)
) ≥ SW SP ((q∗1, · · · , q∗k−1, qins1 , qins2 , q∗k+1, · · · , q∗n)) .
Therefore, SW SP
(
(q∗∗1 , · · · , q∗∗k , · · · , q∗∗n+1)
)
> SW SP ((q∗1, · · · , q∗k, · · · , q∗n)), which im-
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plies that V (n) is strictly increasing in n.
From now on, I show that two famous continuous product phenomena, the no
distortion on top and the downward distortion properties, can be recovered in our
finite model when n goes to infinite.
Proof. (Proposition II.9: No Distortion on Top and Downward Distortion
when n goes to Infinity) Suppose that n =∞ and θ∗n (or θmn ) < θ¯. This cannot be
an optimal. If we insert a higher quality product aiming at a consumer with a taste
between θ∗n (or θ
m
n ) and θ¯, we can increase social welfare (or profit).
14 Therefore,
θ∗n (or θ
m
n ) → θ¯ as n → ∞. Then, q∗n (or qmn ) goes to q¯, which explains the no
distortion on top.
We know that θ∗k+1 → θ∗k and θ∗k−1 → θ∗k, as n→∞. Then,
(B.9) lim
n→∞
C ′(q∗k) = lim
n→∞
E(θ|θ ∈ [θ∗k, θ∗k+1)) = lim
n→∞
E(θ|θ ∈ [θ∗k−1, θ∗k)) = θ∗k.
Similarly, for all k > 1, θmk+1 → θmk , as n→∞. We know that
lim
n→∞
F (θmk+1)− F (θmk )
θmk+1 − θmk
= f(θmk ),
and so
lim
n→∞
(
1− F (θmk+1)
F (θmk+1)− F (θmk )
(θmk+1 − θmk )
)
=
1− F (θmk )
f(θmk )
= H(θmk ).
Then,
(B.10) lim
n→∞
C ′(qmk ) = θ
m
k −
1− F (θmk )
f(θmk )
= θmk −H(θmk ).
Let Q1(θ) ≡ θ and Q2(θ) ≡ θ−H(θ). By the definition of q∗(θ) and qm(θ) and the
equations (B.9) and (B.10), Q1(θ) = limn→∞C ′(q∗(θ)) andQ2(θ) = limn→∞C ′(qm(θ)).
14Check the proofs for the Propositions II.8 and II.7.
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Since for all θ, H(θ) ≥ 0, Q1(θ) − Q2(θ) = H(θ) ≥ 0. Thus, Q1(θ) ≥ Q2(θ) ⇔
limn→∞C ′(q∗(θ)) ≥ limn→∞C ′(qm(θ)). Since C ′ is strictly increasing, q∗(θ) ≥ qm(θ),
when n =∞. It shows the downward distortion.
Proof for the Section D in the Chapter III
Proof. (Proposition III.1: Increasing Information Rent in Type) Without
loss of generality, we can assume that θ ∈ [θmj , θmj+1). For the first case, suppose that
θ′ ∈ [θmj , θmj+1). Then, q(θ) = q(θ′) = qmj and p(θ) = p(θ′) = pmj .
U(q(θ′), p(θ′); θ′)− U(q(θ), p(θ); θ) = (θ′qmj − pmj )− (θqmj − pmj ) = (θ′ − θ)qmj ≥ 0,
where the equality holds only when qmj = q
m
0 = 0.
For the second case, suppose that θ′ ∈ [θmk , θmk+1), where k > j. Then,
U(q(θ′), p(θ′); θ′)− U(q(θ), p(θ); θ) = (θ′qmk − pmk )−
(
θqmj − pmj
)
≥ (θmk qmk − pmk )−
(
θqmj − pmj
)
=
(
θmk q
m
k−1 − pmk−1
)− (θqmj − pmj )
>
(
θmk−1q
m
k−1 − pmk−1
)− (θqmj − pmj ) = · · · = (θmj+1qmj − pmj )− (θqmj − pmj ) > 0.
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APPENDIX C
UNIQUENESS OF THE SOCIAL PLANNER’S MAXIMIZER
In this appendix, I will introduce a condition to guarantee the uniqueness of
maximizer for the social planner’s problem. From the Proposition II.6, we know the
conditions that the solution for the problem (P.S) should satisfies. The Proposition
II.5 argues that the solution exists. We, however, still do not know whether the
solution is unique or not. The uniqueness may be a crucial factor if we want to
find the solution computationally. If we have multiple solutions, the answer obtained
by the numerical computation is only one of multiple solutions. We cannot find
any information about other solutions. If we have only one solution, the answer a
computer finds is “the” solution.
To describe the condition which guarantees uniqueness of maximizer, we need
to newly define some concepts, for the interpretational and notational convenience.
I make two notations related with conditional expectation. For given θl and θu such
that 0 ≤ θl ≤ θ ≤ θu ≤ θ¯,
El(θ|θl) ≡ E(s|s ∈ [θl, θ)) =
∫ θ
θl
s
f(s)
F (θ)− F (θl)ds and
Eu(θ|θu) ≡ E(s|s ∈ [θ, θu)) =
∫ θu
θ
s
f(s)
F (θu)− F (θ)ds.
Denote the product served to consumers in [θl, θ) as ql and the product served in [θ, θu]
as qu. From the Proposition II.6, we know C
′(ql) = El(θ|θl) and C ′(qu) = Eu(θ|θu).
Since C ′′(q) > 0, we can define
ql(θ|θl) ≡ C ′−1(El(θ|θl)) and qu(θ|θu) ≡ C ′−1(Eu(θ|θu)).
Now, I introduce a condition which are crucial for uniqueness of maximizer.
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Condition 1. For arbitrarily given θl and θu such that 0 ≤ θl < θu ≤ θ¯ and for all θ
such that θl ≤ θ ≤ θu,
θ − El(θ|θl)
C ′′(ql(θ|θl))
(θ − El(θ|θl))f(θ) + (El(θ|θl)− θl)f(θl)
F (θ)− F (θl) +
(Eu(θ|θu)− θ)2
C ′′(qu(θ|θu))
f(θ)
F (θu)− F (θ)
< qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl)
and
(θ − El(θ|θl))2
C ′′(ql(θ|θl))
f(θ)
F (θ)− F (θl) +
Eu(θ|θu)− θ
C ′′(qu(θ|θu))
(Eu(θ|θu)− θ)f(θ) + (θu − Eu(θ|θu))f(θu)
F (θu)− F (θ)
< qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl).
The above Condition 1 looks very complicated and messy. In fact, it is very
difficult to find economic or mathematical interpretations at a glance. I will discuss
and suggest some interpretations about the Condition 1, after presenting proposition
for uniqueness.
The next proposition states that under the general assumptions, the the maxi-
mizer for the problem (P.S) is unique if the Condition 1 holds.
Proposition B. 1. (Uniqueness of Maximizer in the Social Planner’s Prob-
lem) Under the Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the maximizer q∗ for the problem (P.S) is
unique, if the Condition 1 holds.
Except the Condition 1, the conditions to guarantee the uniqueness for the max-
imizer are considerably mild. Obviously, our next task is to understand and explain
what Condition 1 implies technically or economically.
121
Interpretation of Condition 1
From the Proposition II.6, we know
θ∗k =
C(q∗k)− C(q∗k−1)
q∗k − q∗k−1
.
In fact, we can easily find q∗ once we establish θ∗. Thus, we can rewrite the above
equation as follows;
(C.1) θ∗k =
C(q∗k(θ
∗))− C(q∗k−1(θ∗))
q∗k(θ
∗)− q∗k−1(θ∗)
.
Let
Mk(θ) ≡ θk − C(qk(θ))− C(qk−1(θ))
qk(θ)− qk−1(θ) .
Using this definition, we can reveal the hidden meaning of the Condition 1. In fact,
the Condition 1, which looks very complicated, only requires that ∂Mk(θ)/∂θk > 0
whenever Mk(θ) = 0. Since the above equation (C.1) enforces Mk(θ
∗) = 0, the
Condition 1 can guarantee the uniqueness of θ satisfying the equation (C.1).
From now on, I examine the economic property of the Condition 1. In the
Conditions 1 and 2, which will appear when we prove the Proposition 1, each term
includes the density function f , the marginal cost function C and their crosses. Thus,
we have two approaches to explain the condition. The first approach starts from the
consumer distribution and the second one is built on the cost structure.
To begin with, I investigate the upper and lower bounds of both sides in the
Condition 1. Since θl ≤ El(θ|θl) ≤ θ ≤ Eu(θ|θu) ≤ θu, the left hand side of the
condition is not negative. That is, the lower bound is 0. On the other hand, the
right hand side of the Condition 1 is upper bounded, since qu(θ|θu) − ql(θ|θl) <
qu(θu|θu) − ql(θl|θl). Then, both left hand sides of the Condition 1 should be also
upper bounded.
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Now, I consider properties related with the hazard rate. By the Assumption 3,
we know that limθ→θl{f(θ)/(F (θ)−F (θl))} =∞, limθ→θl{f(θl)/(F (θ)−F (θl))} =∞,
limθ→θu{f(θ)/(F (θu)− F (θ))} =∞, and limθ→θu{f(θu)/(F (θu)− F (θ))} =∞. And
we know limθ→θl(θ−El(θ|θl)) = 0, limθ→θl(El(θ|θl)−θl) = 0, limθ→θu(Eu(θ|θu)−θ) = 0,
and limθ→θu(θu−Eu(θ|θu)) = 0. In order that the left hand sides are upper bounded,
following all four
(θ − El(θ|θl))f(θ)
F (θ)− F (θl) ,
(El(θ|θl)− θl)f(θl)
F (θ)− F (θl) ,
(Eu(θ|θu)− θ)f(θ)
F (θu)− F (θ) , and
(θu − Eu(θ|θu))f(θu)
F (θu)− F (θ)
are upper bounded. Now, denote the bound as M .
To understand the meaning of M better, I will add one more assumption for the
density function. Let m ≡ minθ∈[θl,θu] f(θ) and m ≡ minθ∈[θl,θu] f(θ), and assume that
km ≥ m. This assumption means that fluctuation of distribution is limited. Clearly,
k ≥ 1 and if k = 1, the distribution is uniform.15
Here, I examine only the first one. The other three inequalities have similar
stories.
(C.2)
(θ − El(θ|θl))f(θ)
F (θ)− F (θl) ≤M.
By the definition for m, m and k,
(θ − El(θ|θl)) f(θ)
F (θ)− F (θl) ≤
{
θ − 1
2
m
m
(θ + θl)
}
m
m(θ − θl)
≤ k θ
θ − θl −
1
2
θ + θl
θ − θl
=
1
2
1
θ − θl ((2k − 1)θ − θl) .(C.3)
15Related with this assumption, we can establish some results like m ≤ f(θ) ≤ m,
(1/2)m(θ2 − θ2l ) ≤
∫ θ
θl
sf(s)ds ≤ (1/2)m(θ2 − θ2l ), and m(θ − θl) ≤ F (θ) − F (θl) ≤
m(θ − θl). These results will be utilized in the following discussion.
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This equation gives us a very feeble hint for a relationship between M and k. For
given M , if
(C.4) k ≤ 1
2
+
θ − θl
θ
M +
1
2
θl
θ
,
the inequality (C.2) holds. Here, we should check that k > 1/2 + {(θ − θl)/θ}M +
(1/2)(θl/θ) does not imply the inequality (C.2) does not hold. The inequality (C.4)
is just one possible sufficient condition to guarantee the inequality (C.2). We can
conclude that if k is enough small, that is the density function is quite flat, our
inequalities hold easily. Meanwhile, we can argue that the Condition 1 holds, if M is
enough big. Note that if the equation (C.4), the strong sufficient condition, holds, M
should be greater than 1/2. For the reason, consult with the fact that k ≥ 1 and the
equation (C.3).
Now, let us consider the cost structure. Applying the upper bound of each
inequality, the following inequality
(C.5)
{
θ − El(θ|θl)
C ′′(ql(θ|θl)) +
Eu(θ|θu)− θ
C ′′(qu(θ|θu))
}
2M ≤ qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl)
implies the Condition 1. Remember that the equation (C.5) is a very strong sufficient
condition for the Condition 1. This strong sufficient condition introduced here is just
for exploring a possible family of distributions and cost structures to agree with our
concern.
Assume that for all q in the relevant support, that is [0, C ′−1(θ¯)], there exist c
and c such that c ≤ C ′′(q) ≤ c. That is, the acceleration of C stays in a bounded area.
In other words, the acceleration of C does not fluctuate highly. If C is quadratic,
C ′′(q) is constant for all q, that is the acceleration of C does not change.
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Now, consider the following inequality
(C.6)
C ′(qu(θ|θu))− C ′(ql(θ|θl))
qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl) ≤
c
2M
.
Since C ′(qu(θ|θu)) = Eu(θ|θu) and C ′(ql(θ|θl)) = El(θ|θl), the inequality (C.6) is equiv-
alent with
(Eu(θ|θu)− El(θ|θl)) 2M
c
≤ qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl).
Since c ≤ C ′′(qu(θ|θu)) and c ≤ C ′′(ql(θ|θl)),
θ − El(θ|θl)
C ′′(ql(θ|θl)) +
Eu(θ|θu)− θ
C ′′(qu(θ|θu)) ≤
θ − El(θ|θl)
c
+
Eu(θ|θu)− θ
c
.
Thus, the equation (C.6) implies the equation (C.5).
The left hand side in the inequality (C.6) is the slope of C ′ between ql(θ|θl)
and qu(θ|θu). When ql(θ|θl) and qu(θ|θu) are very close, it approaches to C ′′. Gen-
erally, it is greater than c, which is the smallest value of C ′′. If (C ′(qu(θ|θu)) −
C ′(ql(θ|θl)))/(qu(θ|θu)−ql(θ|θl)) > c, we need that M is enough small for the inequal-
ity (C.6). If the left hand side is not quite different with c, it is also very helpful for
the inequality (C.6) to hold. Thus, we can conclude that if the acceleration of C is
stable, that is C ′′ is not very changeable, and M is not quite big, the equation (C.6)
and the equation (C.5) hold. We know these equations are sufficient conditions to
guarantee the Condition 1.
In fact, holding both two inequalities (C.4) and (C.6) simultaneously is too ex-
cessively sufficient for the Condition 1. Obviously, we know that if the inequalities
(C.4) and (C.6) hold, then The Condition 1 also hold. But this is too strong. From
the inequality (C.6), we know 2M ≤ 1. The equation (C.4) obstinately requires that
M should be greater than 1/2. That is, only when M = 1/2, and so k = 1, both the
inequalities (C.4) and (C.6) can hold. In addition, both inequalities hold in equalities.
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That is, the distribution should be uniform and the second derivative of cost function
should be constant, like a quadratic cost function. We can conclude that at least we
have a unique maximizer for the problem (P.S), if F is uniform and C is quadratic.
Fortunately, the Condition 1 is much less restrictive compared to the inequalities
(C.4) and (C.6), which are sufficient conditions for the Condition 1. Assume that a
cost function is quadratic, and assume that we have a truncated normal distribution
in an interval [0, 2] with a mean 1. In this case, the Condition 1 holds for any standard
deviation. We can confirm same thing in asymmetric truncated normal distributions
with intervals [0, 3/2] and [0, 3].
Proof for the Proposition B. 1
From now on, I prove the uniqueness. This proof needs a few lemmas and a long
process until we reach the final destination. I present some lemmas and prove them,
before proving the proposition. First of all, I introduce a condition, which is a weaker
version for the Condition 1.
Condition 2. For arbitrarily given θl and θu such that 0 ≤ θl < θu ≤ θ¯, and for all
θ such that θl ≤ θ ≤ θu,
(θ − El(θ|θl))2
C ′′(ql(θ|θl))
f(θ)
F (θ)− F (θl) +
(Eu(θ|θu)− θ)2
C ′′(qu(θ|θu))
f(θ)
F (θu)− F (θ) < qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl).
We can easily show that the Condition 1 implies the Condition 2. Check that
both
(El(θ|θl)− θl)f(θl)
F (θ)− F (θl) ≥ 0 and
(θu − Eu(θ|θu))f(θu)
F (θu)− F (θ) ≥ 0.
Thus, if the Condition 1 holds, then the Condition 2 also holds.
The first lemma gives a hint for uniqueness when only two products, lower and
higher, are provided.
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Lemma B. 1. (Clue for Uniqueness when n = 2) Suppose that the Assumptions
1 and 2 hold. Let N(θ|θl, θu) ≡ (C(qu(θ|θu)) − C(ql(θ|θl)))/(qu(θ|θu) − ql(θ|θl)). For
given θl and θu such that 0 ≤ θl < θu ≤ θ¯ and for θ such that θl ≤ θ ≤ θu, θ, such
that N(θ|θl, θu) = θ, exists. Additionally, θ, such that N(θ|θl, θu) = θ, is unique if
the Condition 2 holds.
Proof. (Existence) Define El(θl|θl) ≡ limθ→θl El(θ|θl) and Eu(θu|θu) ≡ limθ→θu Eu(θ|θu).
Check that by the strict convexity of C,
N(θl|θl, θu) = C(qu(θl|θu))− C(ql(θl|θl))
qu(θl|θu)− ql(θl|θl) > C
′(ql(θl|θl)) = El(θl|θl) = θl
and
N(θu|θl, θu) = C(qu(θu|θu))− C(ql(θu|θl))
qu(θu|θu)− ql(θu|θl) < C
′(qu(θu|θu)) = Eu(θu|θu) = θu.
Obviously, N(θ|θl, θu) is continuous in θ in [θl, θu]. SinceN is continuous, N(θl|θl, θu) >
θl, and N(θu|θl, θu) < θu, θ, satisfying N(θ|θl, θu) = θ, exists by the intermediate value
theorem.
(Uniqueness) Now, we are moving to the proof for the uniqueness. The first step
of proof is to establish the equivalence between the uniqueness of maximizer and the
following tentative condition;
(C.7) for all θ such that N(θ|θl, θu) = θ,N ′(θ|θl, θu) < 1.
(⇒) For this direction, I adopt a contraposition. Assume that there exists θ satisfying
both N(θ|θl, θu) = θ and N ′(θ|θl, θu) ≥ 1. We denote this one as θˆ. Then, there is
θ such that θ < θˆ and N(θ|θl, θu) < θ or θ such that θ > θˆ and N(θ|θl, θu) > θ. By
the intermediate value theorem, we need other θ satisfying N(θ|θl, θu) = θ than θˆ, at
lease one from [θl, θˆ) or (θˆ, θu]. Therefore, θ satisfying N(θ|θl, θu) = θ is not unique.
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(⇐) Suppose that θ satisfying N(θ|θl, θu) = θ is not unique. Then, we can find θ1
and θ2 which both satisfy that N(θ|θl, θu) = θ and N ′(θ|θl, θu) < 1. Without loss
of generality, we can assume that θ1 < θ2. Then, there are θ3 and θ4 such that
N(θ3|θl, θu) < θ3, N(θ4|θl, θu) > θ4, and θ1 < θ3 < θ4 < θ2. Then, we need at least
one θ such that θ3 < θ < θ4, N(θ|θl, θu) = θ, and N ′(θ|θl, θu) > 1. It is a contradiction.
Now, we can derive N ′(θ|θl, θu).
N ′(θ|θl, θu) = C
′(qu(θ|θu))q′u(θ|θu)− C ′(ql(θ|θl))q′l(θ|θl)
qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl)
− C(qu(θ|θu))− C(ql(θ|θl))
(qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl))2 (q
′
u(θ|θu)− q′l(θ|θl))
=
1
qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl)
{(
C ′(qu(θ|θu))− C(qu(θ|θu))− C(ql(θ|θl))
qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl)
)
q′u(θ|θu)
}
+
1
qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl)
{(
C(qu(θ|θu))− C(ql(θ|θl))
qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl) − C
′(ql(θ|θl))
)
q′l(θ|θl)
}
.
Since
q′u(θ|θu) =
1
C ′′(qu(θ|θu))
dEu(θ|θu)
dθ
=
(Eu(θ|θu)− θ)
C ′′(qu(θ|θu))
f(θ)
F (θu)− F (θ)
16
and
q′l(θ|θl) =
1
C ′′(ql(θ|θl))
dEl(θ|θl)
dθ
=
(θ − El(θ|θl))
C ′′(ql(θ|θl))
f(θ)
F (θ)− F (θl) ,
N ′(θ|θl, θu) =
1
qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl)
{
(Eu(θ|θu)−N(θ|θl, θu)) (Eu(θ|θu)− θ)
C ′′(qu(θ|θu))
f(θ)
F (θu)− F (θ)
}
16Since Eu =
∫ θu
θ
s [f(s)/(F (θu)− F (θ))] ds = [1/(F (θu)− F (θ))]
∫ θu
θ
sf(s)ds,
dEu
dθ
=
1
F (θu)− F (θ) (−θf(θ))+
f(θ)
{F (θu)− F (θ)}2
∫ θu
θ
sf(s)ds = (Eu−θ) f(θ)
F (θu)− F (θ) .
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+
1
qu(θ|θu)− ql(θ|θl)
{
(N(θ|θl, θu)− El(θ|θl)) (θ − El(θ|θl))
C ′′(ql(θ|θl))
f(θ)
F (θ)− F (θl)
}
.
The second step of proof is to establish that the Condition 2 implies the equation
(C.7). In fact, it is obvious. Substituting θ intoN(θ|θl, θu) and applying the Condition
2 complete the proof.
The next lemma states the possibility of uniqueness when three products are
provided: a lower, a middle and a higher.
Lemma B. 2. (Clue for Uniqueness when n = 3) Suppose that the Assumptions
1, 2 and 3 hold. For given θl and θu such that 0 ≤ θl < θu ≤ θ¯ and for θ1 and θ2 such
that θl ≤ θ1 < θ2 ≤ θu, let
N(θ1|θl, θ2) ≡ C(qm(θ1|θ2))− C(ql(θ1|θl))
qm(θ1|θ2)− ql(θ1|θl)
and
N(θ2|θ1, θu) ≡ C(qu(θ2|θ1))− C(qm(θ2|θ1))
qu(θ2|θu)− qm(θ2|θ1) .
Then, (θ1, θ2), satisfying both N(θ1|θl, θ2) = θ1 and N(θ2|θ1, θu) = θ2 simultaneously,
uniquely exists, if the Condition 1 holds.
Proof. (Existence) I define θ0 so that it satisfies N(θ0|θl, θu) = θ0. By the Lemma B.
1, θ0 is uniquely determined. In the same line, we know that θ1 is uniquely determined
by θl and θ2, just substituting θ2 into the position of θu in the Lemma B. 1. Then,
we can construct a function, θ1(θ2|θl). Similarly, we can make a function, θ2(θ1|θu).
By the construction of the functions, θ1(θ2 = θu|θl) = θ2(θ1 = θl|θu) = θ0. Obviously,
θ1(θ2 = θl|θl) = θl and θ2(θ1 = θu|θu) = θu. The above equations implies that the
function θ1(θ2|θl) starts from θl and finishes at θ0, while θ2(θ1|θu) travels from θ0 and
finishes at θu.
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Since N(θ1|θl, θ2) is continuous in θ2 as well as θ1 and N(θ2|θ1, θu) is continuous
in θ1 as well as θ2, θ1(θ2|θl) is continuous in θ2 and θ2(θ1|θu) is continuous in θ1.
The above conditions and the continuity guarantee the existence of (θ1, θ2), satisfying
N(θ1|θl, θ2) = θ1 and N(θ2|θ1, θu) = θ2. See the Figure 19. At the intersection of
θ1(θ2|θl) and θ2(θ1|θu), N(θ1|θl, θ2) = θ1 and N(θ2|θ1, θu) = θ2 simultaneously.
(Uniqueness) The question about uniqueness is about the number of intersections
of θ1(θ2|θl) and θ2(θ1|θu) in the Figure 19.
First of all, we check the sign of ∂N(θ1|θl, θ2)/∂θ2 and ∂N(θ2|θ1, θu)/∂θ1.
∂N(θ1|θl, θ2)
∂θ2
=
∂
∂θ2
{
C(qm(θ1|θ2))− C(ql(θ1|θl))
qm(θ1|θ2)− ql(θ1|θl)
}
=
1
qm(θ1|θ2)− ql(θ1|θl)
{
C ′(qm(θ1|θ2))− C(qm(θ1|θ2))− C(ql(θ1|θl))
qm(θ1|θ2)− ql(θ1|θl)
}
∂qm
∂θ2
=
(E(s|s ∈ [θ1, θ2)−N(θ1|θl, θ2))
qm(θ1|θ2)− ql(θ1|θl)
(θ2 − E(s|s ∈ [θ1, θ2)))
C ′′(qm(θ1|θ2))
f(θ2)
F (θ2)− F (θ1) > 0,
and
∂N(θ2|θ1, θu)
∂θ1
=
∂
∂θ1
{
C(qu(θ2|θu))− C(qm(θ2|θ1))
qu(θ2|θu)− qm(θ2|θ1)
}
=
1
qu(θ2|θu)− qm(θ2|θ1)
{
C(qu(θ2|θu))− C(qm(θ2|θ1))
qu(θ2|θu)− qm(θ2|θ1) − C
′(qm(θ2|θ1))
}
∂qm
∂θ1
=
(N(θ2|θ1, θu)− E(s|s ∈ [θ1, θ2))
qu(θ2|θu)− qm(θ2|θ1)
(E(s|s ∈ [θ1, θ2))− θ1)
C ′′(qm(θ2|θ1))
f(θ1)
F (θ2)− F (θ1) > 0.
Now, I will concentrate on θ1(θ2|θl). From the above result, we can check
∂N(θ1|θl, θ2)/∂θ2 > 0. That is, if θ2 < θ˜2, for given θ1, N(θ1|θl, θ2) < N(θ1|θl, θ˜2).
That is, N(θ1|θl, ·) will shift upward as θ2 increases. To understand how θ2 affects on
the determination of θ1, we adopt the analysis using linearization and limit. See the
Figure 20. First, the increase from θ2 to θ˜2 changes N(θ1|θl, θ2) to N(θ1|θl, θ˜2). Sec-
ond, we can find a new θ along N(θ1|θl, θ˜2). Denoting θ1 = θ1(θ2|θl) and θ˜1 = θ1(θ˜2|θl),
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we know
(C.8) N ′(θ1|θl, θ˜2)(θ˜1 − θ1) + (N(θ1|θl, θ˜2)−N(θ1|θl, θ2)) = θ˜1 − θ1.
The above equation (C.8) can be easily understood in the Figure 20; A + B should
equal to θ˜1−θ1. Rearranging both sides of the equation (C.8) and dividing by θ˜2−θ2,
N(θ1|θl, θ˜2)−N(θ1|θl, θ2)
θ˜2 − θ2
=
(
1−N ′(θ1|θl, θ˜2)
) θ˜1 − θ1
θ˜2 − θ2
.
Taking the limitation in both sides,
lim
θ˜2→θ2
N(θ1|θl, θ˜2)−N(θ1|θl, θ2)
θ˜2 − θ2
= lim
θ˜2→θ2
(
1−N ′(θ1|θl, θ˜2)
) θ˜1 − θ1
θ˜2 − θ2
⇔ ∂N(θ1|θl, θ2)
∂θ2
= (1−N ′(θ1|θl, θ2)) dθ1
dθ2
.
Thus, dθ1/dθ2 = [1/ (1−N ′(θ1|θl, θ2))] [∂N(θ1|θl, θ2)/∂θ2]. In the similar way, we can
get
dθ2
dθ1
=
1
(1−N ′(θ2|θ1, θu))
∂N(θ2|θ1, θu)
∂θ1
.
When θ1 = N(θ1|θl, θ2),
N ′(θ1|θl, θ2) + ∂N(θ1|θl, θ2)
∂θ2
=
1
qm(θ1|θ2)− ql(θ1|θl)
{
(E(s|s ∈ [θ1, θ2))− θ1)2
C ′′(qm(θ1|θ2))
f(θ1)
F (θ2)− F (θ1)
}
+
1
qm(θ1|θ2)− ql(θ1|θl)
{
(θ1 − El(θ1|θl))2
C ′′(ql(θ1|θl))
f(θ1)
F (θ1)− F (θl)
}
+
(E(s|s ∈ [θ1, θ2)− θ1)
qm(θ1|θ2)− ql(θ1|θl)
{
(θ2 − E(s|s ∈ [θ1, θ2)))
C ′′(qm(θ1|θ2))
f(θ2)
F (θ2)− F (θ1)
}
< 1 (by the Condition 1).
When θ2 = N(θ2|θ1, θu), by the Condition 1,
N ′(θ2|θ1, θu) + ∂N(θ2|θ1, θu)
∂θ1
< 1.
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Rearranging these inequalities, we get
1
(1−N ′(θ1|θl, θ2))
∂N(θ1|θl, θ2)
∂θ2
< 1 and
1
(1−N ′(θ2|θ1, θu))
∂N(θ2|θ1, θu)
∂θ1
< 1.
Therefore, whenever both θ1 = N(θ1|θl, θ2) and θ2 = N(θ2|θ1, θu) hold,
dθ1
dθ2
< 1 and
dθ2
dθ1
< 1.
See the Figure 19 again. The slope for θ2(·) is less than 1 and the slope for θ−11 (·)
is greater than 1 whenever two functions intersect. Then, the intersection should be
unique in the same logic appeared in the proof of Lemma B. 1.
The next lemma extends two previous lemmas in the situation where n products
are provided.
Lemma B. 3. (Clue for Uniqueness for general n) Suppose that the Assumptions
1, 2 and 3 hold. For given θl and θu such that 0 ≤ θl < θu ≤ θ¯ and for θ1, θ2, · · · , θn
such that θl = θ0 ≤ θ1 < · · · < θn ≤ θu = θn+1, let
N(θk|θk−1, θk+1) ≡ C(qk(θk|θk+1))− C(qk−1(θk|θk−1))
qk(θk|θk+1)− qk−1(θk|θk−1) ,
for all k = 1, 2, · · · , n. Then, (θ1, · · · , θn), satisfying N(θk|θk−1, θk+1) = θk for all k,
uniquely exists, if the Condition 2 holds.
Proof. I will use mathematical induction. The Lemma B. 1 proves this lemma when
n = 1. Suppose that (θ1, · · · , θk−1), satisfying the conditions listed in the Lemma B.
3, uniquely exists when n = k − 1.
Now, take an arbitrary θ so that θl < θ < θu, and denote it as θk. Then, we
can find a unique combination (θ1, · · · , θk−1) on the interval [θl, θk], by the induction
hypothesis. Especially, we get a uniquely determined θk−1 by θk. For θk to satisfy
the condition in the Lemma B. 3, θk should be also determined by θk−1 and given
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θu. Thanks to the Lemma B. 2, we know the combination (θk−1, θ), satisfying our
desirable conditions, is uniquely exists.
Finally, I can prove the Proposition B. 1.
Proof. (Proposition B. 1: Uniqueness of Maximizer in the Social Planner’s
Problem) For this proof, I will change the problem (P.S) into a problem whose
argument is θ, rather than q. To do so, I need to establish an one to one relationship
between θ and q. We already know that θ is uniquely determined if q is fixed.
Suppose that θ is given. Since C is strictly convex, C ′(q1) > (C(q1)−C(q0))/(q1−
q0) = C(q1)/q1. Then,
d(C(q1)/q1)
dq1
=
1
q21
(C ′(q1)q1 − C(q1)) > 0.
Because C(q1)/q1 is strictly increasing in q1, q1, satisfying θ1 = C(q1)/q1, is uniquely
determined when θ1 is given.
Now, assume that qk−1 is uniquely determined by given θ. From the strict
convexity of C, we know that C ′(qk) > (C(qk)− C(qk−1))/(qk − qk−1). Then, for the
uniquely determined qk−1,
∂ ((C(qk)− C(qk−1))/(qk − qk−1))
∂qk
=
1
(qk − qk−1)2 {C
′(qk)(qk − qk−1)− (C(qk)− C(qk−1))} > 0.
Thus, qk, satisfying θk = (C(qk) − C(qk−1))/(qk − qk−1), is also uniquely determined
by given θk.
By the constraint in (P.S) and the Proposition II.6, we know that the maximizer
q∗ = (q∗1, q
∗
2, · · · , q∗n) satisfies
(C.9) θ∗k =
C(q∗k)− C(q∗k−1)
q∗k − q∗k−1
and C ′(q∗k) = E
(
θ|θ ∈ [θ∗k, θ∗k+1)
)
.
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Instead of q∗, I will find θ∗ = (θ∗1, θ
∗
2, · · · , θ∗n) satisfying the above two equations. The
one to one relationship between θ and q, established above, guarantees finding θ∗ is
equivalent with finding q∗.
Now, I define the function S(θ) = (S1(θ), S2(θ), · · · , Sn(θ)) : Rn ⇒ Rn as
follows;
Sk(θ) =
C (C ′−1 (E (θ|θ ∈ [θk, θk+1))))− C (C ′−1 (E (θ|θ ∈ [θk−1, θk))))
C ′−1 (E (θ|θ ∈ [θk, θk+1)))− C ′−1 (E (θ|θ ∈ [θk−1, θk))) .
At the maximizer, θ∗k = Sk(θ
∗) for all k.
By the equation (C.9) and the Lemma B. 3,
Sk(θ) =
C(qk(θk|θk+1))− C(qk−1(θk|θk−1))
qk(θk|θk+1)− qk−1(θk|θk−1) = N(θk|θk−1, θk+1).
Remind the Lemma B. 3 for N(θk|θk−1, θk+1). Then, the Lemma B. 3 guarantees the
unique (θ∗2, · · · , θ∗n) in the interval [θ1, θ¯] for given θ1. Note that a series of previous
lemmas does not give us any clue for choice between q0 (buying nothing) and q1 (buy-
ing a minimum-quality good). Thus, we need to show θ∗1 is also uniquely determined.
In fact, it is obvious. Replacing ql as q0 = 0, the Lemmas B. 1 and 2 easily proves
that θ∗1 is uniquely determined.
Now, we have a unique θ∗. Then, the relationship established in this proof earlier
guarantees the unique q∗.
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APPENDIX D
DATA AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
The variables in this dissertation are divided in two categories. The first category
is variables for the cable service provider in each franchise. Mainly, each franchise is
city-level, and the cable service provider serves only in the franchise. Sometimes, the
provider may serve neighboring areas of the main franchise. My unit of observation is
a franchise. In most cases, each franchise has only one cable service provider. In the
case that multiple providers are operating, I choose only the biggest one. This case
only happens in the large cities, such as Houston, and the other provider’s market
shares are ignorable, comparing to the biggest’s. I gathered the data set from Tele-
vision & Cable Factbook 2012, published by Warren Communications News. Here, I
list all variables and their explanation which are gathered from WarrenCommunica-
tionsNews (2012).
mrnk the franchise’s TV market ranking
cpct the provider’s maximum channel capacity
2wyc whether the provider can offer 2-way capable service or not
mplt the provider’s installed total miles of plant
mplt c the provider’s installed miles of plant (coaxial)
mplt f the provider’s installed miles of plant (fiber optic)
V OD whether the provider offer VOD service or not
PPV whether the provider offer pay per view service or not
itnt whether the provider offer internet service or not
itnt s the number of households subscribing internet service
tlps the number of households subscribing telephone service
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tlps mo monthly fee for subscribing telephone service
bs nc number of channels, which basic service offers
bs air number of channels using off-air or microwave or translator, which basic service
offers
bs sat number of channels using satellite, which basic service offers
bs ins installation fee for basic service
bs mo monthly fee for basic service
bs s the number of subscribers of basic service
ebs nc number of channels, which expanded basic service offers
ebs ins installation fee for expanded basic service
ebs mo monthly fee for expanded basic service
ebs s the number of subscribers of expanded basic service
dbs nc number of channels, which digital basic service offers
dbs ins installation fee for digital basic service
dbs mo monthly fee for digital basic service
dbs s the number of subscribers of digital basic service
I have one more service provider related variable, which is not obtained from
WarrenCommunicationsNews (2012). It is about whether the provider is an MSO or
not, and its ranking. The data comes from National Cable & Telecommunications
Association.17
d rk MSO whether the provider is an MSO, which is ranked inside 25, or not
The second category of variables is about the demographic variables, which de-
scribes each franchise. The data has three different sources. The first and major
17For the source, visit http://www.ncta.com/Stats/TopMSOs.aspx.
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source is United States Census Bureau.18 I find some additional variables, like city-
level poverty ratio, in City-Data.com.19 Last, for driving distances from the nearest
large city, I consult with Google map service.20 To define “large,” I use the Metropoli-
tan Statistical Area, which is defined United States Census Bureau. These are demo-
graphic variables at franchise-level.
dist 5M driving distance to the nearest MSA with population over 5M
dist 1M driving distance to the nearest MSA with population over 1M
dist 0.5M driving distance to the nearest MSA with population over 0.5M
pop 2009 the franchise’s population in 2009
pop crt the franchise’s population-increase rate from 2000
rt pop fm the franchise’s ratio of female population
rt pop w the franchise’s ratio of white population
rt pop h the franchise’s ratio of Hispanic population
rt pop b the franchise’s ratio of black population
den pop the franchise’s population density (per square mile)
age the franchise’s median resident age
inc 2009 the franchise’s median household income in 2009
inc 2000 the franchise’s median household income in 2000
inc pc the franchise’s income per capita
rt pov the franchise’s ratio of population in poverty in 2009
rt inc x y the franchise’s ratio of households whose income is greater than xk and
less than yk
18For the source, visit http://www.census.gov.
19For the source, visit http://www.city-data.com.
20I obtain and construct the data, using the “Get directions” tap at
maps.google.com.
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rt inc z the franchise’s ratio of households whose income is greater than zk
ar land the franchise’s land area (square mile)
av h sz the franchise’s average household size (number of people)
lv cst the franchise’s cost of living index in 2011 (US: 100)
All above variables are used in the estimation processes, in themselves or by some
operations.
Unfortunately, WarrenCommunicationsNews (2012) does not offer the perfect set
of data. I recover some missing variables for the cable service providers. I use the
other related variables, whenever they are available. For example, when bs s, the
number of subscribers of basic service, is missing, I use the variables, like pop 2009,
rt pop h, av h sz, inc 2009, rt inc 0 10, d rk mso, mplt, d tlps, bs nc, bs mo, ebs s,
and dbs s, to restore bs s.
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APPENDIX E
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Increasing Speed of Profit (or Social Welfare)
mean st. dev.
n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 10
profit SW profit SW profit SW profit SW
1 1 0.8310 0.8454 0.9303 0.9369 0.9620 0.9657 0.9952 0.9957
2 1 0.8593 0.8861 0.9433 0.9557 0.9694 0.9764 0.9963 0.9972
2.5 1 0.8737 0.9067 0.9501 0.9649 0.9734 0.9816 0.9969 0.9979
3 1 0.8884 0.9266 0.9569 0.9735 0.9773 0.9864 0.9974 0.9985
4 1 0.9182 0.9600 0.9700 0.9866 0.9846 0.9933 0.9983 0.9993
2.5 0.5 0.9182 0.9623 0.9676 0.9862 0.9825 0.9928 0.9979 0.9991
2.5 1 0.8737 0.9067 0.9501 0.9649 0.9734 0.9816 0.9969 0.9979
2.5 2 0.8722 0.8873 0.9529 0.9590 0.9758 0.9790 0.9973 0.9977
2.5 5 0.8855 0.8882 0.9587 0.9597 0.9789 0.9795 0.9977 0.9977
2.5 10 0.8880 0.8887 0.9597 0.9600 0.9794 0.9796 0.9977 0.9978
The above st. dev. is the standard deviation for normal distribution before truncation.
I normalize the profit and the social welfare when n = 100 as 1.
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Table 2. Optimal Quality Level with Truncated Normal Consumer Types Distribution
mean θ σ1 σ2 θ
∗
3 θ
m
3 q
∗
3 q
m
3
1 2 1.0000 1.7089 1.4047 1.6731 1.6819 1.6731
1 2 0.2000 1.0000 1.1238 1.1369 1.2459 1.1369
1 5 1.0000 0.9182 2.1501 2.5641 2.6459 2.5641
1 5 1.5870 1.0000 2.8857 3.5366 3.5658 3.5366
1 8 1.0000 0.9173 2.1513 2.5631 2.6476 2.5630
1 8 2.5685 1.0000 4.4136 5.4562 5.4944 5.4562
σ1 and σ2 are the standard deviation before and after truncation, respectively.
θ∗ and q∗ are the choice by the social planners and θm and qm by the monopolist.
Fig. 1. Quality Provided to Each Taste Type
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Table 3. Two-way Quality Distortion
σ θ∗3 θ
m
3 q
∗
3 q
m
3 Social Welfare Profit
0.5 1.4291 1.6212 1.7064 1.6211 0.6232 0.2940
1 2.1501 2.5630 2.6459 2.5630 1.1041 0.4832
1.5 2.8054 3.4286 3.4690 3.4286 1.8143 0.7880
2 3.1453 3.8645 3.8652 3.8644 2.4661 1.1016
2.01 3.1497 3.8697 3.8701 3.8697 2.4772 1.1072
2.02 3.1540 3.8747 3.8749 3.8747 2.4882 1.1129
2.03 3.1583 3.8797 3.8796 3.8797 2.4991 1.1185
2.04 3.1625 3.8847 3.8842 3.8847 2.5099 1.1240
2.05 3.1668 3.8895 3.8888 3.8895 2.5207 1.1296
2.1 3.1866 3.9123 3.9105 3.9123 2.5733 1.1568
2.5 3.3039 4.0403 4.0343 4.0403 2.9257 1.3457
3 3.3879 4.1246 4.1182 4.1245 3.2300 1.5178
5 3.5066 4.2325 4.2292 4.2325 3.7490 1.8295
10 3.5554 4.2728 4.2720 4.2728 3.9958 1.9854
20 3.5674 4.2825 4.2823 4.2825 4.0600 2.0268
50 3.5708 4.2851 4.2852 4.2851 4.0782 2.0386
100 3.5712 4.2855 4.2856 4.2855 4.0808 2.0403
uniform 3.5714 4.2857 4.2857 4.2857 4.0816 2.0408
σ is the standard deviation before truncation.
θ∗ and q∗ are the choice by the social planners and θm and qm by the monopolist.
141
Table 4. Summary of Cable Data
variable unit min max mean median st. dev.
mplt mile 7 29791 477.0391 70 536.382
d itnt dummy 0 1 0.774194 1 0.419643
d tlps dummy 0 1 0.387097 0 0.503308
d rk MSO dummy 0 1 0.471774 0 0.504349
bs ins dollar 10 55 37.10039 38 9.967326
ebs ins dollar 10 68.34 37.70283 38 10.98089
dbs ins dollar 10 68.34 38.15913 38 11.0266
bs nc channel 6 72 22.34274 17 13.44649
bs air channel 3 19 9.758065 9 3.854671
bs mo dollar 4.95 61.95 21.78021 19.95 11.56839
bs s people 64 790000 17651.94 1839 51168.8
ebs nc channel 5 62 34.81463 38 13.43525
ebs mo dollar 4.57 49.99 25.74219 23.325 11.05807
ebs s people 43 526208 19813.39 1942 40791.92
dbs nc channel 7 148 41.28796 32 31.82128
dbs mo dollar 3.99 54.99 17.85573 13.95 16.77435
dbs s people 9 480000 33966.13 5012 25093.67
st. dev. is the standard deviation.
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Table 5. Summary of Demographic Data
variable unit min max mean median st. dev.
dist 5M mile 0 638 169.1653 134 109.4857
dist 1M mile 0 552 138.2177 107 100.8309
dist 0.5M mile 0 457 127.0444 103 88.27156
pop 2009 people 266 2257926 46088.65 5562.5 115728.6
pop crt percent -22.3 126.6 6.366524 3.7 12.52698
rt pop fm percent 39.5 61.1 52.04556 52.2 2.155879
rt pop w percent 3.9 97.5 56.97056 57.75 18.75092
rt pop h percent 0.4 96.2 30.87218 24.85 19.29593
rt pop b percent 0 51.9 9.549194 4.8 12.85585
den pop people/sq. mile 49 6792 1301.484 1221 654.674
age year 24.4 45.9 35.21895 34.95 3.388071
inc 2009 dollar 16161 139007 38825.43 37214.5 9526.69
inc 2000 dollar 15400 92778 31235.65 29493.5 7241.295
inc pc dollar 9225 64712 19219.22 18199.5 4059.255
rt pov percent 1.4 45 19.83105 19.45 8.739056
rt inc 0 10 percent 0 34.5 11.50806 10.9 6.134368
rt inc 200 percent 0 38 1.59879 1.2 1.23711
ar land sq. mile 0.55 579.4 22.12012 4.925 48.94505
av h sz people 2.2 3.7 2.613306 2.6 0.170542
lv cst − 76.1 103.4 82.38185 80.4 4.968363
st. dev. is the standard deviation.
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Table 6. Summary of Simulated Parameters
Case 1: Taking # as a quality, 248 observations.
parameter min max mean median st. dev.
m(mean) -0.8720859 3.597811 1.745755 1.753276 0.6279741
σ(st. dev.) 0.0627664 10.11214 1.301668 1.202148 0.9449456
θ¯(upper bound) 0.1655705 5.285252 1.698061 1.222921 1.149143
M(t. subs.) 81.14688 1874962.5 50041.64 6841.152 199500.1
a 0.0004494 0.078143 0.0139462 0.0070602 0.01466
Case 2: Taking
√
# as a quality, 209 meaningful observations.
parameter min max mean median st. dev.
m(mean) -197.845 47.50065 -1.53716 1.162821 19.8733
σ(st. dev.) 0.633634 359.358 7.060615 1.498823 30.71782
θ¯(upper bound) 2.604025 11.80095 5.107607 4.401373 2.025908
M(t. subs.) 117.4732 2314081 63155.07 8919.308 254496.2
a 0.033127 0.884143 0.132846 0.074576 0.160553
# is the number of channels.
st. dev. is the standard deviation.
t. subs. is the total number of potential subscribers.
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Table 7. Welfare Loss in Notable Franchises Displaying Upward Quality Distortion
franchise t. subs. prof cs/m sw/m sw/sb wl/a wl/p
AMARILLO 234809 654817 404894 1059711 2108417 1048705 49.7
SAN ANGELO 131319 296858 318643 615501 957492 341991 35.7
CONROE 99208 263821 254159 517980 1098787 580806 52.9
GEORGETOWN 78448 55490 489743 545233 574605 29372 5.1
GREENVILLE 62250 103804 38784 142587 760347 617760 81.2
HUNTSVILLE 49082 318740 355404 674144 911207 237063 26.0
MINEOLA 35112 25060 6049 31109 322481 291372 90.4
MT. PLEASANT 24302 55920 21620 77541 234336 156795 66.9
ANDREWS 21422 47475 68720 116194 212156 95962 45.2
CRYSTAL CITY 16840 157922 102828 260750 261992 1242 0.5
PLEASANTON 13665 7851 19893 27745 121274 93529 77.1
NAVASOTA 11695 5271 760 6031 84596 78565 92.9
DALHART 10916 40915 45793 86708 113367 26659 23.5
COLUMBUS 6540 3271 3439 6709 87386 80677 92.3
GILMER 6355 6376 1130 7506 39836 32330 81.2
WHITESBORO 5733 12060 15195 27256 33492 6236 18.6
MT. VERNON 4393 10163 3940 14103 42173 28071 66.6
SABINAL 3443 4316 3425 7741 28946 21205 73.3
GANADO 2109 13786 6853 20639 44839 24200 54.0
TUSCOLA 1199 1412 513 1926 6820 4895 71.8
ROSCOE 1008 1801 528 2328 8726 6398 73.3
TEXHOMA 902 4409 4228 8637 10640 2003 18.8
COOPER 516 923 1021 1945 5157 3212 62.3
t. subs. is the total number of potential subscribers. (unit: people)
prof is the profit of the monopoly. (unit: dollar)
cs/m is the consumer surplus in the monopoly. (unit: dollar)
sw/m is the social welfare in the monopoly. (unit: dollar)
sw/sb is the social welfare at the social best. (unit: dollar)
wl/a is the amount of welfare loss induced by the upward distortion. (unit: dollar)
wl/p is the percent of welfare loss. (unit: percent)
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Table 8. Estimated Coefficients for Consumer Type Distribution (Parameters)
mean st. dev. upper bound t. subs.
ar land
−0.061428 0.089675 −0.0177109∗∗ 814.2932∗∗∗
(0.0691736) (0.10513) (0.0074001) (263.8655)
dist 5m
0.0401105∗ −0.0595175∗ −0.0024297 194.9267∗∗
(0.0240105) (0.0365456) (0.0026045) (91.72563)
dist 05m
−0.0623385∗∗∗ 0.0760575∗ 0.0046534∗ −250.7468∗∗
(0.0261046) (0.0396737) (0.0028139) (99.57697)
pop 2009
0.000022 −0.0000299 4.96e-06∗∗ 0.9809839∗∗∗
(0.0000211) (0.0000321) (2.26e-06) (0.0805236)
den pop
0.0000791 0.0011224 0.000222 11.3361
(0.0024471) (0.0037192) (0.0002652) (9.334743)
rt pop fm
−0.6564762 1.079083 −0.0537857 1619.52
(0.6335078) (0.9628052) (0.0686615) (2416.542)
rt pop h
−0.1955067∗ 0.3341066∗ −0.0019423 217.6518
(0.1175894) (0.1787123) (0.0127642) (448.5496)
av h sz
9.674475 −12.78075 −0.5232359 −52702.32
(8.902405) (13.52988) (0.9656676) (33958.6)
lv cst
−0.1345113 −0.0667913 −0.0337358 688.1137
(0.3791828) (0.5762821) (0.0410905) (1446.409)
ln inc
−6.348325 6.33373 −1.477376 −7837.052
(10.72374) (16.29795) (1.15925) (40906.18)
rt inc 0 10
−0.5023324 0.8816102 −0.0697276∗ −16.12913
(0.3612038) (0.5489576) (0.038888) (1377.827)
rt inc 75 100
−0.0152204 −0.3410856 0.1023775∗∗ 1729.897
(0.4610764) (0.700744) (0.0495067) (1758.796)
rt inc 100
−1.220839∗∗∗ 2.285005∗∗∗ 0.0002127 −144.6192
(0.4690323) (0.7128354) (0.0509159) (1789.144)
rt inc 150
2.2565∗∗ −3.287437∗∗ 0.0041301 −2050.069
(1.050953) (1.597238) (0.1140859) (4008.903)
rt inc 200
−0.933054 0.704138 −0.0106244 980.4974
(1.168443) (1.775799) (0.1268381) (4457.074)
θ¯
−3.921158∗∗∗ 6.680463∗∗∗
N/A
−1562.127
(0.6630877) (1.007761) (2529.376)
cons
125.2684 −143.8579 27.19189∗∗ 58741.39
(122.0835) (185.5426) (13.10746) (465692.8)
# of obs 209 209 209 209
R2 0.2220 0.2479 0.1132 0.9310
st. dev. is the standard deviation.
t. subs. is the total number of potential subscribers.
The numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations.
∗ means the estimate is significant at 90% level.
∗∗ means the estimate is significant at 95% level.
∗∗ means the estimate is significant at 99% level.
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Table 9. Estimated Coefficients for Consumer Type Distribution (Cutoff Levels)
cutoff(40) cutoff(50) cutoff(75) cutoff(90) cutoff(95) cutoff(98)
ar land
−0.0062051∗ −0.0070875∗ −0.0096826∗ −0.0119493∗ −0.0132506∗∗ −0.0147127∗∗
(0.0036684) (0.0041229) (0.0054662) (0.0062733) (0.0065043) (0.0066629)
dist 5m
−0.0010207 −0.0013201 −0.0020148 −0.0023315 −0.0023849 −0.0023871
(0.0012911) (0.001451) (0.0019238) (0.0022079) (0.0022892) (0.002345)
dist 05m
0.0006033 0.0010711 0.0023193 0.0031888 0.0035612 0.0038959
(0.0013949) (0.0015677) (0.0020785) (0.0023854) (0.0024733) (0.0025336)
pop 2009
2.47e-06∗∗ 2.66e-06∗∗ 3.19e-06∗ 3.65e-06∗ 3.94e-06∗∗ 4.29e-06∗∗
(1.12e-06) (1.26e-06) (1.67e-06) (1.92e-06) (1.99e-06) (2.04e-06)
den pop
0.0001201 0.000146 0.0001981 0.0002118 0.0002067 0.0001976
(0.0001314) (0.0001477) (0.0001959) (0.0002248) (0.0002331) (0.0002388)
rt pop fm
−0.02832 −0.0349469 −0.0511756 −0.0584545 −0.058431 −0.0563347
(0.0340368) (0.0382537) (0.0507175) (0.0582063) (0.0603494) (0.0618211)
rt pop h
0.0036145 0.0038458 0.0038877 0.0029601 0.0020158 0.0007267
(0.0063274) (0.0071114) (0.0094284) (0.0108205) (0.011219) (0.0114925)
av h sz
−0.0444236 −0.1617713 −0.4589145 −0.6224744 −0.6542898 −0.6364215
(0.4786997) (0.5380075) (0.7133003) (0.8186243) (0.8487659) (0.8694631)
lv cst
−0.017315 −0.0190863 −0.0236407 −0.0259327 −0.0265761 −0.0275667
(0.0203694) (0.022893) (0.030352) (0.0348336) (0.0361162) (0.0369969)
ln inc
−0.664002 −0.7723282 −1.098729 −1.345654 −1.438825 −1.486918
(0.5746622) (0.6458591) (0.856292) (0.9827298) (1.018914) (1.04376)
rt inc 0 10
−0.0131248 −0.0163315 −0.0265535 −0.0366553 −0.0428154 −0.0495845
(0.0192775) (0.0216659) (0.028725) (0.0329665) (0.0341803) (0.0350138)
rt inc 75 100
−0.0018222 0.0092358 0.0430825 0.0703774∗ 0.0826093∗ 0.0923878∗∗
(0.0245414) (0.027582) (0.0365687) (0.0419683) (0.0435136) (0.0445746)
rt inc 100
0.0100366 0.009513 0.0070302 0.0038016 0.0017688 −0.0002248
(0.02524) (0.028367) (0.0376095) (0.0431628) (0.0447521) (0.0458434)
rt inc 150
0.0546479 0.0570987 0.0619516 0.0598377 0.0541828 0.0436754
(0.0565545) (0.0635613) (0.0842707) (0.0967139) (0.1002749) (0.1027201)
rt inc 200
−0.073196 −0.0761099 −0.0778222 −0.0683849 −0.0580565 −0.0440597
(0.0628761) (0.070666) (0.0936903) (0.1075244) (0.1114834) (0.1142019)
cons
11.47385∗ 13.65469∗ 19.79582∗∗ 24.0788∗∗ 25.6045∗∗ 26.458∗∗
(6.497615) (7.302627) (9.681959) (11.11157) (11.5207) (11.80163)
# of obs 209 209 209 209 209 209
R2 0.0816 0.0723 0.0666 0.0763 0.0855 0.0968
The cutoff(p) is the taste level such that F (cutoff(p)) = n× 0.01.
The numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations.
∗ means the estimate is significant at 90% level.
∗∗ means the estimate is significant at 95% level.
∗∗ means the estimate is significant at 99% level.
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Table 10. Estimated Coefficients for Consumer Type Distribution (Probability)
prob(0.5) prob(1) prob(2) prob(3) prob(4) prob(5)
ar land
0.0001296 0.0004229 0.0012358∗ 0.0019291∗∗ 0.0030163∗ 0.0039632
(0.000165) (0.0003441) (0.0006663) (0.0008031) (0.001765) (0.0047912)
dist 5m
0.0000357 0.0000638 0.0001027 0.0001794 0.0002558 0.0008166
(0.0000581) (0.0001211) (0.0002345) (0.0002941) (0.0004484) (0.0008168)
dist 05m
-9.87e-06 −0.0000134 −0.0000354 −0.0000428 −0.0001742 −0.0007946
(0.0000627) (0.0001308) (0.0002534) (0.0003128) (0.0004526) (0.0007836)
pop 2009
-5.18e-08 -1.55e-07 −4.39e-07∗∗ −6.81e-07∗∗∗ −9.09e-07∗ -1.03e-06
(5.05e-08) (1.05e-07) (2.04e-07) (2.45e-07) (4.81e-07) (1.20e-06)
den pop
-8.27e-06 −0.0000162 −0.0000264 −0.0000145 −0.0000422 −0.0000504
(5.91e-06) (0.0000123) (0.0000239) (0.0000289) (0.0000455) (0.000071)
rt pop fm
0.002221 0.004291 0.0069087 0.0076436 0.010589 −0.0051362
(0.0015311) (0.0031928) (0.0061821) (0.0074656) (0.0104373) (0.0168942)
rt pop h
−0.0001312 −0.0001455 0.0000574 −0.000934 −0.0022753 −0.0020757
(0.0002846) (0.0005935) (0.0011493) (0.0014336) (0.0018436) (0.0031476)
av h sz
−0.0066205 −0.0177804 −0.0406902 −0.006503 0.0513013 −0.1105867
(0.0215333) (0.044904) (0.0869462) (0.1069106) (0.1512391) (0.2550867)
lv cst
0.0001801 0.001041 0.0035614 0.0056418 −0.0010323 −0.000459
(0.0009163) (0.0019107) (0.0036997) (0.0044767) (0.006531) (0.0122953)
ln inc
−0.0022486 0.0103596 0.0647001 0.1060982 0.31667∗∗ 0.3195182
(0.0258499) (0.0539056) (0.1043758) (0.1263626) (0.1573806) (0.2754897)
rt inc 0 10
0.0001542 0.0008093 0.0026155 0.0035704 0.0027503 −0.0077056
(0.0008672) (0.0018083) (0.0035014) (0.0042565) (0.0053529) (0.0104966)
rt inc 75 100
0.0018734∗ 0.0027312 0.0017632 −0.0003045 −0.0051271 0.0045993
(0.0011039) (0.0023021) (0.0044575) (0.0053798) (0.0067029) (0.0111709)
rt inc 100
0.0000865 5.61e-07 −0.0007157 −0.0012292 −0.0062162 −0.0050359
(0.0011354) (0.0023676) (0.0045843) (0.0055383) (0.0079187) (0.0125896)
rt inc 150
−0.0023329 −0.0047189 −0.0091287 −0.0164212 −0.010637 −0.0206197
(0.002544) (0.005305) (0.010272) (0.0125309) (0.0162417) (0.0239152)
rt inc 200
0.0038712 0.0077388 0.0144221 0.0215024 0.0093025 −0.0513939
(0.0028283) (0.005898) (0.0114202) (0.013911) (0.0251788) (0.0537044)
cons
0.0321673 −0.1105275 −0.6714479 −1.16472 −2.903509 −1.682281
(0.2922809) (0.6095027) (1.180161) (1.42774) (1.81518) (3.200077)
# of obs 209 209 209 204 129 64
R2 0.0756 0.0682 0.0693 0.0931 0.1522 0.2359
The prob(θ) is the probability, F (θ).
The numbers in the parentheses are the standard deviations.
∗ means the estimate is significant at 90% level.
∗∗ means the estimate is significant at 95% level.
∗∗ means the estimate is significant at 99% level.
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Table 11. Number of Subscribers of Top 10 MSOs in 2008
Rank MSO Subscribers
1 Comcast Corporation 24,182,000
2 Time Warner Cable, Inc. 13,069,000
3 Cox Communications, Inc. 5,328,304
4 Charter Communications, Inc. 5,045,700
5 Cablevision Systems Corporation 3,108,000
6 Bright House Networks LLC 2,307,778
7 Mediacom Communications Corporation 1,318,000
8 Suddenlink Communications 1,268,674
9 Insight Communications Company, Inc. 707,600
10 CableOne, Inc. 669,469
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Fig. 2. Diminishing Increment of Profit or Social Welfare in n
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Fig. 3. Diminishing Increment of Profit in n
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Fig. 4. Classification of Consumer Distributions
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Fig. 5. Degree of Quality Distortion on Top and Center of Distribution
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Fig. 6. Degree of Quality Distortion on Top and Degree of Concentration
0 5 10 15 20
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
<−concentrated              sigma              dispersed−>
de
gr
ee
 o
f q
ua
lity
 d
ist
or
tio
n
left−centered distribution
 
 
m = 0.5
m = 1
m = 1.5
0 5 10 15 20
0.935
0.945
0.955
0.965
0.975
0.985
0.995
<−concentrated              sigma              dispersed−>
de
gr
ee
 o
f q
ua
lity
 d
ist
or
tio
n
intermediate and right−centered distribution
 
 
m = 2
m = 2.5
m = 3.5
m = 4.5
154
Fig. 7. Density of Types and Standard Deviation
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Fig. 8. Offered Quality and Thickness of Right Side Tail
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Fig. 9. Excluded Consumers: Differently Centered
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Fig. 10. Excluded Consumers: Differently Concentrated
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Fig. 11. Information Rents: Differently Centered
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Fig. 12. Information Rents: Differently Concentrated
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Fig. 13. Profit and Consumer Surplus in the Monopoly
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Fig. 14. Social Welfare in the Monopoly and Social Welfare at the Social Best
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Fig. 15. The Efficiency Score Achieved by the Monopolist
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Fig. 16. The Shift or Rotation of Demand Curves in Dallas
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Fig. 17. The Shift or Rotation of Demand Curves in Georgetown
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Fig. 18. θs Satisfying ∂K(θ|θk−1)/∂θ = 0
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Fig. 19. θ1(θ2|θl) and θ2(θ1|θu)
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Fig. 20. Newly Determined θ1 as θ2 Increases
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